# HG changeset patch # User Yiteng Zhang # Date 1484098521 28800 # Node ID 17fdfad419036b19d81c20405df94a2f73cace40 # Parent d7da0f26b875f4e002a0f3885f488118a5a11e77 25241371 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241378 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241832 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241839 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241853 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241867 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241881 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241889 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241894 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25241900 problem in LIBRARY/CURL 25306385 problem in LIBRARY/CURL diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/013-CVE-2016-8615.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/013-CVE-2016-8615.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 1620f552a277ed5b23a48b9c27dbf07663cac068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 17:36:19 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookie: replace use of fgets() with custom version + +... that will ignore lines that are too long to fit in the buffer. + +CVE-2016-8615 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102A.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + lib/cookie.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- lib/cookie.c ++++ lib/cookie.c +@@ -901,10 +901,39 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + } + + return co; + } + ++/* ++ * get_line() makes sure to only return complete whole lines that fit in 'len' ++ * bytes and end with a newline. ++ */ ++static char *get_line(char *buf, int len, FILE *input) ++{ ++ bool partial = FALSE; ++ while(1) { ++ char *b = fgets(buf, len, input); ++ if(b) { ++ size_t rlen = strlen(b); ++ if(rlen && (b[rlen-1] == '\n')) { ++ if(partial) { ++ partial = FALSE; ++ continue; ++ } ++ return b; ++ } ++ else ++ /* read a partial, discard the next piece that ends with newline */ ++ partial = TRUE; ++ } ++ else ++ break; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++ + /***************************************************************************** + * + * Curl_cookie_init() + * + * Inits a cookie struct to read data from a local file. This is always +@@ -957,11 +986,11 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + bool headerline; + + line = malloc(MAX_COOKIE_LINE); + if(!line) + goto fail; +- while(fgets(line, MAX_COOKIE_LINE, fp)) { ++ while(get_line(line, MAX_COOKIE_LINE, fp)) { + if(checkprefix("Set-Cookie:", line)) { + /* This is a cookie line, get it! */ + lineptr=&line[11]; + headerline=TRUE; + } +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/014-CVE-2016-8616.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/014-CVE-2016-8616.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From cef510beb222ab5750afcac2c74fcbcdc31ada64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 18:01:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] connectionexists: use case sensitive user/password + comparisons + +CVE-2016-8616 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102B.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + lib/url.c | 12 ++++++------ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- lib/url.c ++++ lib/url.c +@@ -3401,12 +3401,12 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, + } + + if(!(needle->handler->flags & PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST)) { + /* This protocol requires credentials per connection, + so verify that we're using the same name and password as well */ +- if(!strequal(needle->user, check->user) || +- !strequal(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) { ++ if(strcmp(needle->user, check->user) || ++ strcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) { + /* one of them was different */ + continue; + } + } + +@@ -3462,12 +3462,12 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, + already authenticating with the right credentials. If not, keep + looking so that we can reuse NTLM connections if + possible. (Especially we must not reuse the same connection if + partway through a handshake!) */ + if(wantNTLMhttp) { +- if(!strequal(needle->user, check->user) || +- !strequal(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) ++ if(strcmp(needle->user, check->user) || ++ strcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) + continue; + } + else if(check->ntlm.state != NTLMSTATE_NONE) { + /* Connection is using NTLM auth but we don't want NTLM */ + continue; +@@ -3477,8 +3477,8 @@ ConnectionExists(struct SessionHandle *data, + if(wantProxyNTLMhttp) { +- if(!strequal(needle->proxyuser, check->proxyuser) || +- !strequal(needle->proxypasswd, check->proxypasswd)) ++ if(strcmp(needle->proxyuser, check->proxyuser) || ++ strcmp(needle->proxypasswd, check->proxypasswd)) + continue; + } + else if(check->proxyntlm.state != NTLMSTATE_NONE) { + /* Proxy connection is using NTLM auth but we don't want NTLM */ + continue; +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/015-CVE-2016-8617.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/015-CVE-2016-8617.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 3599341dd611303ee9544839d30f603f606d1082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 00:05:12 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] base64: check for integer overflow on large input + +CVE-2016-8617 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102C.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + lib/base64.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +--- lib/base64.c ++++ lib/base64.c +@@ -188,10 +188,15 @@ static CURLcode base64_encode(const char *table64, + *outlen = 0; + + if(0 == insize) + insize = strlen(indata); + ++#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T == 4 ++ if(insize > UINT_MAX/4) ++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; ++#endif ++ + base64data = output = malloc(insize*4/3+4); + if(NULL == output) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + /* +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/016-CVE-2016-8618.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/016-CVE-2016-8618.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 31106a073882656a2a5ab56c4ce2847e9a334c3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 10:15:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] aprintf: detect wrap-around when growing allocation + +On 32bit systems we could otherwise wrap around after 2GB and allocate 0 +bytes and crash. + +CVE-2016-8618 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102D.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + lib/mprintf.c | 9 ++++++--- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- lib/mprintf.c ++++ lib/mprintf.c +@@ -1034,20 +1034,23 @@ static int alloc_addbyter(int output, FILE *data) + } + infop->alloc = 32; + infop->len =0; + } + else if(infop->len+1 >= infop->alloc) { +- char *newptr; ++ char *newptr = NULL; ++ size_t newsize = infop->alloc*2; + +- newptr = realloc(infop->buffer, infop->alloc*2); ++ /* detect wrap-around or other overflow problems */ ++ if(newsize > infop->alloc) ++ newptr = realloc(infop->buffer, newsize); + + if(!newptr) { + infop->fail = 1; + return -1; /* fail */ + } + infop->buffer = newptr; +- infop->alloc *= 2; ++ infop->alloc = newsize; + } + + infop->buffer[ infop->len ] = outc; + + infop->len++; +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/017-CVE-2016-8619.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/017-CVE-2016-8619.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 91239f7040b1f026d4d15765e7e3f58e92e93761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 12:56:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] krb5: avoid realloc(0) + +If the requested size is zero, bail out with error instead of doing a +realloc() that would cause a double-free: realloc(0) acts as a free() +and then there's a second free in the cleanup path. + +CVE-2016-8619 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102E.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + lib/security.c | 9 ++++++--- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- lib/security.c ++++ lib/security.c +@@ -190,19 +190,22 @@ socket_write(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t fd, const void *to, + static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn, + curl_socket_t fd, + struct krb5buffer *buf) + { + int len; +- void* tmp; ++ void *tmp = NULL; + CURLcode result; + + result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len)); + if(result) + return result; + +- len = ntohl(len); +- tmp = realloc(buf->data, len); ++ if(len) { ++ /* only realloc if there was a length */ ++ len = ntohl(len); ++ tmp = realloc(buf->data, len); ++ } + if(tmp == NULL) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + buf->data = tmp; + result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len); +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/018-CVE-2016-8620.