upstream/oracle/userland-gate: comparison components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11

equal deleted inserted replaced

-:65a016eaa866
+:227137d9fbce
+/*
+* Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+*/
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
+* This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+* use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+*
+* This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+* Afchine Madjlessi.
+*/
+/*
+* ====================================================================
+* Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+*
+* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+* are met:
+*
+* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+*
+* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+*    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+*    distribution.
+*
+* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+*    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+*    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+*    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+*
+* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+*    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+*    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+*    [email protected].
+*
+* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+*    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+*    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+*
+* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+*    acknowledgment:
+*    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+*    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+*
+* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+* ====================================================================
+*
+* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+* ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+* Hudson ([email protected]).
+*
+*/
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "hw_pk11.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+/*
+* During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
+* token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
+*/
+char *passphrasedialog;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+/* DSA stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+	DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+	DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+#endif
+/* DH stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
+#endif
+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
+	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+static int pk11_pkey_meth_nids[] = {NID_dsa};
+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
+#else
+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
+#endif
+/*
+* Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
+* object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
+* locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
+* so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
+* all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
+* session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
+* 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
+* See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
+*/
+#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
+	{								\
+	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
+		{							\
+		var = CK_TRUE;						\
+		if (unlock)						\
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
+		goto label;						\
+		}							\
+	}
+/*
+* Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
+* entry otherwise return NULL.
+*
+* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+* held.
+*/
+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
+		if (entry->h == h)
+			return (entry);
+	return (NULL);
+	}
+/*
+* Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
+* search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
+* failure.
+*
+* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+* held.
+*/
+int
+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+	/* search for entry in the active list */
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
+		entry->refcnt++;
+	else
+		{
+		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
+		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
+		if (entry == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		entry->h = h;
+		entry->refcnt = 1;
+		entry->prev = NULL;
+		entry->next = NULL;
+		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
+		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+		else /* make the entry first in the list */
+			{
+			entry->next = active_list[type];
+			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+			}
+		}
+	return (entry->refcnt);
+	}
+/*
+* Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
+*
+* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+* held.
+*/
+void
+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *prev_entry;
+	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
+	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+		{
+		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		active_list[type] = entry->next;
+		/* we were the first but not the only one */
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = NULL;
+		}
+	/* sanitization */
+	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	entry->prev = NULL;
+	entry->next = NULL;
+	OPENSSL_free(entry);
+	}
+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
+void
+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
+	switch (type)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			break;
+		default:
+			return;
+		}
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	}
+/*
+* Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
+* decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
+*
+* Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
+* return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
+*
+* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+* held.
+*/
+int
+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
+	entry->refcnt--;
+	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+		{
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+		return (1);
+		}
+	return (0);
+	}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 RSA method",
+	pk11_RSA_public_encrypt,		/* rsa_pub_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_public_decrypt,		/* rsa_pub_decrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_encrypt,		/* rsa_priv_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_decrypt,		/* rsa_priv_decrypt */
+	NULL,					/* rsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL,					/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_RSA_init,				/* init */
+	pk11_RSA_finish,			/* finish */
+	RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER,			/* flags */
+	NULL,					/* app_data */
+	pk11_RSA_sign,				/* rsa_sign */
+	pk11_RSA_verify,			/* rsa_verify */
+	/* Internal rsa_keygen will be used if this is NULL. */
+	NULL					/* rsa_keygen */
+	};
+RSA_METHOD *
+PK11_RSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_rsa);
+	}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DSA method",
+	pk11_dsa_do_sign, 	/* dsa_do_sign */
+	NULL, 			/* dsa_sign_setup */
+	pk11_dsa_do_verify, 	/* dsa_do_verify */
+	NULL,			/* dsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL, 			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DSA_init, 		/* init */
+	pk11_DSA_finish, 	/* finish */
+	0, 			/* flags */
+	NULL 			/* app_data */
+	};
+DSA_METHOD *
+PK11_DSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dsa);
+	}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+* PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
+* output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
+* should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
+* rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
+* enough.
+*/
+#define	DH_BUF_RESERVE	8
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DH method",
+	pk11_DH_generate_key,	/* generate_key */
+	pk11_DH_compute_key,	/* compute_key */
+	NULL,			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DH_init,		/* init */
+	pk11_DH_finish,		/* finish */
+	0,			/* flags */
+	NULL,			/* app_data */
+	NULL			/* generate_params */
+	};
+DH_METHOD *
+PK11_DH(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dh);
+	}
+#endif
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
+#define	DSA_DATA_LEN		20
+#define	DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN	40
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+* Similar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
+* support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
+* support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
+* The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+/*
+* Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
+* should be caught in the padding functions
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+	BN_init(&f);
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* make data into a big number */
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
+	 */
+	for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
+		if (buf[j] != 0)
+			break;
+	p = buf + j;
+	j = r - j;  /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+	BN_init(&f);
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's here
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
+		if (buf[i] != 0)
+			break;
+	p = buf + i;
+	i = r - i;  /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+/*
+* This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
+* C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_encrypted;
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+/*
+* This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
+* C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
+			    rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = ul_sig_len;
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+/*
+* This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
+* C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
+* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+/*
+* This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
+* and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
+			p_mech, h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
+	 * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
+	 */
+	rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+	return (1);
+	}
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
+	 * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+	return (1);
+	}
+/*
+* Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
+* rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
+* See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
+*/
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long ulsiglen;
+	/* Encode the digest */
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ulsiglen = j;
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
+			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
+		*siglen = ulsiglen;
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+err:
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	/* Encode the digest	*/
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
+			(CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+err:
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#define	MAXATTR	1024
+/*
+* Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+* PKCS#11 token.
+*/
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *privkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	const char *file;
+	int ret;
+	pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+	/* We look for private keys only. */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
+	 * never ask for private components.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	/*
+	 * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
+	 * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
+	 * the 'privkey_id' parameter.
+	 */
+	ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto err;
+	/* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
+	if (ret == 1)
+		{
+		if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		/*
+		 * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+		 * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
+		 * is done.
+		 */
+		pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+		/*
+		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
+		 * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
+		 * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
+		 * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
+		 * many times. We do not check the return value because even in
+		 * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
+		 * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+			    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
+		 * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+		/*
+		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
+		 * care of handle management ourselves.
+		 */
+		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+		/*
+		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+		/*
+		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
+		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
+		 * in the keystore.
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+			{
+			pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			(void) fclose(privkey);
+			if (pkey != NULL)
+				{
+				rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+				if (rsa != NULL)
+					{
+					(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
+					    rsa);
+					h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+					    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+					if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+						goto err;
+					}
+				else
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *pubkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
+	int ret;
+	const char *file;
+	pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto err;
+	if (ret == 1)
+		{
+		if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+		/*
+		 * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+		 * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
+		 */
+		pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+		/*
+		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
+		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+			    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+		/*
+		 * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		/*
+		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
+		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
+		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
+		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
+		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
+		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
+		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
+		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
+		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
+		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
+		 */
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+			{
+			pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			(void) fclose(pubkey);
+			if (pkey != NULL)
+				{
+				rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+				if (rsa != NULL)
+					{
+					/*
+					 * This will always destroy the RSA
+					 * object since we have a new RSA
+					 * structure here.
+					 */
+					(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
+					    rsa);
+					h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+					    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+					if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+						{
+						EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+						pkey = NULL;
+						}
+					}
+				else
+					{
+					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+					pkey = NULL;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+/*
+* Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
+* PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
+* the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
+* session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
+*
+* We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
+* opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
+*/
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+	int i;
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
+	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
+	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+/*
+* Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
+* components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
+* are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
+* NULL here.
+*/
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	/*
+	 * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		};
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	/*
+	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
+	 * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
+	 * use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d == NULL)
+		{
+		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+		/*
+		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
+		 * session keys.
+		 */
+		a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
+		 * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
+		 * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
+		 * types we just create a new session key using the private
+		 * components from the RSA structure.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	/*
+	 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
+	 * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
+	 * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
+	 * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
+	 * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
+	 * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
+	 * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d != NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
+	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
+	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+/*
+* Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+* meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+* cache miss.
+*/
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
+	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 *
+	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
+	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
+	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
+	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
+	 * both data signing and verifying.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+		{
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			return (1);
+		else
+			/*
+			 * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
+			 * structure with potentially existing private key
+			 * object. We can just create a public object and move
+			 * on with this session structure.
+			 */
+			return (0);
+		}
+	/*
+	 * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+	 * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+	 */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+/*
+* Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+* meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+* cache miss.
+*/
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
+	 * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
+	 * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
+	 * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
+	 * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
+	 * about why we compare the handle as well.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+		{
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			return (1);
+		else
+			/*
+			 * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
+			 * structure with potentially existing public key
+			 * object. We can just create a private object and move
+			 * on with this session structure.
