# Developed in house.
# It checks the validity of the context.
# The issue was reported to the upstream by QE: #4679
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c	2016-11-09 12:52:40.755645360 -0800
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c	2016-11-09 12:53:17.872944235 -0800
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@
     int i, j, reset = 0;
     unsigned char pad[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
 
+    /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */
+    if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0))
+        return 0;
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     /* If FIPS mode switch to approved implementation if possible */
     if (FIPS_mode()) {
@@ -97,9 +101,6 @@
             return FIPS_hmac_init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL);
     }
 #endif
-    /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */
-    if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0))
-        return 0;
 
     if (md != NULL) {
         reset = 1;
@@ -164,12 +165,13 @@
 
 int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
 {
+    if (!ctx->md)
+        return 0;
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine)
         return FIPS_hmac_update(ctx, data, len);
 #endif
-    if (!ctx->md)
-        return 0;
 
     return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
 }
@@ -178,14 +180,15 @@
 {
     unsigned int i;
     unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+    if (!ctx->md)
+        goto err;
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine)
         return FIPS_hmac_final(ctx, md, len);
 #endif
 
-    if (!ctx->md)
-        goto err;
-
     if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx))