components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c
changeset 1586 2d3ec080d6a3
parent 363 9c0cad004039
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c	Mon Dec 09 15:11:31 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "hw_pk11.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
+
+/*
+ * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one
+ * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI
+ * processing.
+ */
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+/*
+ * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not
+ * cache the PIN by default.
+ */
+static char *token_pin;
+
+static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin);
+static char *run_askpass(char *dialog);
+
+/*
+ * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to
+ * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using
+ * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated
+ * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take
+ * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted
+ * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN.
+ *
+ * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after
+ * the fork.
+ *
+ * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock"
+ * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL)
+ *	1 if we got the PIN
+ */
+#define	EXEC_SPEC	"exec:"
+#define	BUILTIN_SPEC	"builtin"
+int
+pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin)
+	{
+	/* Initialize as an error. */
+	*pin = NULL;
+
+	if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0)
+		{
+		/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		/* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */
+		*pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: ");
+		if (*pin == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			char *pw;
+
+			/*
+			 * getpassphrase() uses an internal  buffer to hold the
+			 * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer
+			 * with '\0'.
+			 */
+			if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			/* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */
+			memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin));
+			*pin = pw;
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/*
+		 * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output
+		 * of an external command.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0)
+			{
+			dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC);
+			if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog
+			 * keyword.
+			 */
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the
+ * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present
+ * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes
+ * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct'
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN
+ * 	1 if all is OK
+ *	2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string
+ *	pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points
+ *	inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present.
+ */
+int
+pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+	const char **file)
+	{
+	char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name;
+
+	/* Check the "file://" case. */
+	if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0)
+		{
+		*file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX);
+		return (2);
+		}
+
+	/*  This is the "pkcs11:" case. */
+	if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0)
+		{
+		/* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */
+		*file = (const char *)uristr;
+		return (2);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */
+		uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX));
+		if (uristr2 == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Initialize the structure. */
+	memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct));
+
+	/*
+	 * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We
+	 * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first
+	 * and the last character in the URI.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' ||
+	    (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';'))
+		goto bad_uri;
+
+	tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1);
+	for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1))
+		{
+		/* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */
+		name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2);
+		/* Check whether there is '=' at all. */
+		if (l2 == NULL)
+			goto bad_uri;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit
+		 * attributes.
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->token == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->serial == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->model == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+				{
+				uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2);
+				if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else
+			goto bad_uri;
+		}
+
+	/* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */
+	if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	free(uristr2);
+	return (1);
+bad_uri:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI);
+	if (uristr2 != NULL)
+		free(uristr2);
+	return (0);
+no_mem:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err:
+	pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE);
+	if (uristr2 != NULL)
+		free(uristr2);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside.
+ */
+void
+pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself)
+	{
+	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->token);
+	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->manuf);
+	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->serial);
+	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->model);
+	if (uri_struct->object != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->object);
+	if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->objecttype);
+	if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+	if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE)
+		OPENSSL_free(uri_struct);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is
+ * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that
+ * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note
+ * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to
+ * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see
+ * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11
+ * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	if (token_info == NULL)
+		{
+		token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO));
+		if (token_info == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0)
+			{
+			goto urierr;
+			}
+
+	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf,
+		    (char *)token_info->manufacturerID,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial,
+		    (char *)token_info->serialNumber,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (1);
+
+urierr:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH);
+	/* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */
+err:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the
+ * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will
+ * not have any affect on the policy.
+ *
+ * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked.
+ *
+ * Returns the caching policy number.
+ */
+int
+pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void)
+	{
+	char *value = NULL;
+	static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		return (policy);
+
+	value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY");
+
+	if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_NONE;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_MEMORY;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE);
+done:
+	return (policy);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or
+ * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_cache_pin(char *pin)
+	{
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	/* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */
+	if (token_pin != NULL)
+		goto ok;
+
+	if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY)
+		if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+	else
+		if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY)
+			{
+			if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+ok:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to
+ * the normal memory caching.
+ *
+ * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock"
+ * mutex.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+static int
+mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin)
+	{
+	void *addr = NULL;
+	long pagesize = 0;
+
+	/* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */
+	if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */
+	if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */
+	if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common
+		 * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues.
+		 */
+		if (errno == EPERM)
+			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING);
+		else
+			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+			    PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED);
+
+		/*
+		 * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check
+		 * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet
+		 * anyway.
+		 */
+		(void) munmap(addr, pagesize);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */
+	token_pin = (char *)addr;
+	strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+    pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even
+	 * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to
+	 * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may
+	 * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the
+	 * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set.
+	 */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ||
+	    is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags &
+	    CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into
+	 * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we
+	 * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in
+	 * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded
+	 * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
+	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a
+	 * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before
+	 * C_Login().
+	 */
+	if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+		    uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+			    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+		    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+			{
+			if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass,
+			    &uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
+		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
+		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
+		 * the engine.
+		 *
+		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
+		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
+		 */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
+			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin,
+			    strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+
+			/*
+			 * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which
+			 * would need to relogin).
+			 */
+			if (passphrasedialog == NULL &&
+			    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+				{
+				passphrasedialog =
+				    strdup(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+				if (passphrasedialog == NULL)
+					{
+					PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+					    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv);
+					goto err_locked;
+					}
+				}
+
+			/*
+			 * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might
+			 * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required -
+			 * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory.
+			 */
+			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() ==
+			    POLICY_WRONG_VALUE)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE)
+				if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+					goto err_locked;
+			}
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
+			 * login was done.
+			 */
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that
+	 * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the
+	 * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the
+	 * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with
+	 * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it.
+	 */
+	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+
+	return (1);
+
+err_locked:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+err:
+	/* Always get rid of the PIN. */
+	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There
+ * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite
+ * different so we need a separate function for this.
+ *
+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again.
+	 * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session
+	 * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token
+	 * then.
+	 */
+	if (passphrasedialog != NULL)
+		{
+		char *pin = NULL;
+
+		/* If we cached the PIN then use it. */
+		if (token_pin != NULL)
+			pin = token_pin;
+		else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+		    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
+			    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+
+		/* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */
+		if (pin != token_pin)
+			{
+			memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
+			OPENSSL_free(pin);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we
+ * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able
+ * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we
+ * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed
+ * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose().
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	allocated buffer on success
+ *	NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *
+run_askpass(char *dialog)
+	{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int n, p[2];
+	char *buf = NULL;
+
+	if (pipe(p) == -1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	switch (pid = fork())
+		{
+		case -1:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED);
+			return (NULL);
+		/* child */
+		case 0:
+			/*
+			 * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on
+			 * file descriptor shortage.
+			 */
+			close(p[0]);
+			(void) dup2(p[1], 1);
+			close(p[1]);
+			/*
+			 * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are
+			 * in the child. However, parent will get read() error
+			 * so do not worry.
+			 */
+			(void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL);
+			exit(1);
+		/* parent */
+		default:
+			/* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */
+			buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+			if (buf == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+				    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				return (NULL);
+				}
+
+			close(p[1]);
+			n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN);
+			if (n == -1 || n == 0)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+				    PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND);
+				OPENSSL_free(buf);
+				return (NULL);
+				}
+			buf[n] = '\0';
+
+			(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+		}
+
+	return (buf);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */