7155371 "ldm init-system" on s11u1 hits libcrypto.so.1.0.0`pk11_get_session SEGV in mutex_lock_impl
6980830 Memory leaked when calling ENGINE_load_private_key()
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
*/
/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
/*
* This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
* use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
*
* This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
* Afchine Madjlessi.
*/
/*
* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* [email protected].
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson ([email protected]).
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/dso.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <cryptlib.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
#include <security/cryptoki.h>
#include <security/pkcs11.h>
#include "hw_pk11.h"
#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
/*
* During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
* token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
*/
char *passphrasedialog;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
const RSA *rsa);
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
#endif
/* DSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
DSA *dsa);
static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
#endif
/* DH stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
#endif
static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
#else
static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
#endif
/*
* Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
* object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
* locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
* so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
* all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
* session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
* 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
* See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
*/
#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
{ \
if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
{ \
var = CK_TRUE; \
if (unlock) \
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
goto label; \
} \
}
/*
* Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
* entry otherwise return NULL.
*
* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
* held.
*/
static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
{
PK11_active *entry;
for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
if (entry->h == h)
return (entry);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
* search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
* failure.
*
* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
* held.
*/
int
pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
{
PK11_active *entry = NULL;
if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
return (-1);
}
/* search for entry in the active list */
if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
entry->refcnt++;
else
{
/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
if (entry == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
entry->h = h;
entry->refcnt = 1;
entry->prev = NULL;
entry->next = NULL;
/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
if (active_list[type] == NULL)
active_list[type] = entry;
else /* make the entry first in the list */
{
entry->next = active_list[type];
active_list[type]->prev = entry;
active_list[type] = entry;
}
}
return (entry->refcnt);
}
/*
* Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
*
* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
* held.
*/
void
pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
{
PK11_active *prev_entry;
/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
{
prev_entry->next = entry->next;
if (entry->next != NULL)
entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
}
else
{
active_list[type] = entry->next;
/* we were the first but not the only one */
if (entry->next != NULL)
entry->next->prev = NULL;
}
/* sanitization */
entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
entry->prev = NULL;
entry->next = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(entry);
}
/* Free all entries from the active list. */
void
pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
{
PK11_active *entry;
/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
switch (type)
{
case OP_RSA:
case OP_DSA:
case OP_DH:
break;
default:
return;
}
/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
}
/*
* Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
* decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
*
* Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
* return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
*
* This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
* held.
*/
int
pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
{
PK11_active *entry = NULL;
if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
return (-1);
}
OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
entry->refcnt--;
if (entry->refcnt == 0)
{
pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
{
"PKCS#11 RSA method",
pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
NULL, /* app_data */
pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
};
RSA_METHOD *
PK11_RSA(void)
{
return (&pk11_rsa);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
{
"PKCS#11 DSA method",
pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
0, /* flags */
NULL /* app_data */
};
DSA_METHOD *
PK11_DSA(void)
{
return (&pk11_dsa);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*
* PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
* output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
* should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
* rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
* enough.
*/
#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
{
"PKCS#11 DH method",
pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
pk11_DH_init, /* init */
pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
0, /* flags */
NULL, /* app_data */
NULL /* generate_params */
};
DH_METHOD *
PK11_DH(void)
{
return (&pk11_dh);
}
#endif
/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/*
* Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
* support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
* support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
* The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
break;
#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
default:
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
err:
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
/*
* Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
* should be catched in the padding functions
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
default:
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
err:
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f;
int j, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_init(&f);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes
*/
if (flen > num)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
/* make data into a big number */
if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
/*
* PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
* Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
*/
for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
if (buf[j] != 0)
break;
p = buf + j;
j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
break;
#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
break;
default:
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
BN_clear_free(&f);
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f;
int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_init(&f);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (buf == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes
*/
if (flen > num)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
/*
* PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
* Needs to skip these 0's here
*/
for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
if (buf[i] != 0)
break;
p = buf + i;
i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
break;
default:
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
BN_clear_free(&f);
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return (r);
}
/*
* This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
* C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
return (-1);
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
retval = bytes_encrypted;
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (retval);
}
/*
* This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
* C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
return (-1);
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
retval = ul_sig_len;
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (retval);
}
/*
* This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
* C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
return (-1);
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
retval = bytes_decrypted;
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (retval);
}
/*
* This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
* and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
return (-1);
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
p_mech, h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (-1);
}
retval = bytes_decrypted;
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (retval);
}
static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
{
/*
* This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
* rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
*/
rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
return (1);
}
static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
/*
* Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
* to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
* structures.
*/
if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
return (1);
}
/*
* Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
* rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
* See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
*/
static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
{
X509_SIG sig;
ASN1_TYPE parameter;
int i, j;
unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned long ulsiglen;
/* Encode the digest */
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
{
if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
s = (unsigned char *)m;
}
else
{
sig.algor = &algor;
sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
goto err;
}
parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
sig.digest = &digest;
sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
sig.digest->length = m_len;
i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
}
j = RSA_size(rsa);
if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
goto err;
}
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
if (s == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = s;
(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
goto err;
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
ulsiglen = j;
rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
*siglen = ulsiglen;
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (ret);
}
static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
const RSA *rsa)
{
X509_SIG sig;
ASN1_TYPE parameter;
int i, j;
unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/* Encode the digest */
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
{
if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
s = (unsigned char *)m;
}
else
{
sig.algor = &algor;
sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
goto err;
}
parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
sig.digest = &digest;
sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
sig.digest->length = m_len;
i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
}
j = RSA_size(rsa);
if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
goto err;
}
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
if (s == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = s;
(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
goto err;
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
(CK_ULONG)siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (ret);
}
#define MAXATTR 1024
/*
* Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
* PKCS#11 token.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
FILE *privkey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
const char *file;
int ret;
pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
CK_RV rv;
CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
/* We look for private keys only. */
CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
{
{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
};
/*
* These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
* structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
* never ask for private components.
*/
CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
{
{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
};
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
/*
* The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
* the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
* the 'privkey_id' parameter.
*/
ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
if (ret == 0)
goto err;
/* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
if (ret == 1)
{
if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
goto err;
search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
&uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
goto err;
/*
* Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
* if we can't find it.
*/
if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
&ks_key) == 0)
goto err;
/*
* Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
* directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
* is done.
*/
pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
/*
* We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
* the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
* RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
* everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
* many times. We do not check the return value because even in
* case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
* and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
* the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
goto err;
}
/*
* Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
* for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
*/
sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
/*
* We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
* care of handle management ourselves.
*/
KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
/*
* Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
* from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
*/
attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
/*
* Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
* well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
* in the keystore.
*/
attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
goto err;
}
else
if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
{
pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
(void) fclose(privkey);
if (pkey != NULL)
{
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa != NULL)
{
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
goto err;
}
else
goto err;
}
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (pkey);
err:
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
if (pkey != NULL)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
return (pkey);
}
/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
/* ARGSUSED */
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
FILE *pubkey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
/* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
int ret;
const char *file;
pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
CK_RV rv;
CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
{
{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
};
/*
* These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
* structure with something we can use to look up the key.
*/
CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
{
{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
};
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
if (ret == 0)
goto err;
if (ret == 1)
{
if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
goto err;
search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
&uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
goto err;
if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
&ks_key) == 0)
{
goto err;
}
/*
* Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
* directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
*/
pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
/*
* We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
* structure. No cache hit is possible.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
goto err;
}
/*
* Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
*/
sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
/*
* These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
* from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
*/
attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
goto err;
/*
* Create a session object from it so that when calling
* pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
* reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
* structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
* additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
* a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
* we always have a session key. Note that this is different
* from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
* case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
* object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
*/
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
goto err;
}
else
if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
{
pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
(void) fclose(pubkey);
if (pkey != NULL)
{
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa != NULL)
{
/*
* This will always destroy the RSA
* object since we have a new RSA
* structure here.
*/
(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
else
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
return (pkey);
err:
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
if (pkey != NULL)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
return (pkey);
}
/*
* Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
* PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
* the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
* session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
*
* We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
* opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
int i;
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
goto err;
}
}
if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
err:
if (rollback)
{
/*
* We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
* since we are doing rollback.
*/
if (found == 0)
(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
malloc_err:
for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return (h_key);
}
/*
* Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
* components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
* are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
* NULL here.
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
int i;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
/*
* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
*/
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
};
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
/* Put the private key components into the template */
if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
/*
* We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
* That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
* use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
*/
if (rsa->d == NULL)
{
ul_key_attr_count = 8;
/*
* We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
* session keys.
*/
a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
/*
* We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
* tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
* really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
* types we just create a new session key using the private
* components from the RSA structure.
*/
if (rsa->d == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
* components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
* expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
* in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
* to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
* problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
* from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
*/
if (rsa->d != NULL)
{
if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
}
else
sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
/*
* For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
* since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
* 'n'/'e' components as well.
*/
if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
err:
if (rollback)
{
/*
* We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
* since we are doing rollback.
*/
if (found == 0)
(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
malloc_err:
/*
* 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
* They need to be freed upon exit or error.
*/
for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return (h_key);
}
/*
* Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
* meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
* cache miss.
*/
static int
pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
{
/*
* Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
* check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
* key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
* cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
*
* We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
* components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
* could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
* key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
* both data signing and verifying.
*/
if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
{
if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
return (1);
else
/*
* No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
* structure with potentially existing private key
* object. We can just create a public object and move
* on with this session structure.
*/
return (0);
}
/*
* A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
* or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
return (0);
}
/*
* Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
* meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
* cache miss.
*/
static int
pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
{
/*
* Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
* check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
* key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
* be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
* since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
* not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
* about why we compare the handle as well.
*/
if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
{
if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
return (1);
else
/*
* No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
* structure with potentially existing public key
* object. We can just create a private object and move
* on with this session structure.
*/
return (0);
}
/*
* A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
* or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
return (0);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/* The DSA function implementation */
/* ARGSUSED */
static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
{
return (1);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
{
return (1);
}
static DSA_SIG *
pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
int i;
DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
/*
* The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
* each is 20 bytes long
*/
unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
goto ret;
}
i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
if (dlen > i)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto ret;
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
goto ret;
(void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
&sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
&sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
goto ret;
}
(void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
(CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
goto ret;
}
}
if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
dsa_sig->r = r;
dsa_sig->s = s;
ret:
if (dsa_sig == NULL)
{
if (r != NULL)
BN_free(r);
if (s != NULL)
BN_free(s);
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
return (dsa_sig);
}
static int
pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
DSA *dsa)
{
int i;
CK_RV rv;
int retval = 0;
CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
goto ret;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
goto ret;
}
i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
if (dlen > i)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto ret;
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
goto ret;
(void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
&sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
rv);
goto ret;
}
/*
* The representation of each of the two big numbers could
* be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
* to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
*/
(void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
goto ret;
}
}
retval = 1;
ret:
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
return (retval);
}
/*
* Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
* The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
int i;
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
};
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
goto err;
}
}
if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
if (key_ptr != NULL)
*key_ptr = dsa;
err:
if (rollback)
{
/*
* We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
* since we are doing rollback.
*/
if (found == 0)
(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
malloc_err:
for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return (h_key);
}
/*
* Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
* The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
int i;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
/*
* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
*/
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
};
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
/* Put the private key components into the template */
if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
goto err;
}
}
if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
if (key_ptr != NULL)
*key_ptr = dsa;
err:
if (rollback)
{
/*
* We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
* since we are doing rollback.