+			 */
+			return (0);
+		}
+	/*
+	 * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+	 * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+	 */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* The DSA function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+static DSA_SIG *
+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+	int i;
+	DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	/*
+	 * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
+	 * each is 20 bytes long
+	 */
+	unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+			(void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
+			rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			    (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
+			    (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	dsa_sig->r = r;
+	dsa_sig->s = s;
+ret:
+	if (dsa_sig == NULL)
+		{
+		if (r != NULL)
+			BN_free(r);
+		if (s != NULL)
+			BN_free(s);
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (dsa_sig);
+	}
+static int
+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
+	DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int retval = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+	unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		/*
+		 * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
+		 * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
+		 * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
+		 */
+		(void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
+		    BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+	retval = 1;
+ret:
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+/*
+* Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
+* The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
+*/
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* pub_key - y */
+		};
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+/*
+* Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
+* The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
+*/
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	/*
+	 * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* priv_key - x */
+		};
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+/*
+* Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+* in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+*/
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+/*
+* Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+* in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+*/
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* The DH function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+/*
+* Generate DH key-pair.
+*
+* Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
+* and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
+* if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
+* is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
+* for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+*/
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG i;
+	CK_RV rv, rv1;
+	int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
+		};
+	CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+	pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
+		 * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
+		 * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
+		 */
+		pub_key_template[1].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+	pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		pub_key_template[2].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+	/*
+	 * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
+	 *	 a session handle. The objects created in this function are
+	 *	 destroyed before return and thus not cached.
+	 */
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    pub_key_template,
+	    ul_pub_key_attr_count,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_pub_key,
+	    &h_priv_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
+	 * should be sufficient for reuse.
+	 */
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+	rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
+		((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
+			pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+	for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
+		{
+		if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
+			pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+	DH *dh)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		};
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = -1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
+	priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+	mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
+	if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
+	(void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
+	h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
+			pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
+			    &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    h_key,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_derived_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+	    priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue =
+		OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
+	if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
+	 * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
+	 */
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
+		 * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
+		 * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
+		 * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
+		 * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
+		 * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
+		 * pre-master secret.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
+			{
+			if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
+				break;
+			}
+		(void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
+		ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
+		}
+err:
+	if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+	if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
+		priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
+		}
+	if (mechanism.pParameter)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
+		mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+		}
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
+	DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		};
+	key_template[0].pValue = &class;
+	key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
+	key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
+	key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
+	key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dh;
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
+			key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+/*
+* Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+* in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+*
+* Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
+*       to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
+*/
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
+	 * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
+	 * in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+/*
+* Local function to simplify key template population
+* Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+*/
+static int
+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
+	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG len;
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
+	 * check that here than individually in the callers.
+	 */
+	if (bn != NULL)
+		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
+		return (1);
+	*ul_value_len = len;
+	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
+	if (*p_value == NULL)
+		return (0);
+	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+	return (1);
+	}
+static void
+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
+	{
+		if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+			*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+	}
+/*
+* Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
+* if we find more objects based on the template we got.
+*
+* Returns:
+*	1 OK
+*	0 no object or more than 1 object found
+*/
+static int
+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG objcnt;
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (objcnt > 1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if (objcnt == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	return (0);
+	}
+/*
+* OpenSSL 1.0.0 introduced ENGINE API for the PKEY EVP functions. Sadly,
+* "openssl dgst -dss1 ..." now uses a new function EVP_DigestSignInit() which
+* internally needs a PKEY method for DSA even when in the engine. So, to avoid
+* a regression when moving from 0.9.8 to 1.0.0, we use an internal OpenSSL
+* structure for the DSA PKEY methods to make it work. It is a future project to
+* make it work with HW acceleration.
+*
+* Note that at the time of 1.0.0d release there is no documentation as to how
+* the PKEY EVP functions are to be implemented in an engine. There is only one
+* engine shipped with 1.0.0d that uses the PKEY EVP methods, the GOST engine.
+* It was used as an example when fixing the above mentioned regression problem.
+*/
+int
+pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids,
+int nid)
+	{
+	if (pmeth == NULL)
+		{
+		*nids = pk11_pkey_meth_nids;
+		return (1);
+		}
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_dsa:
+			*pmeth = (EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)EVP_PKEY_meth_find(nid);
+			return (1);
+		}
+	/* Error branch. */
+	*pmeth = NULL;
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */

changeset 1158	227137d9fbce
parent 866	c6e2467e422e