--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openstack/swift/patches/01-CVE-2014-0006.patch	Wed Jun 11 17:13:12 2014 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+This proposed upstream patch addresses CVE-2014-0006 and is tracked
+under Launchpad bug 1265665. Although it's been addressed in 1.12.0,
+the patch below is still not yet released for 1.10.0.
+
+commit b2c61375b3255486adb2900922a894dc7dad3c6d
+Author: Samuel Merritt <[email protected]>
+Date:   Thu Jan 16 13:44:23 2014 +0100
+
+    Use constant time comparison in tempURL
+    
+    Use constant time comparison when evaluating tempURL to avoid timing
+    attacks (CVE-2014-0006). This is the havana backport of the master
+    patch.
+    
+    Fixes bug 1265665
+    
+    Change-Id: I11e4ad83cc4077e52adf54a0bd0f9749294b2a48
+
+diff --git a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
+index ffc1431..ae2f4a1 100644
+--- a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
++++ b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ from urlparse import parse_qs
+ 
+ from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
+ from swift.common.swob import HeaderKeyDict
+-from swift.common.utils import split_path
++from swift.common.utils import split_path, streq_const_time
+ 
+ 
+ #: Default headers to remove from incoming requests. Simply a whitespace
+@@ -267,17 +267,20 @@ class TempURL(object):
+         if not keys:
+             return self._invalid(env, start_response)
+         if env['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD':
+-            hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
+-                                        request_method='GET')
+-            if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
+-                hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
+-                                            request_method='PUT')
+-                if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
+-                    return self._invalid(env, start_response)
++            hmac_vals = (self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
++                                         request_method='GET') +
++                         self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
++                                         request_method='PUT'))
+         else:
+             hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys)
+-            if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
+-                return self._invalid(env, start_response)
++
++        # While it's true that any() will short-circuit, this doesn't affect
++        # the timing-attack resistance since the only way this will
++        # short-circuit is when a valid signature is passed in.
++        is_valid_hmac = any(streq_const_time(temp_url_sig, h)
++                            for h in hmac_vals)
++        if not is_valid_hmac:
++            return self._invalid(env, start_response)
+         self._clean_incoming_headers(env)
+         env['swift.authorize'] = lambda req: None
+         env['swift.authorize_override'] = True