Upstream patch for CVE-2014-3476. This fix will be included in the
Juno-2 development milestone and in future 2013.2.4 and 2014.1.2 releases
From 9162837329665b4316afc2270a602dc8ae11f6d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adam Young <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 13:56:17 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Block delegation escalation of privilege
Forbids doing the following with either a trust
or oauth based token:
creating a trust
approving a request_token
listing request tokens
Change-Id: I1528f9dd003f5e03cbc50b78e1b32dbbf85ffcc2
Closes-Bug: 1324592
---
keystone/common/controller.py | 36 +++++++++++-
keystone/contrib/oauth1/controllers.py | 12 ++++
keystone/tests/test_v3_auth.py | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
keystone/tests/test_v3_oauth1.py | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
keystone/trust/controllers.py | 9 +++
5 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/keystone/common/controller.py b/keystone/common/controller.py
index faadc09..d6c33df 100644
--- a/keystone/common/controller.py
+++ b/keystone/common/controller.py
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ def _build_policy_check_credentials(self, action, context, kwargs):
# it would otherwise need to reload the token_ref from backing store.
wsgi.validate_token_bind(context, token_ref)
- creds = {}
+ creds = {'is_delegated_auth': False}
if 'token_data' in token_ref and 'token' in token_ref['token_data']:
#V3 Tokens
token_data = token_ref['token_data']['token']
@@ -66,9 +66,32 @@ def _build_policy_check_credentials(self, action, context, kwargs):
creds['roles'] = []
for role in token_data['roles']:
creds['roles'].append(role['name'])
+
+ trust = token_data.get('OS-TRUST:trust')
+ if trust is None:
+ creds['trust_id'] = None
+ creds['trustor_id'] = None
+ creds['trustee_id'] = None
+ else:
+ creds['trust_id'] = trust['id']
+ creds['trustor_id'] = trust['trustor_user']['id']
+ creds['trustee_id'] = trust['trustee_user']['id']
+ creds['is_delegated_auth'] = True
+
+ oauth1 = token_data.get('OS-OAUTH1')
+ if oauth1 is None:
+ creds['consumer_id'] = None
+ creds['access_token_id'] = None
+ else:
+ creds['consumer_id'] = oauth1['consumer_id']
+ creds['access_token_id'] = oauth1['access_token_id']
+ creds['is_delegated_auth'] = True
+
else:
#v2 Tokens
creds = token_ref.get('metadata', {}).copy()
+ creds['is_delegated_auth'] = False
+
try:
creds['user_id'] = token_ref['user'].get('id')
except AttributeError:
@@ -81,6 +104,16 @@ def _build_policy_check_credentials(self, action, context, kwargs):
# NOTE(vish): this is pretty inefficient
creds['roles'] = [self.identity_api.get_role(role)['name']
for role in creds.get('roles', [])]
+ trust = token_ref.get('trust')
+ if trust is None:
+ creds['trust_id'] = None
+ creds['trustor_id'] = None
+ creds['trustee_id'] = None
+ else:
+ creds['trust_id'] = trust.get('id')
+ creds['trustor_id'] = trust.get('trustor_id')
+ creds['trustee_id'] = trust.get('trustee_id')
+ creds['is_delegated_auth'] = True
return creds
@@ -155,6 +188,7 @@ def protected(callback=None):
policy_dict.update(kwargs)
self.policy_api.enforce(creds, action, flatten(policy_dict))
LOG.debug(_('RBAC: Authorization granted'))
+ context['environment'] = {'KEYSTONE_AUTH_CONTEXT': creds}
return f(self, context, *args, **kwargs)
return inner
return wrapper
diff --git a/keystone/contrib/oauth1/controllers.py b/keystone/contrib/oauth1/controllers.py
index b8c2441..d4024df 100644
--- a/keystone/contrib/oauth1/controllers.py
+++ b/keystone/contrib/oauth1/controllers.py
@@ -86,6 +86,12 @@ class AccessTokenCrudV3(controller.V3Controller):
@controller.protected()
def list_access_tokens(self, context, user_id):
+ auth_context = context.get('environment',
+ {}).get('KEYSTONE_AUTH_CONTEXT', {})
+ if auth_context.get('is_delegated_auth'):
+ raise exception.Forbidden(
+ _('Cannot list request tokens'
+ ' with a token issued via delegation.'))
refs = self.oauth_api.list_access_tokens(user_id)
formatted_refs = ([self._format_token_entity(x) for x in refs])
return AccessTokenCrudV3.wrap_collection(context, formatted_refs)
@@ -314,6 +320,12 @@ class OAuthControllerV3(controller.V3Controller):
there is not another easy way to make sure the user knows which roles
are being requested before authorizing.