*/
if (found == 0)
(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
malloc_err:
/*
* 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
* They need to be freed apon exit or error.
*/
for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return (h_key);
}
/*
* Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
* in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
*/
static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
{
/*
* Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
* check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
* key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
* cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
*/
if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
(BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
{
/*
* We do not check the return value because even in case of
* failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
* and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
* reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
/*
* Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
* in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
*/
static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
{
/*
* Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
* check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
* key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
* cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
*/
if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
(BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
{
/*
* We do not check the return value because even in case of
* failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
* and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
* reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/* The DH function implementation */
/* ARGSUSED */
static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
{
return (1);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
{
return (1);
}
/*
* Generate DH key-pair.
*
* Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
* and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
* if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
* is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
* for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
*/
static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
{
CK_ULONG i;
CK_RV rv, rv1;
int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
};
CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
{
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
{
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
{
/*
* We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
* could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
* DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
*/
pub_key_template[1].pValue =
OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
DH_BUF_RESERVE);
if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
}
else
goto err;
pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
{
pub_key_template[2].pValue =
OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
DH_BUF_RESERVE);
if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
}
else
goto err;
/*
* Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
* a session handle. The objects created in this function are
* destroyed before return and thus not cached.
*/
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
goto err;
rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
&mechanism,
pub_key_template,
ul_pub_key_attr_count,
priv_key_template,
ul_priv_key_attr_count,
&h_pub_key,
&h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
goto err;
}
/*
* Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
* should be sufficient for reuse.
*/
if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
{
reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
}
else
{
reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
{
rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
goto err;
}
if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
goto err;
}
/* Reuse the memory allocated */
pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
goto err;
}
if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
{
if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
/* Reuse the memory allocated */
priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
{
if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
}
}
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
}
}
for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
{
if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
return (ret);
}
static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
DH *dh)
{
int i;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
};
CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
{
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_RV rv;
int ret = -1;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
goto err;
priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
goto err;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
(void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
&sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
&mechanism,
h_key,
priv_key_template,
ul_priv_key_attr_count,
&h_derived_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
rv);
goto err;
}
if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
goto err;
}
priv_key_result[0].pValue =
OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
rv);
goto err;
}
/*
* OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
* length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
*/
if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
{
/*
* CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
* leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
* OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
* vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
* finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
* zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
* pre-master secret.
*/
for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
{
if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
break;
}
(void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
}
err:
if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
}
}
if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
{
OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
}
if (mechanism.pParameter)
{
OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
}
pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
return (ret);
}
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
int i;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
};
key_template[0].pValue = &class;
key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto malloc_err;
}
BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
rv);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
rv);
goto err;
}
}
if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
rollback = CK_TRUE;
goto err;
}
/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
if (key_ptr != NULL)
*key_ptr = dh;
err:
if (rollback)
{
/*
* We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
* since we are doing rollback.
*/
if (found == 0)
(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
malloc_err:
for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
{
if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return (h_key);
}
/*
* Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
* in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
*
* Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
* to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
*/
static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
{
/*
* Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
* check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
* is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
* in PK11_SESSION structure.
*/
if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
(BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
{
/*
* We do not check the return value because even in case of
* failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
* and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
* reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
*/
(void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
#endif
/*
* Local function to simplify key template population
* Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
*/
static int
init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
{
CK_ULONG len;
/*
* This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
* check that here than individually in the callers.
*/
if (bn != NULL)
len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
return (1);
*ul_value_len = len;
*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
if (*p_value == NULL)
return (0);
BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
return (1);
}
static void
attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
{
if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
}
/*
* Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
* if we find more objects based on the template we got.
*
* Returns:
* 1 OK
* 0 no object or more than 1 object found
*/
static int
find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_ULONG objcnt;
LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
rv);
goto err;
}
if (objcnt > 1)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
else
if (objcnt == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
return (1);
err:
UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
return (0);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */