--- a/components/openstack/swift/patches/01-CVE-2014-0006.patch Fri Mar 20 22:56:27 2015 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-This proposed upstream patch addresses CVE-2014-0006 and is tracked
-under Launchpad bug 1265665. Although it's been addressed in 1.12.0,
-the patch below is still not yet released for 1.10.0.
-
-commit b2c61375b3255486adb2900922a894dc7dad3c6d
-Author: Samuel Merritt <[email protected]>
-Date: Thu Jan 16 13:44:23 2014 +0100
-
- Use constant time comparison in tempURL
-
- Use constant time comparison when evaluating tempURL to avoid timing
- attacks (CVE-2014-0006). This is the havana backport of the master
- patch.
-
- Fixes bug 1265665
-
- Change-Id: I11e4ad83cc4077e52adf54a0bd0f9749294b2a48
-
-diff --git a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
-index ffc1431..ae2f4a1 100644
---- a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
-+++ b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ from urlparse import parse_qs
-
- from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
- from swift.common.swob import HeaderKeyDict
--from swift.common.utils import split_path
-+from swift.common.utils import split_path, streq_const_time
-
-
- #: Default headers to remove from incoming requests. Simply a whitespace
-@@ -267,17 +267,20 @@ class TempURL(object):
- if not keys:
- return self._invalid(env, start_response)
- if env['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD':
-- hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
-- request_method='GET')
-- if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
-- hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
-- request_method='PUT')
-- if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
-- return self._invalid(env, start_response)
-+ hmac_vals = (self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
-+ request_method='GET') +
-+ self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
-+ request_method='PUT'))
- else:
- hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys)
-- if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
-- return self._invalid(env, start_response)
-+
-+ # While it's true that any() will short-circuit, this doesn't affect
-+ # the timing-attack resistance since the only way this will
-+ # short-circuit is when a valid signature is passed in.
-+ is_valid_hmac = any(streq_const_time(temp_url_sig, h)
-+ for h in hmac_vals)
-+ if not is_valid_hmac:
-+ return self._invalid(env, start_response)
- self._clean_incoming_headers(env)
- env['swift.authorize'] = lambda req: None
- env['swift.authorize_override'] = True