# HG changeset patch # User Misaki Miyashita # Date 1376744844 25200 # Node ID 45cb7c6c7aa2ffac234973cd3e14b3b1bee26f69 # Parent 7dbaf9c81b754eb8658410247f7e5f6e8d1cf78d 16922032 Need X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN - ability to trust a leaf certificate 16325640 OpenSSL: Enable ASLR to make hacking and modifying binaries more difficult diff -r 7dbaf9c81b75 -r 45cb7c6c7aa2 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/Makefile --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/Makefile Fri Aug 16 09:01:07 2013 -0700 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/Makefile Sat Aug 17 06:07:24 2013 -0700 @@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ $(LN) -fs $(COMPONENT_DIR)/inline-t4/sparcv9-gf2m.pl $(@D)/crypto/bn/asm; \ $(LN) -fs $(COMPONENT_DIR)/inline-t4/sparct4-mont.pl $(@D)/crypto/bn/asm; ) +# Enable ASLR for this component +ASLR_MODE = $(ASLR_ENABLE) + # OpenSSL for wanboot is built on sparc only. ifeq ($(MACH), sparc) BUILD_64 += $(BUILD_DIR_WANBOOT)/.built diff -r 7dbaf9c81b75 -r 45cb7c6c7aa2 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/33_cert_chain.patch --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/33_cert_chain.patch Sat Aug 17 06:07:24 2013 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +This patch comes from OpenSSL upstream code, and the change has been commited to OpenSSL 1.0.2. + http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=fbd2164044f92383955a801ad1b2857d71e83f27 + http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=51e7a4378a78bb0870a2cdc5c524c230c929ebcb + http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2dabd822366df7b2608b55d5ca5f31d5d484cbaf + +Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c +============================================================================ +$ diff -ru crypto/x509/x509_trs.c crypto/x509/x509_trs.c +--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c.orig 4 Dec 2012 17:26:04 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 ++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c 14 Dec 2012 14:30:45 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 +@@ -114,6 +114,15 @@ int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags) + X509_TRUST *pt; + int idx; + if(id == -1) return 1; ++ /* We get this as a default value */ ++ if (id == 0) ++ { ++ int rv; ++ rv = obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, 0); ++ if (rv != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED) ++ return rv; ++ return trust_compat(NULL, x, 0); ++ } + idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id); + if(idx == -1) return default_trust(id, x, flags); + pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx); +Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +============================================================================ +$ cvs diff -u -r1.105.2.9.2.4.2.3 -r1.105.2.9.2.4.2.4 x509_vfy.c +--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 14 Dec 2012 12:53:48 -0000 1.105.2.9.2.4.2.3 ++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 14 Dec 2012 14:30:46 -0000 1.105.2.9.2.4.2.4 +@@ -150,6 +150,33 @@ + } + #endif + ++/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ ++ ++static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) ++ { ++ STACK_OF(X509) *certs; ++ X509 *xtmp = NULL; ++ int i; ++ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ ++ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); ++ if (certs == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ /* Look for exact match */ ++ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) ++ { ++ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); ++ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) ++ break; ++ } ++ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) ++ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); ++ else ++ xtmp = NULL; ++ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); ++ return xtmp; ++ } ++ ++ + int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; +@@ -307,8 +307,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + + /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ + +- /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ +- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) ++ i = check_trust(ctx); ++ ++ /* If explicitly rejected error */ ++ if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) ++ goto end; ++ /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */ ++ if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) + { + if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) + { +@@ -346,12 +351,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + + if (!ok) goto end; + +- /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ +- +- if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); +- +- if (!ok) goto end; +- + /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ + X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); + +@@ -642,28 +641,54 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + + static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { +-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY +- return 1; +-#else + int i, ok; +- X509 *x; ++ X509 *x = NULL; + int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); + cb=ctx->verify_cb; +-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ +- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; +- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); +- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); +- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) +- return 1; +- ctx->error_depth = i; +- ctx->current_cert = x; +- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) +- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; +- else +- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; +- ok = cb(0, ctx); +- return ok; +-#endif ++ /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ ++ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) ++ { ++ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); ++ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); ++ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ ++ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) ++ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; ++ /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if ++ * not overridden. ++ */ ++ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) ++ { ++ ctx->error_depth = i; ++ ctx->current_cert = x; ++ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; ++ ok = cb(0, ctx); ++ if (!ok) ++ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ++ } ++ } ++ /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted ++ * certificate return success. ++ */ ++ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) ++ { ++ X509 *mx; ++ if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) ++ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; ++ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); ++ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); ++ if (mx) ++ { ++ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); ++ X509_free(x); ++ ctx->last_untrusted = 0; ++ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and ++ * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. ++ */ ++ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; + } + + static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +@@ -1591,6 +1630,8 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + xs=xi; + else + { ++ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0) ++ return check_cert_time(ctx, xi); + if (n <= 0) + { + ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; +Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h +============================================================================ +$ cvs diff -u -r1.67.2.3.4.1 -r1.67.2.3.4.2 x509_vfy.h +--- openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h 26 Sep 2012 13:50:42 -0000 1.67.2.3.4.1 ++++ openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h 14 Dec 2012 14:30:46 -0000 1.67.2.3.4.2 +@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@ + /* Check selfsigned CA signature */ + #define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000 + ++/* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */ ++#define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0x80000 + + #define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1 + #define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2 +Index: openssl/apps/apps.c +============================================================================ +$ cvs diff -u -r1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 -r1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 apps.c +--- openssl/apps/apps.c 4 Dec 2012 17:26:04 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.3 ++++ openssl/apps/apps.c 14 Dec 2012 14:30:45 -0000 1.133.2.11.2.6.2.4 +@@ -2361,6 +2361,8 @@ + flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig")) + flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE; ++ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain")) ++ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN; + else + return 0; +