components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/33_cert_chain.patch
branchs11-update
changeset 2801 02364d9168f2
child 1641 2fc479afcf70
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/33_cert_chain.patch	Thu Oct 24 14:16:19 2013 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+This patch comes from OpenSSL upstream code, and the change has been commited to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
+  http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=fbd2164044f92383955a801ad1b2857d71e83f27
+  http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=51e7a4378a78bb0870a2cdc5c524c230c929ebcb
+  http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2dabd822366df7b2608b55d5ca5f31d5d484cbaf
+
+Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+============================================================================
+$ diff -ru crypto/x509/x509_trs.c crypto/x509/x509_trs.c 
+--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c.orig	4 Dec 2012 17:26:04 -0000	1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3
++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c	14 Dec 2012 14:30:45 -0000	1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4
+@@ -114,6 +114,15 @@ int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
+ 	X509_TRUST *pt;
+ 	int idx;
+ 	if(id == -1) return 1;
++	/* We get this as a default value */
++	if (id == 0)
++		{
++		int rv;
++		rv = obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, 0);
++		if (rv != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
++			return rv;
++		return trust_compat(NULL, x, 0);
++		}
+ 	idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ 	if(idx == -1) return default_trust(id, x, flags);
+ 	pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+============================================================================
+$ cvs diff -u -r1.105.2.9.2.4.2.3 -r1.105.2.9.2.4.2.4 x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	14 Dec 2012 12:53:48 -0000	1.105.2.9.2.4.2.3
++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	14 Dec 2012 14:30:46 -0000	1.105.2.9.2.4.2.4
+@@ -150,6 +150,33 @@
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
++
++static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
++	{
++	STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
++	X509 *xtmp = NULL;
++	int i;
++	/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
++	certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
++	if (certs == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++	/* Look for exact match */
++	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
++		{
++		xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
++		if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
++			break;
++		}
++	if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
++		CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
++	else
++		xtmp = NULL;
++	sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
++	return xtmp;
++	}
++
++
+ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 	{
+ 	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
+@@ -307,8 +307,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 
+ 	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+ 
+-	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+-	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
++	i = check_trust(ctx);
++
++	/* If explicitly rejected error */
++	if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
++		goto end;
++	/* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
++	if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ 		{
+ 		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
+ 			{
+@@ -346,12 +351,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 	
+ 	if (!ok) goto end;
+ 
+-	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
+-
+-	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+-
+-	if (!ok) goto end;
+-
+ 	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
+ 	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
+ 
+@@ -642,28 +641,54 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 
+ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+-	return 1;
+-#else
+ 	int i, ok;
+-	X509 *x;
++	X509 *x = NULL;
+ 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
+-	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+-	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+-	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+-	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+-		return 1;
+-	ctx->error_depth = i;
+-	ctx->current_cert = x;
+-	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+-	else
+-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+-	ok = cb(0, ctx);
+-	return ok;
+-#endif
++	/* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
++	for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
++		{
++		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
++		ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
++		/* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
++		if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
++			return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
++		/* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
++		 * not overridden.
++		 */
++		if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
++			{
++			ctx->error_depth = i;
++			ctx->current_cert = x;
++			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
++			ok = cb(0, ctx);
++			if (!ok)
++				return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
++			}
++		}
++	/* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
++	 * certificate return success.
++	 */
++	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
++		{
++		X509 *mx;
++		if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
++			return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
++		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
++		mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
++		if (mx)
++			{
++			(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
++			X509_free(x);
++			ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
++			return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
++	 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
++	 */
++	return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
+ 
+ static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+@@ -1591,6 +1630,8 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 		xs=xi;
+ 	else
+ 		{
++		if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
++			return check_cert_time(ctx, xi);
+ 		if (n <= 0)
+ 			{
+ 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+============================================================================
+$ cvs diff -u -r1.67.2.3.4.1 -r1.67.2.3.4.2 x509_vfy.h
+--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h	26 Sep 2012 13:50:42 -0000	1.67.2.3.4.1
++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h	14 Dec 2012 14:30:46 -0000	1.67.2.3.4.2
+@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@
+ /* Check selfsigned CA signature */
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE		0x4000
+ 
++/* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */
++#define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN		0x80000
+ 
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT			0x1
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE			0x2
+Index: openssl/apps/apps.c
+============================================================================
+$ cvs diff -u -r1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 -r1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 apps.c
+--- openssl/apps/apps.c	4 Dec 2012 17:26:04 -0000	1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3
++++ openssl/apps/apps.c	14 Dec 2012 14:30:45 -0000	1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4
+@@ -2361,6 +2361,8 @@
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
+ 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
++	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain"))
++		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
+ 	else
+ 		return 0;
+