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/018-CVE-2016-8620.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +From 52f3e1d1092c81a4f574c9fc6cb3818b88434c8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 17:27:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] range: prevent negative end number in a glob range +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +CVE-2016-8620 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102F.html +Reported-by: Luật Nguyễn +--- + src/tool_urlglob.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +--- src/tool_urlglob.c ++++ src/tool_urlglob.c +@@ -255,10 +255,16 @@ static CURLcode glob_range(URLGlob *glob, char **patternp, + else { + if(*endp != '-') + endp = NULL; + else { + pattern = endp+1; ++ while(*pattern && ISBLANK(*pattern)) ++ pattern++; ++ if(!ISDIGIT(*pattern)) { ++ endp = NULL; ++ goto fail; ++ } + errno = 0; + max_n = strtoul(pattern, &endp, 10); + if(errno || (*endp == ':')) { + pattern = endp+1; + errno = 0; +@@ -275,11 +281,12 @@ static CURLcode glob_range(URLGlob *glob, char **patternp, + else + endp = NULL; + } + } + ++ fail: + *posp += (pattern - *patternp); + + if(!endp || (min_n > max_n) || (step_n > (max_n - min_n)) || + (step_n <= 0) ) + /* the pattern is not well-formed */ + return GLOBERROR("bad range", *posp, CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT); +-- +2.9.3 + + +From e97ebe97c2b53d3617c1f4082a2aaa4f1b593ef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 18:23:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] glob_next_url: make sure to stay within the given output + buffer + +--- + src/tool_urlglob.c | 17 +++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- src/tool_urlglob.c ++++ src/tool_urlglob.c +@@ -429,10 +429,11 @@ CURLcode glob_url(URLGlob** glob, char* url, unsigned long *urlnum, + *glob = NULL; + + glob_buffer = malloc(strlen(url) + 1); + if(!glob_buffer) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; ++ glob_buffer[0]=0; + + glob_expand = calloc(1, sizeof(URLGlob)); + if(!glob_expand) { + Curl_safefree(glob_buffer); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +@@ -546,33 +547,37 @@ CURLcode glob_next_url(char **globbed, URLGlob *glob) + for(i = 0; i < glob->size; ++i) { + pat = &glob->pattern[i]; + switch(pat->type) { + case UPTSet: + if(pat->content.Set.elements) { +- len = strlen(pat->content.Set.elements[pat->content.Set.ptr_s]); + snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", + pat->content.Set.elements[pat->content.Set.ptr_s]); ++ len = strlen(buf); + buf += len; + buflen -= len; + } + break; + case UPTCharRange: +- *buf++ = pat->content.CharRange.ptr_c; ++ if(buflen) { ++ *buf++ = pat->content.CharRange.ptr_c; ++ *buf = '\0'; ++ buflen--; ++ } + break; + case UPTNumRange: +- len = snprintf(buf, buflen, "%0*ld", +- pat->content.NumRange.padlength, +- pat->content.NumRange.ptr_n); ++ snprintf(buf, buflen, "%0*ld", ++ pat->content.NumRange.padlength, ++ pat->content.NumRange.ptr_n); ++ len = strlen(buf); + buf += len; + buflen -= len; + break; + default: + printf("internal error: invalid pattern type (%d)\n", (int)pat->type); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + } +- *buf = '\0'; + + *globbed = strdup(glob->glob_buffer); + if(!*globbed) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + +-- +2.9.3 + + +From 9ce377051290c83176f235b526b87904cad6b388 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2016 17:25:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] range: reject char globs with missing end like '[L-]' +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +... which previously would lead to out of boundary reads. + +Reported-by: Luật Nguyễn +--- + src/tool_urlglob.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +--- src/tool_urlglob.c ++++ src/tool_urlglob.c +@@ -186,36 +186,40 @@ static CURLcode glob_range(URLGlob *glob, char **patternp, + + if(ISALPHA(*pattern)) { + /* character range detected */ + char min_c; + char max_c; ++ char end_c; + int step=1; + + pat->type = UPTCharRange; + +- rc = sscanf(pattern, "%c-%c", &min_c, &max_c); ++ rc = sscanf(pattern, "%c-%c%c", &min_c, &max_c, &end_c); + +- if((rc == 2) && (pattern[3] == ':')) { +- char *endp; +- unsigned long lstep; +- errno = 0; +- lstep = strtoul(&pattern[4], &endp, 10); +- if(errno || (*endp != ']')) +- step = -1; +- else { +- pattern = endp+1; +- step = (int)lstep; +- if(step > (max_c - min_c)) ++ if(rc == 3) { ++ if(end_c == ':') { ++ char *endp; ++ unsigned long lstep; ++ errno = 0; ++ lstep = strtoul(&pattern[4], &endp, 10); ++ if(errno || (*endp != ']')) + step = -1; ++ else { ++ pattern = endp+1; ++ step = (int)lstep; ++ if(step > (max_c - min_c)) ++ step = -1; ++ } + } ++ else if(end_c != ']') ++ /* then this is wrong */ ++ rc = 0; + } +- else +- pattern += 4; + + *posp += (pattern - *patternp); + +- if((rc != 2) || (min_c >= max_c) || ((max_c - min_c) > ('z' - 'a')) || ++ if((rc != 3) || (min_c >= max_c) || ((max_c - min_c) > ('z' - 'a')) || + (step <= 0) ) + /* the pattern is not well-formed */ + return GLOBERROR("bad range", *posp, CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT); + + /* if there was a ":[num]" thing, use that as step or else use 1 */ +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/019-CVE-2016-8621.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/019-CVE-2016-8621.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +From 8a6d9ded5f02f0294ae63a007e26087316c1998e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2016 16:59:38 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] parsedate: handle cut off numbers better +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +... and don't read outside of the given buffer! + +CVE-2016-8621 + +bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102G.html +Reported-by: Luật Nguyễn +--- + lib/parsedate.c | 12 +++++++----- + tests/data/test517 | 6 ++++++ + tests/libtest/lib517.c | 8 +++++++- + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +--- lib/parsedate.c ++++ lib/parsedate.c +@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2014, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * +@@ -384,19 +384,21 @@ static int parsedate(const char *date, time_t *output) + } + else if(ISDIGIT(*date)) { + /* a digit */ + int val; + char *end; ++ int len=0; + if((secnum == -1) && +- (3 == sscanf(date, "%02d:%02d:%02d", &hournum, &minnum, &secnum))) { ++ (3 == sscanf(date, "%02d:%02d:%02d%n", ++ &hournum, &minnum, &secnum, &len))) { + /* time stamp! */ +- date += 8; ++ date += len; + } + else if((secnum == -1) && +- (2 == sscanf(date, "%02d:%02d", &hournum, &minnum))) { ++ (2 == sscanf(date, "%02d:%02d%n", &hournum, &minnum, &len))) { + /* time stamp without seconds */ +- date += 5; ++ date += len; + secnum = 0; + } + else { + long lval; + int error; +--- tests/data/test517 ++++ tests/data/test517 +@@ -114,10 +114,16 @@ nothing + 79: 20110632 12:34:56 => -1 + 80: 20110623 56:34:56 => -1 + 81: 20111323 12:34:56 => -1 + 82: 20110623 12:34:79 => -1 + 83: Wed, 31 Dec 2008 23:59:60 GMT => 1230768000 ++84: 20110623 12:3 => 1308830580 ++85: 20110623 1:3 => 1308790980 ++86: 20110623 1:30 => 1308792600 ++87: 20110623 12:12:3 => 1308831123 ++88: 20110623 01:12:3 => 1308791523 ++89: 20110623 01:99:30 => -1 + + + # This test case previously tested an overflow case ("2094 Nov 6 => + # 2147483647") for 32bit time_t, but since some systems have 64bit time_t and + # handles this (returning 3939840000), and some 64bit-time_t systems don't +--- tests/libtest/lib517.c ++++ tests/libtest/lib517.c +@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2011, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * +@@ -114,10 +114,16 @@ static const char * const dates[]={ + "20110632 12:34:56", + "20110623 56:34:56", + "20111323 12:34:56", + "20110623 12:34:79", + "Wed, 31 Dec 2008 23:59:60 GMT", /* leap second */ ++ "20110623 12:3", ++ "20110623 1:3", ++ "20110623 1:30", ++ "20110623 12:12:3", ++ "20110623 01:12:3", ++ "20110623 01:99:30", + NULL + }; + + int test(char *URL) + { +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/020-CVE-2016-8622.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/020-CVE-2016-8622.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +From 71da91453899ba20b28ee9712620e323145a0ee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2016 18:56:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] unescape: avoid integer overflow + +CVE-2016-8622 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102H.