diff -r 2f56a3dac19a -r 7043c27399f1 components/openssl/common/patches/033-cert_chain.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/common/patches/033-cert_chain.patch Thu May 28 09:54:36 2015 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +This patch comes from OpenSSL upstream code, and the change has been commited to OpenSSL 1.0.2. + http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=fbd2164044f92383955a801ad1b2857d71e83f27 + http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=51e7a4378a78bb0870a2cdc5c524c230c929ebcb + http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2dabd822366df7b2608b55d5ca5f31d5d484cbaf + +Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c +============================================================================ +$ diff -ru crypto/x509/x509_trs.c crypto/x509/x509_trs.c +--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c.orig 4 Dec 2012 17:26:04 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 ++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c 14 Dec 2012 14:30:45 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 +@@ -119,6 +119,14 @@ int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags) + int idx; + if (id == -1) + return 1; ++ /* We get this as a default value */ ++ if (id == 0) { ++ int rv; ++ rv = obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, 0); ++ if (rv != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED) ++ return rv; ++ return trust_compat(NULL, x, 0); ++ } + idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id); + if (idx == -1) + return default_trust(id, x, flags); +Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +============================================================================ +$ cvs diff -u -r1.105.2.9.2.4.2.3 -r1.105.2.9.2.4.2.4 x509_vfy.c +--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 14 Dec 2012 12:53:48 -0000 1.105.2.9.2.4.2.3 ++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 14 Dec 2012 14:30:46 -0000 1.105.2.9.2.4.2.4 +@@ -149,6 +149,33 @@ + } + #endif + ++/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ ++ ++static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) ++ { ++ STACK_OF(X509) *certs; ++ X509 *xtmp = NULL; ++ int i; ++ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ ++ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); ++ if (certs == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ /* Look for exact match */ ++ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) ++ { ++ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); ++ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) ++ break; ++ } ++ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) ++ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); ++ else ++ xtmp = NULL; ++ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); ++ return xtmp; ++ } ++ ++ + int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL; +@@ -304,8 +331,17 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + + /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ + +- /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ +- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { ++ i = check_trust(ctx); ++ ++ /* If explicitly rejected error */ ++ if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) ++ goto end; ++ /* ++ * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single ++ * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already ++ * and set bad_chain == 1 ++ */ ++ if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { + if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { + if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; +@@ -340,14 +376,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); + + if (!ok) +- goto end; +- +- /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ +- +- if (param->trust > 0) +- ok = check_trust(ctx); +- +- if (!ok) + goto end; + + /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ +@@ -630,28 +658,53 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + + static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { +-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY +- return 1; +-#else + int i, ok; +- X509 *x; ++ X509 *x = NULL; + int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); + cb = ctx->verify_cb; +-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ +- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; +- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); +- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); +- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) +- return 1; +- ctx->error_depth = i; +- ctx->current_cert = x; +- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) +- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; +- else +- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; +- ok = cb(0, ctx); +- return ok; +-#endif ++ /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ ++ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { ++ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); ++ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); ++ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ ++ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) ++ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; ++ /* ++ * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not ++ * overridden. ++ */ ++ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { ++ ctx->error_depth = i; ++ ctx->current_cert = x; ++ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; ++ ok = cb(0, ctx); ++ if (!ok) ++ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ++ } ++ } ++ /* ++ * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate ++ * return success. ++ */ ++ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { ++ X509 *mx; ++ if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) ++ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; ++ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); ++ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); ++ if (mx) { ++ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); ++ X509_free(x); ++ ctx->last_untrusted = 0; ++ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow ++ * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. ++ */ ++ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; + } + + static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +@@ -1526,6 +1579,8 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) + xs = xi; + else { ++ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0) ++ return check_cert_time(ctx, xi); + if (n <= 0) { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; + ctx->current_cert = xi; +Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h +============================================================================ +$ cvs diff -u -r1.67.2.3.4.1 -r1.67.2.3.4.2 x509_vfy.h +--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h 26 Sep 2012 13:50:42 -0000 1.67.2.3.4.1 ++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h 14 Dec 2012 14:30:46 -0000 1.67.2.3.4.2 +@@ -406,6 +406,9 @@ + /* Check selfsigned CA signature */ + # define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000 + ++/* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */ ++# define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0x80000 ++ + # define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1 + # define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2 + # define X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS 0x4 +Index: openssl/apps/apps.c +============================================================================ +$ cvs diff -u -r1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 -r1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 apps.c +--- openssl/apps/apps.c 4 Dec 2012 17:26:04 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 ++++ openssl/apps/apps.c 14 Dec 2012 14:30:45 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 +@@ -2238,6 +2238,8 @@ + flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig")) + flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE; ++ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain")) ++ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN; + else + return 0; +