components/openstack/swift/patches/01-CVE-2014-0006.patch
changeset 3998 5bd484384122
parent 3997 0ca3f3d6c919
child 4002 95b8f35fcdd5
--- a/components/openstack/swift/patches/01-CVE-2014-0006.patch	Fri Mar 20 03:13:26 2015 -0700
+++ /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-This proposed upstream patch addresses CVE-2014-0006 and is tracked
-under Launchpad bug 1265665. Although it's been addressed in 1.12.0,
-the patch below is still not yet released for 1.10.0.
-
-commit b2c61375b3255486adb2900922a894dc7dad3c6d
-Author: Samuel Merritt <[email protected]>
-Date:   Thu Jan 16 13:44:23 2014 +0100
-
-    Use constant time comparison in tempURL
-    
-    Use constant time comparison when evaluating tempURL to avoid timing
-    attacks (CVE-2014-0006). This is the havana backport of the master
-    patch.
-    
-    Fixes bug 1265665
-    
-    Change-Id: I11e4ad83cc4077e52adf54a0bd0f9749294b2a48
-
-diff --git a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
-index ffc1431..ae2f4a1 100644
---- a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
-+++ b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ from urlparse import parse_qs
- 
- from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
- from swift.common.swob import HeaderKeyDict
--from swift.common.utils import split_path
-+from swift.common.utils import split_path, streq_const_time
- 
- 
- #: Default headers to remove from incoming requests. Simply a whitespace
-@@ -267,17 +267,20 @@ class TempURL(object):
-         if not keys:
-             return self._invalid(env, start_response)
-         if env['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD':
--            hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
--                                        request_method='GET')
--            if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
--                hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
--                                            request_method='PUT')
--                if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
--                    return self._invalid(env, start_response)
-+            hmac_vals = (self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
-+                                         request_method='GET') +
-+                         self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
-+                                         request_method='PUT'))
-         else:
-             hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys)
--            if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
--                return self._invalid(env, start_response)
-+
-+        # While it's true that any() will short-circuit, this doesn't affect
-+        # the timing-attack resistance since the only way this will
-+        # short-circuit is when a valid signature is passed in.
-+        is_valid_hmac = any(streq_const_time(temp_url_sig, h)
-+                            for h in hmac_vals)
-+        if not is_valid_hmac:
-+            return self._invalid(env, start_response)
-         self._clean_incoming_headers(env)
-         env['swift.authorize'] = lambda req: None
-         env['swift.authorize_override'] = True