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + docs/libcurl/curl_easy_unescape.3 | 7 +++++-- + lib/dict.c | 10 +++++----- + lib/escape.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +--- docs/libcurl/curl_easy_unescape.3 ++++ docs/libcurl/curl_easy_unescape.3 +@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ + .\" * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + .\" * / __| | | | |_) | | + .\" * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + .\" * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + .\" * +-.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + .\" * + .\" * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + .\" * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + .\" * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + .\" * +@@ -38,11 +38,14 @@ their binary versions. + If the \fBlength\fP argument is set to 0 (zero), \fIcurl_easy_unescape(3)\fP + will use strlen() on the input \fIurl\fP string to find out the size. + + If \fBoutlength\fP is non-NULL, the function will write the length of the + returned string in the integer it points to. This allows an escaped string +-containing %00 to still get used properly after unescaping. ++containing %00 to still get used properly after unescaping. Since this is a ++pointer to an \fIint\fP type, it can only return a value up to INT_MAX so no ++longer string can be unescaped if the string length is returned in this ++parameter. + + You must \fIcurl_free(3)\fP the returned string when you're done with it. + .SH AVAILABILITY + Added in 7.15.4 and replaces the old \fIcurl_unescape(3)\fP function. + .SH RETURN VALUE +--- lib/dict.c ++++ lib/dict.c +@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * +@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ + + #include "urldata.h" + #include + #include "transfer.h" + #include "sendf.h" +- ++#include "escape.h" + #include "progress.h" + #include "strequal.h" + #include "dict.h" + #include "rawstr.h" + #include "curl_memory.h" +@@ -94,16 +94,16 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_dict = { + static char *unescape_word(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *inputbuff) + { + char *newp; + char *dictp; + char *ptr; +- int len; ++ size_t len; + char ch; + int olen=0; + +- newp = curl_easy_unescape(data, inputbuff, 0, &len); +- if(!newp) ++ CURLcode result = Curl_urldecode(data, inputbuff, 0, &newp, &len, FALSE); ++ if(!newp || result) + return NULL; + + dictp = malloc(((size_t)len)*2 + 1); /* add one for terminating zero */ + if(dictp) { + /* According to RFC2229 section 2.2, these letters need to be escaped with +--- lib/escape.c ++++ lib/escape.c +@@ -222,12 +222,18 @@ char *curl_easy_unescape(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *string, + size_t outputlen; + CURLcode res = Curl_urldecode(data, string, inputlen, &str, &outputlen, + FALSE); + if(res) + return NULL; +- if(olen) +- *olen = curlx_uztosi(outputlen); ++ ++ if(olen) { ++ if(outputlen <= (size_t) INT_MAX) ++ *olen = curlx_uztosi(outputlen); ++ else ++ /* too large to return in an int, fail! */ ++ Curl_safefree(str); ++ } + } + return str; + } + + /* For operating systems/environments that use different malloc/free +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/021-CVE-2016-8623.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/021-CVE-2016-8623.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +From d9d57fe0da6f25d05570fd583520ecd321ed9c3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2016 23:26:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookies: getlist() now holds deep copies of all cookies + +Previously it only held references to them, which was reckless as the +thread lock was released so the cookies could get modified by other +handles that share the same cookie jar over the share interface. + +CVE-2016-8623 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102I.html +Reported-by: Cure53 +--- + lib/cookie.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- + lib/cookie.h | 4 ++-- + lib/http.c | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) + +--- lib/cookie.c ++++ lib/cookie.c +@@ -1022,10 +1022,44 @@ static int cookie_sort(const void *p1, const void *p2) + + /* sorry, can't be more deterministic */ + return 0; + } + ++#define CLONE(field) \ ++ do { \ ++ if(src->field) { \ ++ dup->field = strdup(src->field); \ ++ if(!dup->field) \ ++ goto fail; \ ++ } \ ++ } while(0) ++ ++static struct Cookie *dup_cookie(struct Cookie *src) ++{ ++ struct Cookie *dup = calloc(sizeof(struct Cookie), 1); ++ if(dup) { ++ CLONE(expirestr); ++ CLONE(domain); ++ CLONE(path); ++ CLONE(spath); ++ CLONE(name); ++ CLONE(value); ++ CLONE(maxage); ++ CLONE(version); ++ dup->expires = src->expires; ++ dup->tailmatch = src->tailmatch; ++ dup->secure = src->secure; ++ dup->livecookie = src->livecookie; ++ dup->httponly = src->httponly; ++ } ++ return dup; ++ ++ fail: ++ freecookie(dup); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ + /***************************************************************************** + * + * Curl_cookie_getlist() + * + * For a given host and path, return a linked list of cookies that the +@@ -1077,15 +1111,12 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c, + if(!co->spath || pathmatch(co->spath, path) ) { + + /* and now, we know this is a match and we should create an + entry for the return-linked-list */ + +- newco = malloc(sizeof(struct Cookie)); ++ newco = dup_cookie(co); + if(newco) { +- /* first, copy the whole source cookie: */ +- memcpy(newco, co, sizeof(struct Cookie)); +- + /* then modify our next */ + newco->next = mainco; + + /* point the main to us */ + mainco = newco; +@@ -1093,16 +1124,11 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c, + matches++; + } + else { + fail: + /* failure, clear up the allocated chain and return NULL */ +- while(mainco) { +- co = mainco->next; +- free(mainco); +- mainco = co; +- } +- ++ Curl_cookie_freelist(mainco); + return NULL; + } + } + } + } +@@ -1150,11 +1176,11 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c, + * + ****************************************************************************/ + void Curl_cookie_clearall(struct CookieInfo *cookies) + { + if(cookies) { +- Curl_cookie_freelist(cookies->cookies, TRUE); ++ Curl_cookie_freelist(cookies->cookies); + cookies->cookies = NULL; + cookies->numcookies = 0; + } + } + +@@ -1162,25 +1188,18 @@ void Curl_cookie_clearall(struct CookieInfo *cookies) + * + * Curl_cookie_freelist() + * + * Free a list of cookies previously returned by Curl_cookie_getlist(); + * +- * The 'cookiestoo' argument tells this function whether to just free the +- * list or actually also free all cookies within the list as well. +- * + ****************************************************************************/ + +-void Curl_cookie_freelist(struct Cookie *co, bool cookiestoo) ++void Curl_cookie_freelist(struct Cookie *co) + { + struct Cookie *next; + while(co) { + next = co->next; +- if(cookiestoo) +- freecookie(co); +- else +- free(co); /* we only free the struct since the "members" are all just +- pointed out in the main cookie list! */ ++ freecookie(co); + co = next; + } + } + + +@@ -1231,11 +1250,11 @@ void Curl_cookie_clearsess(struct CookieInfo *cookies) + ****************************************************************************/ + void Curl_cookie_cleanup(struct CookieInfo *c) + { + if(c) { + free(c->filename); +- Curl_cookie_freelist(c->cookies, TRUE); ++ Curl_cookie_freelist(c->cookies); + free(c); /* free the base struct as well */ + } + } + + /* get_netscape_format() +--- lib/cookie.h ++++ lib/cookie.h +@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2011, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * +@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct CookieInfo *, bool header, char *lineptr, + const char *domain, const char *path); + + struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *, const char *, + const char *, bool); +-void Curl_cookie_freelist(struct Cookie *cookies, bool cookiestoo); ++void Curl_cookie_freelist(struct Cookie *cookies); + void Curl_cookie_clearall(struct CookieInfo *cookies); + void Curl_cookie_clearsess(struct CookieInfo *cookies); + + #if defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) || defined(CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES) + #define Curl_cookie_list(x) NULL +--- lib/http.c ++++ lib/http.c +@@ -2382,11 +2382,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done) + break; + count++; + } + co = co->next; /* next cookie please */ + } +- Curl_cookie_freelist(store, FALSE); /* free the cookie list */ ++ Curl_cookie_freelist(store); + } + if(addcookies && !result) { + if(!count) + result = Curl_add_bufferf(req_buffer, "Cookie: "); + if(!result) { +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/022-CVE-2016-8624.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/022-CVE-2016-8624.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 6604d4df30aec66db6f5bd51ee3c341dd7329fcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2016 00:48:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] urlparse: accept '#' as end of host name +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +'http://example.com#@127.0.0.1/x.txt' equals a request to example.com +for the '/' document with the rest of the URL being a fragment. + +CVE-2016-8624 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102J.html +Reported-by: Fernando Muñoz +--- + lib/url.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- lib/url.c ++++ lib/url.c +@@ -4162,8 +4162,8 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data, + /* clear path */ + path[0]=0; + + if(2 > sscanf(data->change.url, +- "%15[^\n:]://%[^\n/?]%[^\n]", ++ "%15[^\n:]://%[^\n/?#]%[^\n]", + protobuf, + conn->host.name, path)) { + +@@ -4174,11 +4174,11 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data, + + /* + * The URL was badly formatted, let's try the browser-style _without_ + * protocol specified like 'http://'. + */ +- rc = sscanf(data->change.url, "%[^\n/?]%[^\n]", conn->host.name, path); ++ rc = sscanf(data->change.url, "%[^\n/?#]%[^\n]", conn->host.name, path); + if(1 > rc) { + /* + * We couldn't even get this format. + * djgpp 2.04 has a sscanf() bug where 'conn->host.name' is + * assigned, but the return value is EOF! +@@ -4279,14 +4279,14 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data, + strcpy(path, "/"); + rebuild_url = TRUE; + } + + /* If the URL is malformatted (missing a '/' after hostname before path) we +- * insert a slash here. The only letter except '/' we accept to start a path +- * is '?'. ++ * insert a slash here. The only letters except '/' that can start a path is ++ * '?' and '#' - as controlled by the two sscanf() patterns above. + */ +- if(path[0] == '?') { ++ if(path[0] != '/') { + /* We need this function to deal with overlapping memory areas. We know + that the memory area 'path' points to is 'urllen' bytes big and that + is bigger than the path. Use +1 to move the zero byte too. */ + memmove(&path[1], path, strlen(path)+1); + path[0] = '/'; +-- +2.9.3 + diff -r d7da0f26b875 -r 17fdfad41903 components/curl/patches/023-CVE-2016-9586.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/curl/patches/023-CVE-2016-9586.patch Tue Jan 10 17:35:21 2017 -0800 @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +commit 3ab3c16db6a5674f53cf23d56512a405fde0b2c9 +Author: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Tue Nov 8 15:32:37 2016 +0100 + + printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues + + ... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests + +This patch is modified to adapt to curl 7.45.0 in Solaris. +--- lib/mprintf.c ++++ lib/mprintf.c +@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@ + #else + # define mp_intmax_t long + # define mp_uintmax_t unsigned long + #endif + +-#define BUFFSIZE 256 /* buffer for long-to-str and float-to-str calcs */ ++#define BUFFSIZE 326 /* buffer for long-to-str and float-to-str calcs, should ++ fit negative DBL_MAX (317 letters) */ + #define MAX_PARAMETERS 128 /* lame static limit */ + + #ifdef __AMIGA__ + # undef FORMAT_INT + #endif +@@ -914,16 +915,29 @@ static int dprintf_formatf( + *fptr++ = '#'; + + *fptr = 0; + + if(width >= 0) { ++ if(width >= (long)sizeof(work)) ++ width = sizeof(work)-1; + /* RECURSIVE USAGE */ + len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, "%ld", width); + fptr += len; + left -= len; + } + if(prec >= 0) { ++ /* for each digit in the integer part, we can have one less ++ precision */ ++ size_t maxprec = sizeof(work) - 2; ++ double val = p->data.dnum; ++ while(val >= 10.0) { ++ val /= 10; ++ maxprec--; ++ } ++ ++ if(prec > (long)maxprec) ++ prec = maxprec-1; + /* RECURSIVE USAGE */ + len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, ".%ld", prec); + fptr += len; + } + if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONG) +@@ -939,11 +953,13 @@ static int dprintf_formatf( + *fptr = 0; /* and a final zero termination */ + + /* NOTE NOTE NOTE!! Not all sprintf implementations return number of + output characters */ + (sprintf)(work, formatbuf, p->data.dnum); +- ++#ifdef CURLDEBUG ++ assert(strlen(work) <= sizeof(work)); ++#endif + for(fptr=work; *fptr; fptr++) + OUTCHAR(*fptr); + } + break;