"""
+ auth_context = context.get('environment',
+ {}).get('KEYSTONE_AUTH_CONTEXT', {})
+ if auth_context.get('is_delegated_auth'):
+ raise exception.Forbidden(
+ _('Cannot authorize a request token'
+ ' with a token issued via delegation.'))
req_token = self.oauth_api.get_request_token(request_token_id)
diff --git a/keystone/tests/test_v3_auth.py b/keystone/tests/test_v3_auth.py
index e89e29f..f3e3ace 100644
--- a/keystone/tests/test_v3_auth.py
+++ b/keystone/tests/test_v3_auth.py
@@ -2150,6 +2150,68 @@ class TestTrustAuth(TestAuthInfo):
self.assertEqual(r.result['token']['project']['name'],
self.project['name'])
+ def test_impersonation_token_cannot_create_new_trust(self):
+ ref = self.new_trust_ref(
+ trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
+ trustee_user_id=self.trustee_user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id,
+ impersonation=True,
+ expires=dict(minutes=1),
+ role_ids=[self.role_id])
+ del ref['id']
+
+ r = self.post('/OS-TRUST/trusts', body={'trust': ref})
+ trust = self.assertValidTrustResponse(r)
+
+ auth_data = self.build_authentication_request(
+ user_id=self.trustee_user['id'],
+ password=self.trustee_user['password'],
+ trust_id=trust['id'])
+ r = self.post('/auth/tokens', body=auth_data)
+
+ trust_token = r.headers['X-Subject-Token']
+
+ # Build second trust
+ ref = self.new_trust_ref(
+ trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
+ trustee_user_id=self.trustee_user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id,
+ impersonation=True,
+ expires=dict(minutes=1),
+ role_ids=[self.role_id])
+ del ref['id']
+
+ self.post('/OS-TRUST/trusts',
+ body={'trust': ref},
+ token=trust_token,
+ expected_status=403)
+
+ def test_delete_trust_revokes_tokens(self):
+ ref = self.new_trust_ref(
+ trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
+ trustee_user_id=self.trustee_user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id,
+ impersonation=False,
+ expires=dict(minutes=1),
+ role_ids=[self.role_id])
+ del ref['id']
+ r = self.post('/OS-TRUST/trusts', body={'trust': ref})
+ trust = self.assertValidTrustResponse(r)
+ trust_id = trust['id']
+ auth_data = self.build_authentication_request(
+ user_id=self.trustee_user['id'],
+ password=self.trustee_user['password'],
+ trust_id=trust_id)
+ r = self.post('/auth/tokens', body=auth_data)
+ self.assertValidProjectTrustScopedTokenResponse(
+ r, self.trustee_user)
+ trust_token = r.headers['X-Subject-Token']
+ self.delete('/OS-TRUST/trusts/%(trust_id)s' % {
+ 'trust_id': trust_id},
+ expected_status=204)
+ headers = {'X-Subject-Token': trust_token}
+ self.head('/auth/tokens', headers=headers, expected_status=404)
+
def test_delete_trust(self):
ref = self.new_trust_ref(
trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
diff --git a/keystone/tests/test_v3_oauth1.py b/keystone/tests/test_v3_oauth1.py
index 73a34d7..a83c86e 100644
--- a/keystone/tests/test_v3_oauth1.py
+++ b/keystone/tests/test_v3_oauth1.py
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
import copy
import os
+import tempfile
import urlparse
import uuid
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@ from keystone import contrib
from keystone.contrib import oauth1
from keystone.contrib.oauth1 import controllers
from keystone.openstack.common import importutils
+from keystone.openstack.common import jsonutils
+from keystone.policy.backends import rules
from keystone.tests import test_v3
@@ -447,6 +450,101 @@ class AuthTokenTests(OAuthFlowTests):
self.assertTrue(len(tokens) > 0)
self.assertTrue(keystone_token_uuid in tokens)
+ def _create_trust_get_token(self):
+ ref = self.new_trust_ref(
+ trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
+ trustee_user_id=self.user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id,
+ impersonation=True,
+ expires=dict(minutes=1),
+ role_ids=[self.role_id])
+ del ref['id']
+
+ r = self.post('/OS-TRUST/trusts', body={'trust': ref})
+ trust = self.assertValidTrustResponse(r)
+
+ auth_data = self.build_authentication_request(
+ user_id=self.user['id'],
+ password=self.user['password'],
+ trust_id=trust['id'])
+ r = self.post('/auth/tokens', body=auth_data)
+
+ trust_token = r.headers['X-Subject-Token']
+ return trust_token
+
+ def _approve_request_token_url(self):
+ consumer = self._create_single_consumer()
+ consumer_id = consumer.get('id')
+ consumer_secret = consumer.get('secret')
+ self.consumer = oauth1.Consumer(consumer_id, consumer_secret)
+ self.assertIsNotNone(self.consumer.key)
+
+ url, headers = self._create_request_token(self.consumer,
+ self.project_id)
+ content = self.post(url, headers=headers)
+ credentials = urlparse.parse_qs(content.result)
+ request_key = credentials.get('oauth_token')[0]
+ request_secret = credentials.get('oauth_token_secret')[0]
+ self.request_token = oauth1.Token(request_key, request_secret)
+ self.assertIsNotNone(self.request_token.key)
+
+ url = self._authorize_request_token(request_key)
+
+ return url
+
+ def test_oauth_token_cannot_create_new_trust(self):
+ self.test_oauth_flow()
+ ref = self.new_trust_ref(
+ trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
+ trustee_user_id=self.user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id,
+ impersonation=True,
+ expires=dict(minutes=1),
+ role_ids=[self.role_id])
+ del ref['id']
+
+ self.post('/OS-TRUST/trusts',
+ body={'trust': ref},
+ token=self.keystone_token_id,
+ expected_status=403)
+
+ def test_oauth_token_cannot_authorize_request_token(self):
+ self.test_oauth_flow()
+ url = self._approve_request_token_url()
+ body = {'roles': [{'id': self.role_id}]}
+ self.put(url, body=body, token=self.keystone_token_id,
+ expected_status=403)
+
+ def test_oauth_token_cannot_list_request_tokens(self):
+ self._set_policy({"identity:list_access_tokens": [],
+ "identity:create_consumer": [],
+ "identity:authorize_request_token": []})
+ self.test_oauth_flow()
+ url = '/users/%s/OS-OAUTH1/access_tokens' % self.user_id
+ self.get(url, token=self.keystone_token_id,
+ expected_status=403)
+
+ def _set_policy(self, new_policy):
+ _unused, self.tmpfilename = tempfile.mkstemp()
+ rules.reset()
+ self.opt(policy_file=self.tmpfilename)
+ with open(self.tmpfilename, "w") as policyfile:
+ policyfile.write(jsonutils.dumps(new_policy))
+ self.addCleanup(os.remove, self.tmpfilename)
+
+ def test_trust_token_cannot_authorize_request_token(self):
+ trust_token = self._create_trust_get_token()
+ url = self._approve_request_token_url()
+ body = {'roles': [{'id': self.role_id}]}
+ self.put(url, body=body, token=trust_token, expected_status=403)
+
+ def test_trust_token_cannot_list_request_tokens(self):
+ self._set_policy({"identity:list_access_tokens": [],
+ "identity:create_trust": []})
+ trust_token = self._create_trust_get_token()
+ url = '/users/%s/OS-OAUTH1/access_tokens' % self.user_id
+ self.get(url, token=trust_token, expected_status=403)
+
class MaliciousOAuth1Tests(OAuth1Tests):
diff --git a/keystone/trust/controllers.py b/keystone/trust/controllers.py
index 1d54f51..7fdc8c2 100644
--- a/keystone/trust/controllers.py
+++ b/keystone/trust/controllers.py
@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ class TrustV3(controller.V3Controller):
# TODO(ayoung): instead of raising ValidationError on the first
# problem, return a collection of all the problems.
+
+ # Explicitly prevent a trust token from creating a new trust.
+ auth_context = context.get('environment',
+ {}).get('KEYSTONE_AUTH_CONTEXT', {})
+ if auth_context.get('is_delegated_auth'):
+ raise exception.Forbidden(
+ _('Cannot create a trust'
+ ' with a token issued via delegation.'))
+
if not trust:
raise exception.ValidationError(attribute='trust',
target='request')