diff -r c59d67c9d1d7 -r 6f932ca78947 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c Thu Jan 23 09:56:38 2014 -0700 +++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 @@ -1,3659 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. - */ - -/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -/* - * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for - * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). - * - * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by - * Afchine Madjlessi. - */ -/* - * ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -#include -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -#include -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include -#endif -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 - -/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -/* - * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more - * information. - */ -#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) -#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -#endif - -#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__) -#else -#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) -#endif - -#include -#include -#include "hw_pk11.h" -#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" - -#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine" -#include "hw_pk11_err.c" - -/* - * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), - * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the - * RSA keys by reference feature. - */ -pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -/* - * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel - * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. - */ -int *hw_cnids; -int *hw_dnids; -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - -/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; - -/* - * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when - * logging into the token. - */ -CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; - -/* - * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for - * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given - * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be - * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already - * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each - * PK11_SESSION object. - * - * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the - * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also - * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another - * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in - * invalid handle returned from the search operation. - * - * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. - * They are also used for active list protection. - */ -pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; - -/* - * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one - * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session - * list) for given algorithm type - */ -PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; - -/* - * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available - * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed - * without losing the secret key objects. - */ -static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - -/* Index for the supported ciphers */ -enum pk11_cipher_id - { - PK11_DES_CBC, - PK11_DES3_CBC, - PK11_DES_ECB, - PK11_DES3_ECB, - PK11_RC4, - PK11_AES_128_CBC, - PK11_AES_192_CBC, - PK11_AES_256_CBC, - PK11_AES_128_ECB, - PK11_AES_192_ECB, - PK11_AES_256_ECB, - PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, - PK11_AES_128_CTR, - PK11_AES_192_CTR, - PK11_AES_256_CTR, - PK11_CIPHER_MAX - }; - -/* Index for the supported digests */ -enum pk11_digest_id - { - PK11_MD5, - PK11_SHA1, - PK11_SHA224, - PK11_SHA256, - PK11_SHA384, - PK11_SHA512, - PK11_DIGEST_MAX - }; - -typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st - { - enum pk11_cipher_id id; - int nid; - int iv_len; - int min_key_len; - int max_key_len; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; - } PK11_CIPHER; - -typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st - { - enum pk11_digest_id id; - int nid; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; - } PK11_DIGEST; - -/* ENGINE level stuff */ -static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); -static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); - -/* RAND stuff */ -static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -static int pk11_rand_status(void); - -/* These functions are also used in other files */ -PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); - -/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); -#endif - -/* Local helper functions */ -static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, - CK_BBOOL persistent); -static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); - -/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ -static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); -static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); -static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); -static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); -static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, - const int **nids, int nid); -static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, - const int **nids, int nid); -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); -static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, - int key_len); -static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, - size_t count); -static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); -static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); -static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); - -static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot); -static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info, - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv, - int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar); -static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids, - int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot); -static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, - int *local_cipher_nids); -static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, - int *local_digest_nids); -static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, - int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, - PK11_CIPHER *cipher); -static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, - int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, - PK11_DIGEST *digest); - -static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); -static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - -#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \ - { \ - if (uselock) \ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ - if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ - { \ - retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ - sp->persistent); \ - } \ - if (uselock) \ - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ - } - -static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -static int cipher_count = 0; -static int digest_count = 0; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; - -/* - * Static list of ciphers. - * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id, - * thus ciphers[i].id == i - * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id. - */ -static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = - { - { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, - CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, - { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, - CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, - { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, - CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, - { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, - CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, - { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, - CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, - { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, - { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, - { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, - { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, - CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, - { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, - { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, - }; - -/* - * Static list of digests. - * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id, - * thus digests[i].id == i - * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id. - */ -static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = - { - {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, - {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, - {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, - {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, - {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, - {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, - {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, - }; - -/* - * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in - * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 - * session in multiple cipher_update calls - */ -typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st - { - PK11_SESSION *sp; - } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; - - -/* - * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets - * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. - * - * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. - */ - -/* DES CBC EVP */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = - { - NID_des_cbc, - 8, 8, 8, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -/* 3DES CBC EVP */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = - { - NID_des_ede3_cbc, - 8, 24, 8, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -/* - * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and - * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. - */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = - { - NID_des_ecb, - 8, 8, 8, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = - { - NID_des_ede3_ecb, - 8, 24, 8, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = - { - NID_aes_128_cbc, - 16, 16, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = - { - NID_aes_192_cbc, - 16, 24, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = - { - NID_aes_256_cbc, - 16, 32, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -/* - * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and - * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. - */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = - { - NID_aes_128_ecb, - 16, 16, 0, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = - { - NID_aes_192_ecb, - 16, 24, 0, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = - { - NID_aes_256_ecb, - 16, 32, 0, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = - { - NID_aes_128_ctr, - 16, 16, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = - { - NID_aes_192_ctr, - 16, 24, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = - { - NID_aes_256_ctr, - 16, 32, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = - { - NID_bf_cbc, - 8, 16, 8, - EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = - { - NID_rc4, - 1, 16, 0, - EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = - { - NID_md5, - NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, - 0, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - MD5_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = - { - NID_sha1, - NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - SHA_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = - { - NID_sha224, - NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, - SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ - SHA256_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = - { - NID_sha256, - NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - SHA256_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = - { - NID_sha384, - NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, - SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ - SHA512_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = - { - NID_sha512, - NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, - SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - SHA512_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -/* - * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. - * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine - */ -#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = - { - { - PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, - "SO_PATH", - "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", - ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING - }, - {0, NULL, NULL, 0} - }; - - -static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = - { - pk11_rand_seed, - pk11_rand_bytes, - pk11_rand_cleanup, - pk11_rand_add, - pk11_rand_bytes, - pk11_rand_status - }; - - -/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support"; - -CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; - -/* - * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function - * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether - * this is 32 or 64 bit build. - */ -static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; - -static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; -/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE; -static int pk11_pid = 0; - -static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; - -/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) - { - int type; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - - if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) - { - session_cache[type].lock = - OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL); - } - - return (1); - -malloc_err: - pk11_free_all_locks(); - PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - -static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) - { - int type; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); - OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); - find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); - OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); - find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); - OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); - find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) - { - if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); - OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); - session_cache[type].lock = NULL; - } - } - } - -/* - * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. - */ -static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; - RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - if (!pk11_library_init(e)) - return (0); - - if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || - !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || - !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || - !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) - return (0); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || - !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || - !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - if (pk11_have_random) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); - } - if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || - !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || - !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || - !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || - !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) - return (0); - -/* - * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup - * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp - * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. - * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); - pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; - pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - - /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ - ERR_load_pk11_strings(); - - return (1); - } - -/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) - { - if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) - return (0); - - if (!bind_pk11(e)) - return (0); - - return (1); - } - -IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) - -#else -static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) - { - ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); - - if (!ret) - return (NULL); - - if (!bind_pk11(ret)) - { - ENGINE_free(ret); - return (NULL); - } - - return (ret); - } - -void -ENGINE_load_pk11(void) - { - ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; - - /* - * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to - * security reasons. We will link it in statically. - */ - /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ - if (!pk11_dso) - pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); - - if (pk11_dso == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - return; - } - - e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); - if (!e_pk11) - { - DSO_free(pk11_dso); - pk11_dso = NULL; - return; - } - - /* - * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically - * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 - * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter - * needs cipher and digest algorithm information - */ - if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) - { - DSO_free(pk11_dso); - pk11_dso = NULL; - ENGINE_free(e_pk11); - return; - } - - ENGINE_add(e_pk11); - - ENGINE_free(e_pk11); - ERR_clear_error(); - } -#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and - * the function symbol names to bind to. - */ -static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; - -static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) - { - if (PK11_LIBNAME) - return (PK11_LIBNAME); - - return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); - } - -static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) - { - if (PK11_LIBNAME) - OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); - - PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; - } - -static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) - { - free_PK11_LIBNAME(); - - return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); - } - -/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) - { - int i; - - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - return; - - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock); - } - } - -/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -static void pk11_fork_parent(void) - { - int i; - - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - return; - - for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); - } - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); - } - -/* - * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them - * accessible to all threads. - */ -static void pk11_fork_child(void) - { - int i; - - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - return; - - for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); - } - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); - } - -/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) - { - return (pk11_library_init(e)); - } - -/* - * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. - * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also - * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and - * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function - * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) - { - CK_C_GetFunctionList p; - CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; - CK_INFO info; - CK_ULONG ul_state_len; - int any_slot_found; - int i; - - /* - * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called - * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one - * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more - * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen - * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a - * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be - * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes - * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID - * check so that we properly initialize the engine again. - */ - if (pk11_library_initialized) - { - if (pk11_pid == getpid()) - { - return (1); - } - else - { - global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* - * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case - * the application calls fork() without finishing the - * engine first. - */ - pk11_free_all_locks(); - } - } - - if (pk11_dso == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) - goto err; -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - - /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ - p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, - PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); - if (!p) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ - rv = p(&pFuncList); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); - if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) - goto err; - - /* - * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any - * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an - * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 - * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just - * because no slot was present. - */ - if (any_slot_found == 0) - return (1); - - if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - /* Open the global_session for the new process */ - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, - PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); - goto err; - } - } - - /* - * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since - * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function - */ - if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) - == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " - "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); - digest_count = 0; - } - - pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE; - pk11_pid = getpid(); - /* - * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() - * will do the cleanup. - */ - if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) - goto err; - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - session_cache[i].head = NULL; - /* - * initialize active lists. We only use active lists - * for asymmetric ciphers. - */ - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - active_list[i] = NULL; - - if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) - { - if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, - pk11_fork_child) != 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); - goto err; - } - pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE; - } - - return (1); - -err: - return (0); - } - -/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) - { - free_PK11_LIBNAME(); - ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); - return (1); - } - -/* - * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 - * library. - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) - { - int i; - - if (pk11_dso == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); - goto err; - } - - OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); - - if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) - goto err; - - /* free all active lists */ - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - pk11_free_active_list(i); - - pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); - global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* - * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function - * may have side-effects. - */ -#if 0 - pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -#endif - if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - pk11_dso = NULL; - pFuncList = NULL; - pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; - pk11_pid = 0; - /* - * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than - * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason - * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out - * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes - * the engine before calling fork(). - */ - pk11_free_all_locks(); - - return (1); - -err: - return (0); - } - -/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()) - { - int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); - - switch (cmd) - { - case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: - if (p == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return (0); - } - - if (initialized) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); - return (0); - } - - return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); - default: - break; - } - - PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); - - return (0); - } - - -/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) - { - return; - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) - { - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) - return; - - /* - * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since - * the calling functions do not care anyway - */ - pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); - - return; - } - -static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) - { - pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); - } - -static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) - { - CK_RV rv; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) - return (0); - - rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); - return (0); - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); - return (1); - } - -/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -static int pk11_rand_status(void) - { - return (1); - } - -/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - switch (optype) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case OP_RSA: - if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - } - break; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case OP_DSA: - if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; - } - break; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - case OP_DH: - if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; - } - break; -#endif - default: - break; - } - } - -/* - * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have - * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here - * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. - * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. - */ -PK11_SESSION * -pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; - pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; - static pid_t pid = 0; - pid_t new_pid; - CK_RV rv; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - case OP_RAND: - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return (NULL); - } - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); - - /* - * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in - * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session - * here, with no PID information. - */ - if (pid == 0) - pid = getpid(); - - freelist = session_cache[optype].head; - sp = freelist; - - /* - * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled - * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first - * structure from the freelist. - */ - if (sp == NULL) - { - if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, - PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); - - /* - * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the - * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so - * mark them as unused. - */ - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - else - freelist = sp->next; - - /* - * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all - * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. - */ - if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) - { - pid = new_pid; - - /* - * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited - * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which - * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the - * head of the list). - */ - while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) - { - freelist = sp1->next; - /* - * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() - * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 - * sessions and destroy all objects. - */ - pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); - OPENSSL_free(sp1); - } - - /* we have to free the active list as well. */ - pk11_free_active_list(optype); - - /* Initialize the process */ - rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); - if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, - rv); - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - - /* - * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this - * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one - * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. - * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more - * information. - */ -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) - goto err; -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) - goto err; - - /* Open the global_session for the new process */ - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, - rv); - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - - /* - * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs - * re-initialization. - */ - if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) - { - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) - { - /* - * We will keep the session in the cache list and let - * the caller cope with the situation. - */ - freelist = sp; - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - } - - if (sp->pid == 0) - { - /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ - if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) - { - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - } - } - - /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ - session_cache[optype].head = freelist; - -err: - if (sp != NULL) - sp->next = NULL; - - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); - - return (sp); - } - - -void -pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; - PK11_SESSION *freelist; - - /* - * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and - * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the - * next time we will ask for a new session. - */ - if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) - return; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - case OP_RAND: - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return; - } - - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); - freelist = session_cache[optype].head; - sp->next = freelist; - session_cache[optype].head = sp; - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); - } - - -/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -static int pk11_free_all_sessions() - { - int ret = 1; - int type; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); - - /* - * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will - * return 0 on exit. - */ - for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) - { - if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) - ret = 0; - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many - * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we - * return an error on return. - */ -static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - CK_RV rv; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; - pid_t mypid = getpid(); - pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; - int ret = 1; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - case OP_RAND: - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return (0); - } - - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); - freelist = session_cache[optype].head; - while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) - { - if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, - PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); - ret = 0; - } - } - freelist = sp->next; - pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); - OPENSSL_free(sp); - } - - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); - return (ret); - } - - -static int -pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_SLOT_ID myslot; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; - break; - case OP_RAND: - myslot = rand_SLOTID; - break; - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - myslot = SLOTID; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return (0); - } - - sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); - if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) - { - /* - * We are probably a child process so force the - * reinitialize of the session - */ - pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; - if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) - return (0); - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); - } - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); - return (0); - } - - sp->pid = getpid(); - - switch (optype) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case OP_RSA: - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case OP_DSA: - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - case OP_DH: - sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dh = NULL; - sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - case OP_CIPHER: - sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; - break; - } - - /* - * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent - * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. - */ - sp->persistent = CK_FALSE; - return (1); - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* - * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code, - * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the - * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying - * a public or a private key, we always free what we can. - */ -static void -destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - } - } - -/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, - ret, uselock, OP_RSA); - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; - destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, - ret, uselock, OP_RSA); - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; - destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all - * objects in the free list. - */ -int -pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; - uselock = CK_FALSE; - } - - /* - * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects - */ - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - /* - * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the - * destroy operations fails. - */ - if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - } - - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); - - return (ret); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, - ret, uselock, OP_DSA); - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; - if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; - } - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, - ret, uselock, OP_DSA); - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; - if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; - } - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all - * objects in the free list. - */ -int -pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; - uselock = CK_FALSE; - } - - /* - * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects - */ - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - /* - * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the - * destroy operations fails. - */ - if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - } - - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); - - return (ret); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, - ret, uselock, OP_DH); - sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dh = NULL; - if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; - } - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy DH key object wrapper. - * - * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure - * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list - */ -int -pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; - uselock = CK_FALSE; - } - - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - /* - * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the - * destroy operations fails. - */ - if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - } -err: - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); - - return (ret); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - -static int -pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, - CK_BBOOL persistent) - { - CK_RV rv; - - /* - * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects - * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so - * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. - */ - if (persistent == CK_TRUE) - return (1); - - rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, - rv); - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - - -/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ - -static int -cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) - if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) - return (ciphers[i].id); - return (-1); - } - -static int -pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) - { - if (cipher_count > 0) - *nids = cipher_nids; - else - *nids = NULL; - return (cipher_count); - } - -static int -pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) - { - if (digest_count > 0) - *nids = digest_nids; - else - *nids = NULL; - return (digest_count); - } - -/* - * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. - */ -static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, - PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; - - /* - * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and - * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before - * pk11_init_symmetric() is called. - */ - OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL); - OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); - OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); - - if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || - ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || - ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) - { - pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); - pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); - /* - * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, - * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 - * needs. For more information on internal structure of the - * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can - * add code so that the counter length can be set via - * ENGINE_ctrl() function. - */ - ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - } - else - { - if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) - { - pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; - pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; - } - } - - /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ - if (ctx->encrypt) - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, - sp->opdata_cipher_key); - else - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, - sp->opdata_cipher_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? - PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) - { - CK_MECHANISM mech; - int index; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; - - state->sp = NULL; - - index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); - if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) - return (0); - - p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; - /* - * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the - * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our - * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From - * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a - * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key - * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this - * code serves as a sanity check. - * - * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be - * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs - * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES - * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. - */ - if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || - ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || - ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); - return (0); - } - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) - return (0); - - /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ - mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - - /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ - (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); - - /* - * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then - * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the - * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). - */ - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && - sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) - { - state->sp = sp; - if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) - return (0); - - return (1); - } - - /* - * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object - * needs to be created. - */ - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( - ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); - } - - if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) - { - /* - * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to - * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. - */ - if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) - { - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - } - - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - - /* now initialize the context with a new key */ - if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) - return (0); - - sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; - state->sp = sp; - - return (1); - } - -/* - * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a - * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session - * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so - * that it needs not be recreated. - * - * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this - * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return - * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good - * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix - * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. - */ -static int -pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - CK_RV rv; - - rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); - return (0); - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -/* - * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient - * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. - */ -static int -pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) - { - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - CK_RV rv; - unsigned long outl = inl; - - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - return (0); - - sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; - - if (!inl) - return (1); - - /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ - if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) - return (0); - - if (ctx->encrypt) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, - PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); - return (0); - } - } - else - { - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, - PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); - return (0); - } - } - - /* - * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always - * the same size of input. - * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with - * correctly aligned buffers. - */ - if (inl != outl) - return (0); - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() - * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's - * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but - * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't - * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with - * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, - * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used - * context is initialized without finalizing it first. - */ -static int -pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; - CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; - - if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) - { - /* - * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get - * rid of the context. - */ - if (ctx->encrypt) - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( - state->sp->session, buf, &len); - else - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( - state->sp->session, buf, &len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? - PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); - state->sp = NULL; - } - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with - * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the - * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, - const int **nids, int nid) - { - if (!cipher) - return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); - - switch (nid) - { - case NID_des_ede3_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; - break; - case NID_des_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; - break; - case NID_des_ede3_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; - break; - case NID_des_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_128_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_192_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_256_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_128_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_192_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_256_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; - break; - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; - break; - case NID_aes_256_ctr: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; - break; - case NID_bf_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; - break; - case NID_rc4: - *cipher = &pk11_rc4; - break; - default: - *cipher = NULL; - break; - } - return (*cipher != NULL); - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, - const int **nids, int nid) - { - if (!digest) - return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); - - switch (nid) - { - case NID_md5: - *digest = &pk11_md5; - break; - case NID_sha1: - *digest = &pk11_sha1; - break; - case NID_sha224: - *digest = &pk11_sha224; - break; - case NID_sha256: - *digest = &pk11_sha256; - break; - case NID_sha384: - *digest = &pk11_sha384; - break; - case NID_sha512: - *digest = &pk11_sha512; - break; - default: - *digest = NULL; - break; - } - return (*digest != NULL); - } - - -/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; - - CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, - {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, - }; - - /* - * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions - * can use the key handles. Here is why: - * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. - * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. - * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with - * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES - * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and - * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session - * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key - * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to - * terminate the active operation. - */ - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; - a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; - a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; - a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; - a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; - - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, - a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, - rv); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Save the key information used in this session. - * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. - */ - sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ? - PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len; - (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); -err: - - return (h_key); - } - -static int -md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) - if (digests[i].nid == nid) - return (digests[i].id); - return (-1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech; - int index; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - PK11_DIGEST *pdp; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; - - state->sp = NULL; - - index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); - if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) - return (0); - - pdp = &digests[index]; - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) - return (0); - - /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ - mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - - rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); - return (0); - } - - state->sp = sp; - - return (1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) - { - CK_RV rv; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; - - /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ - if (count == 0) - return (1); - - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - return (0); - - rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, - count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); - state->sp = NULL; - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) - { - CK_RV rv; - unsigned long len; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; - len = ctx->digest->md_size; - - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - return (0); - - rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); - state->sp = NULL; - return (0); - } - - if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) - return (0); - - /* - * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session - * to the pool - */ - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); - state->sp = NULL; - - return (1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) - { - CK_RV rv; - int ret = 0; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; - CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; - CK_ULONG ul_state_len; - - /* The copy-from state */ - state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - goto err; - - /* Initialize the copy-to state */ - if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) - goto err; - state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; - - /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, - &ul_state_len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, - rv); - goto err; - } - if (ul_state_len == 0) - { - goto err; - } - - pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); - if (pstate == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, - &ul_state_len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, - rv); - goto err; - } - - /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ - rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, - ul_state_len, 0, 0); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, - PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); - goto err; - } - - ret = 1; -err: - if (pstate != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(pstate); - - return (ret); - } - -/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ -static int -pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) - { - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; - unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - - if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) - { - /* - * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not - * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory - * that might have been allocated in the token when - * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() - * will return the session to the cache. - */ - if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key - * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key - * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for - * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first - * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same - * prefix. - */ -static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, - int key_len) - { - if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || - memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) - { - (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); - return (0); - } - return (1); - } - -/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ -static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 0; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; - } - - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - /* - * The secret key object is created in the - * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). - */ - if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, - sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) - goto err; - sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - } - ret = 1; -err: - - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); - - return (ret); - } - - -/* - * Public key mechanisms optionally supported - * - * CKM_RSA_X_509 - * CKM_RSA_PKCS - * CKM_DSA - * - * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a - * public key slot. - * - * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported - * - * CKM_DES3_CBC - * CKM_DES_CBC - * CKM_AES_CBC - * CKM_DES3_ECB - * CKM_DES_ECB - * CKM_AES_ECB - * CKM_AES_CTR - * CKM_RC4 - * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC - * - * Digests optionally supported - * - * CKM_MD5 - * CKM_SHA_1 - * CKM_SHA224 - * CKM_SHA256 - * CKM_SHA384 - * CKM_SHA512 - * - * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which - * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of - * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global - * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key - * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. - */ -static int -pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) - { - CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; - CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; - int i; - CK_RV rv; - CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar; - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; - int best_number_of_mechs = 0; - int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; - int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; - - /* let's initialize the output parameter */ - if (any_slot_found != NULL) - *any_slot_found = 0; - - /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); - return (0); - } - - /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ - if (ulSlotCount == 0) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); - return (1); - } - - pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); - - if (pSlotList == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - - /* Get the slot list for processing */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - return (0); - } - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); - - pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; - for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) - { - current_slot = pSlotList[i]; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking slot: %d ==\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot); - rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - continue; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, - token_info.label); - pk11_choose_rand_slot(token_info, current_slot); - - pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(mech_info, token_info, current_slot, - rv, best_number_of_mechs, best_pubkey_slot_sofar); - - pk11_choose_cipher_digest(&local_cipher_nids, - &local_digest_nids, pFuncList, current_slot); - } - - if (best_number_of_mechs == 0) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); - } - else - { - pubkey_SLOTID = best_pubkey_slot_sofar; - } - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); - - if (pSlotList != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); - OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - - if (any_slot_found != NULL) - *any_slot_found = 1; - return (1); - } - -static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking rand slots\n", PK11_DBG); - - if (((token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) != 0) && !pk11_have_random) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); - pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; - rand_SLOTID = current_slot; - } - } - -static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info, - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv, - int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar) - { - CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; - int current_number_of_mechs = 0; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking pubkey slots\n", PK11_DBG); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of signing and - * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, - &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) - { - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, - * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) - { - slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; - current_number_of_mechs++; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of signing and - * verifying with CKM_DSA. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, - &mech_info); - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) - { - slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; - current_number_of_mechs++; - } - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and - * derivation. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); - if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) - { - slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; - current_number_of_mechs++; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - if (current_number_of_mechs > best_number_of_mechs) - { - best_pubkey_slot_sofar = current_slot; - pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; - pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; - pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; - best_number_of_mechs = current_number_of_mechs; - /* - * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if - * RSA keys by reference feature is used. - */ - pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to " - "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); - } - } - -static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids, - int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot) - { - int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; - int current_slot_n_digest = 0; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking cipher/digest\n", PK11_DBG); - - (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); - (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); - - pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, - ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); - - pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, - ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot_n_cipher); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot_n_digest); - - /* - * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than - * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, - * otherwise leave it where it is. - */ - if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > - (cipher_count + digest_count)) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n", - PK11_DBG, current_slot); - SLOTID = current_slot; - cipher_count = current_slot_n_cipher; - digest_count = current_slot_n_digest; - (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, - sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); - (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, - sizeof (local_digest_nids)); - } - } - -static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, - PK11_CIPHER *cipher) - { - static CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - static CK_RV rv; - static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE last_checked_mech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)-1; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type); - if (cipher->mech_type != last_checked_mech) - { - rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, - &mech_info); - } - - last_checked_mech = cipher->mech_type; - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n"); - return; - } - - if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) - { - if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len || - mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not" - " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n", - cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len, - mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize); - return; - } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids)) -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n"); - local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = - cipher->nid; - } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - " rejected, software implementation only\n"); - } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - } - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n"); - } - - return; - } - -static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, - int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest) - { - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - CK_RV rv; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type); - rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n"); - return; - } - - if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) - { -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids)) -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n"); - local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = - digest->nid; - } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - " rejected, software implementation only\n"); - } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - } - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n"); - } - - return; - } - -/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ -static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) - { - pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, - current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]); - } - } - -/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ -static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) - { - pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest, - local_digest_nids, &digests[i]); - } - } - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -/* - * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library - * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation - * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code - * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the - * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some - * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a - * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, - * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the - * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte - * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products - * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression - * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the - * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. - * - * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for - * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same - * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 - * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without - * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use - * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since - * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said - * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with - * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code - * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for - * asymmetric operations. - * - * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what - * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can - * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be - * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, - * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. - * - * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find - * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric - * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table - * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays - * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the - * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token - * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more - * information. - * - * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined - * the code won't be used. - */ -#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) -static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -#else -static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -#endif - -/* - * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, - * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware - * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. - */ -static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) - { - int i; - CK_RV rv; - void *handle; - CK_C_GetFunctionList p; - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; - CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; - int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; - CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; - CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; - int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; - int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", - PK11_DBG); - /* - * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own - * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions - * from the top-level PKCS#11 library. - */ - if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, - PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ - if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); - if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, - PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); - goto err; - } - - /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ - if (ulSlotCount == 0) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); - hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); - hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); - if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, - PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - /* this means empty tables */ - hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; - hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; - return (1); - } - - pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); - if (pSlotList == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Get the slot list for processing */ - if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); - goto err; - } - - /* - * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also - * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the - * search. - */ - hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; - hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; - tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); - tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); - if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef - * is zero now. - */ - for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) - tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; - for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) - tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", - PK11_DBG); - - for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) - { - if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) - continue; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, - token_info.label); - - /* - * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are - * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. - */ - pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], - &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); - pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], - &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); - } - - /* - * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function - * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by - * dlclose(3C). - */ -#if 0 - pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); -#endif - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - (void) dlclose(handle); - hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; - hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); - return (1); - -err: - if (pSlotList != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); - if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); - - return (0); - } - -/* - * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., - * non-existent). - */ -static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) - { - int i = 0; - - /* - * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new - * table. - */ - if (nid_table == NULL) - return (1); - - /* - * the table is never full, there is always at least one - * NID_undef. - */ - while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) - { - if (nid_table[i++] == nid) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); - return (1); - } - } - - return (0); - } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */