# HG changeset patch # User jenny.yung@oracle.com # Date 1390767705 28800 # Node ID 6f932ca789472f7ccfaa8ccb1c441670c58b1a4d # Parent c59d67c9d1d7ab9a8491d44d613d05148e5c4bc5 18118716 engines/pkcs11 need some clean up diff -r c59d67c9d1d7 -r 6f932ca78947 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.c --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.c Thu Jan 23 09:56:38 2014 -0700 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.c Sun Jan 26 12:21:45 2014 -0800 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. */ /* crypto/engine/e_pk11.c */ @@ -313,6 +313,14 @@ static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); +static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot); +static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info, + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv, + int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar); +static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids, + int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot); static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids); @@ -2955,14 +2963,9 @@ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; int i; CK_RV rv; - CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar; - CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; - int slot_n_cipher = 0; - int slot_n_digest = 0; + CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar; CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; - int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; - int current_slot_n_digest = 0; - + int best_number_of_mechs = 0; int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; @@ -3006,42 +3009,12 @@ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); + pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) { current_slot = pSlotList[i]; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot); - /* Check if slot has random support. */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - continue; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, - token_info.label); - - if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); - pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; - rand_SLOTID = current_slot; - break; - } - } - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); - - pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; - for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) - { - CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; - current_slot = pSlotList[i]; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking slot: %d ==\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); if (rv != CKR_OK) @@ -3049,153 +3022,22 @@ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of signing and - * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, - &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) - { - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, - * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) - { - slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of signing and - * verifying with CKM_DSA. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, - &mech_info); - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) - { - slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; - } - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and - * derivation. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); - if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) - { - slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - if (!found_candidate_slot && - (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); - best_slot_sofar = current_slot; - pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; - pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; - pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; - found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; - /* - * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if - * RSA keys by reference feature is used. - */ - pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", - PK11_DBG); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best slot so far: %d\n", PK11_DBG, - best_slot_sofar); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to " - "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); - } - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); - } - } /* for */ - - if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) + pk11_choose_rand_slot(token_info, current_slot); + + pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(mech_info, token_info, current_slot, + rv, best_number_of_mechs, best_pubkey_slot_sofar); + + pk11_choose_cipher_digest(&local_cipher_nids, + &local_digest_nids, pFuncList, current_slot); + } + + if (best_number_of_mechs == 0) { - pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); } - - found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; - best_slot_sofar = 0; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); - - SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; - for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + else { - current_slot = pSlotList[i]; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot); - - current_slot_n_cipher = 0; - current_slot_n_digest = 0; - (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); - (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); - - pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, - ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); - - pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, - ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot_n_cipher); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot_n_digest); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best cipher/digest slot so far: %d\n", - PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); - - /* - * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than - * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, - * otherwise leave it where it is. - */ - if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > - (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n", - PK11_DBG, current_slot); - best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; - cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; - digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; - (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, - sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); - (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, - sizeof (local_digest_nids)); - } + pubkey_SLOTID = best_pubkey_slot_sofar; } DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); @@ -3211,25 +3053,182 @@ if (pSlotList != NULL) OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ if (any_slot_found != NULL) *any_slot_found = 1; return (1); } +static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot) + { + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking rand slots\n", PK11_DBG); + + if (((token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) != 0) && !pk11_have_random) + { + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( + "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); + pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; + rand_SLOTID = current_slot; + } + } + +static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info, + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv, + int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar) + { + CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; + int current_number_of_mechs = 0; + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking pubkey slots\n", PK11_DBG); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, + &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, + * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) + { + slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; + current_number_of_mechs++; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_DSA. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, + &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; + current_number_of_mechs++; + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and + * derivation. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) + { + slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; + current_number_of_mechs++; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (current_number_of_mechs > best_number_of_mechs) + { + best_pubkey_slot_sofar = current_slot; + pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; + pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; + pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; + best_number_of_mechs = current_number_of_mechs; + /* + * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if + * RSA keys by reference feature is used. + */ + pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to " + "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); + } + } + +static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids, + int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot) + { + int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + int current_slot_n_digest = 0; + + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking cipher/digest\n", PK11_DBG); + + (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); + + pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); + + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_cipher); + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_digest); + + /* + * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than + * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, + * otherwise leave it where it is. + */ + if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > + (cipher_count + digest_count)) + { + DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n", + PK11_DBG, current_slot); + SLOTID = current_slot; + cipher_count = current_slot_n_cipher; + digest_count = current_slot_n_digest; + (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, + sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, + sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + } + } + static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, PK11_CIPHER *cipher) { - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - CK_RV rv; + static CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + static CK_RV rv; + static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE last_checked_mech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)-1; DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type); - rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, &mech_info); + if (cipher->mech_type != last_checked_mech) + { + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, + &mech_info); + } + + last_checked_mech = cipher->mech_type; if (rv != CKR_OK) { @@ -3249,21 +3248,21 @@ mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize); return; } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids)) -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ { DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n"); local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = cipher->nid; } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION else { DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( " rejected, software implementation only\n"); } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ } else { diff -r c59d67c9d1d7 -r 6f932ca78947 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c Thu Jan 23 09:56:38 2014 -0700 +++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 @@ -1,3659 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. - */ - -/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ -/* - * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for - * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). - * - * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by - * Afchine Madjlessi. - */ -/* - * ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -#include -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -#include -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include -#endif -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 - -/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ -#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" -/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ -#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -/* - * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more - * information. - */ -#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) -#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -#endif - -#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION -#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__) -#else -#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) -#endif - -#include -#include -#include "hw_pk11.h" -#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" - -#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine" -#include "hw_pk11_err.c" - -/* - * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), - * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the - * RSA keys by reference feature. - */ -pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -/* - * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel - * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. - */ -int *hw_cnids; -int *hw_dnids; -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - -/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ -static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; - -/* - * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when - * logging into the token. - */ -CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; - -/* - * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for - * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given - * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be - * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already - * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each - * PK11_SESSION object. - * - * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the - * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also - * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another - * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in - * invalid handle returned from the search operation. - * - * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. - * They are also used for active list protection. - */ -pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; - -/* - * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one - * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session - * list) for given algorithm type - */ -PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; - -/* - * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available - * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed - * without losing the secret key objects. - */ -static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - -/* Index for the supported ciphers */ -enum pk11_cipher_id - { - PK11_DES_CBC, - PK11_DES3_CBC, - PK11_DES_ECB, - PK11_DES3_ECB, - PK11_RC4, - PK11_AES_128_CBC, - PK11_AES_192_CBC, - PK11_AES_256_CBC, - PK11_AES_128_ECB, - PK11_AES_192_ECB, - PK11_AES_256_ECB, - PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, - PK11_AES_128_CTR, - PK11_AES_192_CTR, - PK11_AES_256_CTR, - PK11_CIPHER_MAX - }; - -/* Index for the supported digests */ -enum pk11_digest_id - { - PK11_MD5, - PK11_SHA1, - PK11_SHA224, - PK11_SHA256, - PK11_SHA384, - PK11_SHA512, - PK11_DIGEST_MAX - }; - -typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st - { - enum pk11_cipher_id id; - int nid; - int iv_len; - int min_key_len; - int max_key_len; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; - } PK11_CIPHER; - -typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st - { - enum pk11_digest_id id; - int nid; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; - } PK11_DIGEST; - -/* ENGINE level stuff */ -static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); -static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); -static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); -static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); -static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); - -/* RAND stuff */ -static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); -static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -static int pk11_rand_status(void); - -/* These functions are also used in other files */ -PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); - -/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ -extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); -extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); -#endif - -/* Local helper functions */ -static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); -static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); -static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); -static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); -static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, - CK_BBOOL persistent); -static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); -static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); - -/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ -static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); -static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); -static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); -static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); -static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, - const int **nids, int nid); -static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, - const int **nids, int nid); -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); -static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, - int key_len); -static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); -static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, - size_t count); -static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); -static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); -static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); - -static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); -static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot); -static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info, - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv, - int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar); -static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids, - int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot); -static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, - int *local_cipher_nids); -static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, - int *local_digest_nids); -static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, - int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, - PK11_CIPHER *cipher); -static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, - int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, - PK11_DIGEST *digest); - -static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); -static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); -static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - -#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \ - { \ - if (uselock) \ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ - if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ - { \ - retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ - sp->persistent); \ - } \ - if (uselock) \ - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ - } - -static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; -static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; -static int cipher_count = 0; -static int digest_count = 0; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; - -/* - * Static list of ciphers. - * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id, - * thus ciphers[i].id == i - * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id. - */ -static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = - { - { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, - CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, - { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, - CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, - { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, - CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, - { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, - CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, - { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, - CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, - { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, - { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, - { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, - { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, - CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, - { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, - { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, - { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, - CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, - }; - -/* - * Static list of digests. - * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id, - * thus digests[i].id == i - * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id. - */ -static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = - { - {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, - {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, - {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, - {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, - {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, - {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, - {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, - }; - -/* - * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in - * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 - * session in multiple cipher_update calls - */ -typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st - { - PK11_SESSION *sp; - } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; - - -/* - * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets - * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. - * - * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. - */ - -/* DES CBC EVP */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = - { - NID_des_cbc, - 8, 8, 8, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -/* 3DES CBC EVP */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = - { - NID_des_ede3_cbc, - 8, 24, 8, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -/* - * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and - * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. - */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = - { - NID_des_ecb, - 8, 8, 8, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = - { - NID_des_ede3_ecb, - 8, 24, 8, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = - { - NID_aes_128_cbc, - 16, 16, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = - { - NID_aes_192_cbc, - 16, 24, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = - { - NID_aes_256_cbc, - 16, 32, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -/* - * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and - * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. - */ -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = - { - NID_aes_128_ecb, - 16, 16, 0, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = - { - NID_aes_192_ecb, - 16, 24, 0, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = - { - NID_aes_256_ecb, - 16, 32, 0, - EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = - { - NID_aes_128_ctr, - 16, 16, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = - { - NID_aes_192_ctr, - 16, 24, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = - { - NID_aes_256_ctr, - 16, 32, 16, - EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = - { - NID_bf_cbc, - 8, 16, 8, - EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = - { - NID_rc4, - 1, 16, 0, - EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, - pk11_cipher_init, - pk11_cipher_do_cipher, - pk11_cipher_cleanup, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - NULL, - NULL, - NULL - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = - { - NID_md5, - NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, - 0, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - MD5_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = - { - NID_sha1, - NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - SHA_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = - { - NID_sha224, - NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, - SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ - SHA256_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = - { - NID_sha256, - NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - SHA256_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = - { - NID_sha384, - NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, - SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ - SHA512_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = - { - NID_sha512, - NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, - SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, - EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS, - pk11_digest_init, - pk11_digest_update, - pk11_digest_final, - pk11_digest_copy, - pk11_digest_cleanup, - EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, - SHA512_CBLOCK, - sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), - }; - -/* - * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. - * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine - */ -#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE -static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = - { - { - PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, - "SO_PATH", - "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", - ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING - }, - {0, NULL, NULL, 0} - }; - - -static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = - { - pk11_rand_seed, - pk11_rand_bytes, - pk11_rand_cleanup, - pk11_rand_add, - pk11_rand_bytes, - pk11_rand_status - }; - - -/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; -static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support"; - -CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; -static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; - -/* - * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function - * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether - * this is 32 or 64 bit build. - */ -static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; - -static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; -/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ -CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; -static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; -static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE; -static int pk11_pid = 0; - -static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; - -/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ -static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) - { - int type; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - - if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) - { - session_cache[type].lock = - OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); - if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) - goto malloc_err; - (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL); - } - - return (1); - -malloc_err: - pk11_free_all_locks(); - PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - -static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) - { - int type; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); - OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); - find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); - OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); - find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); - OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); - find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) - { - if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); - OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); - session_cache[type].lock = NULL; - } - } - } - -/* - * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. - */ -static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; - RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - if (!pk11_library_init(e)) - return (0); - - if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || - !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || - !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || - !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) - return (0); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || - !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || - !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - if (pk11_have_random) - { - if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) - return (0); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); - } - if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || - !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || - !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || - !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || - !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) - return (0); - -/* - * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup - * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp - * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. - * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); - pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; - pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - - /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ - ERR_load_pk11_strings(); - - return (1); - } - -/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ -#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) - { - if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) - return (0); - - if (!bind_pk11(e)) - return (0); - - return (1); - } - -IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() -IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) - -#else -static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) - { - ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); - - if (!ret) - return (NULL); - - if (!bind_pk11(ret)) - { - ENGINE_free(ret); - return (NULL); - } - - return (ret); - } - -void -ENGINE_load_pk11(void) - { - ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; - - /* - * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to - * security reasons. We will link it in statically. - */ - /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ - if (!pk11_dso) - pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); - - if (pk11_dso == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - return; - } - - e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); - if (!e_pk11) - { - DSO_free(pk11_dso); - pk11_dso = NULL; - return; - } - - /* - * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically - * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 - * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter - * needs cipher and digest algorithm information - */ - if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) - { - DSO_free(pk11_dso); - pk11_dso = NULL; - ENGINE_free(e_pk11); - return; - } - - ENGINE_add(e_pk11); - - ENGINE_free(e_pk11); - ERR_clear_error(); - } -#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and - * the function symbol names to bind to. - */ -static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; - -static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) - { - if (PK11_LIBNAME) - return (PK11_LIBNAME); - - return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); - } - -static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) - { - if (PK11_LIBNAME) - OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); - - PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; - } - -static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) - { - free_PK11_LIBNAME(); - - return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); - } - -/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ -static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) - { - int i; - - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - return; - - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock); - } - } - -/* release all engine specific mutexes */ -static void pk11_fork_parent(void) - { - int i; - - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - return; - - for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); - } - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); - } - -/* - * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them - * accessible to all threads. - */ -static void pk11_fork_child(void) - { - int i; - - if (!pk11_library_initialized) - return; - - for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) - { - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); - } - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); - } - -/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ -static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) - { - return (pk11_library_init(e)); - } - -/* - * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. - * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also - * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and - * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function - * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) - { - CK_C_GetFunctionList p; - CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; - CK_INFO info; - CK_ULONG ul_state_len; - int any_slot_found; - int i; - - /* - * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called - * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one - * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more - * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen - * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a - * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be - * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes - * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID - * check so that we properly initialize the engine again. - */ - if (pk11_library_initialized) - { - if (pk11_pid == getpid()) - { - return (1); - } - else - { - global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - /* - * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case - * the application calls fork() without finishing the - * engine first. - */ - pk11_free_all_locks(); - } - } - - if (pk11_dso == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) - goto err; -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - - /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ - p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, - PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); - if (!p) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ - rv = p(&pFuncList); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); - if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) - goto err; - - /* - * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any - * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an - * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 - * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just - * because no slot was present. - */ - if (any_slot_found == 0) - return (1); - - if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - /* Open the global_session for the new process */ - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, - PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); - goto err; - } - } - - /* - * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since - * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function - */ - if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) - == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " - "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); - digest_count = 0; - } - - pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE; - pk11_pid = getpid(); - /* - * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() - * will do the cleanup. - */ - if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) - goto err; - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - session_cache[i].head = NULL; - /* - * initialize active lists. We only use active lists - * for asymmetric ciphers. - */ - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - active_list[i] = NULL; - - if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) - { - if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, - pk11_fork_child) != 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); - goto err; - } - pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE; - } - - return (1); - -err: - return (0); - } - -/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) - { - free_PK11_LIBNAME(); - ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); - return (1); - } - -/* - * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 - * library. - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) - { - int i; - - if (pk11_dso == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); - goto err; - } - - OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); - - if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) - goto err; - - /* free all active lists */ - for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) - pk11_free_active_list(i); - - pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); - global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* - * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function - * may have side-effects. - */ -#if 0 - pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); -#endif - if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - pk11_dso = NULL; - pFuncList = NULL; - pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; - pk11_pid = 0; - /* - * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than - * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason - * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out - * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes - * the engine before calling fork(). - */ - pk11_free_all_locks(); - - return (1); - -err: - return (0); - } - -/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()) - { - int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); - - switch (cmd) - { - case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: - if (p == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return (0); - } - - if (initialized) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); - return (0); - } - - return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); - default: - break; - } - - PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); - - return (0); - } - - -/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) - { - return; - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) - { - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) - return; - - /* - * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since - * the calling functions do not care anyway - */ - pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); - - return; - } - -static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) - { - pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); - } - -static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) - { - CK_RV rv; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) - return (0); - - rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); - return (0); - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); - return (1); - } - -/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ -static int pk11_rand_status(void) - { - return (1); - } - -/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ -static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - switch (optype) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case OP_RSA: - if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - } - break; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case OP_DSA: - if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; - } - break; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - case OP_DH: - if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; - } - break; -#endif - default: - break; - } - } - -/* - * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have - * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here - * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. - * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. - */ -PK11_SESSION * -pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; - pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; - static pid_t pid = 0; - pid_t new_pid; - CK_RV rv; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - case OP_RAND: - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return (NULL); - } - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); - - /* - * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in - * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session - * here, with no PID information. - */ - if (pid == 0) - pid = getpid(); - - freelist = session_cache[optype].head; - sp = freelist; - - /* - * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled - * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first - * structure from the freelist. - */ - if (sp == NULL) - { - if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, - PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); - - /* - * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the - * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so - * mark them as unused. - */ - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - else - freelist = sp->next; - - /* - * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all - * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. - */ - if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) - { - pid = new_pid; - - /* - * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited - * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which - * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the - * head of the list). - */ - while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) - { - freelist = sp1->next; - /* - * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() - * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 - * sessions and destroy all objects. - */ - pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); - OPENSSL_free(sp1); - } - - /* we have to free the active list as well. */ - pk11_free_active_list(optype); - - /* Initialize the process */ - rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); - if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, - rv); - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - - /* - * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this - * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one - * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. - * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more - * information. - */ -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) - goto err; -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) - goto err; - - /* Open the global_session for the new process */ - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, - rv); - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - - /* - * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs - * re-initialization. - */ - if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) - { - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) - { - /* - * We will keep the session in the cache list and let - * the caller cope with the situation. - */ - freelist = sp; - sp = NULL; - goto err; - } - } - - if (sp->pid == 0) - { - /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ - if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) - { - OPENSSL_free(sp); - sp = NULL; - } - } - - /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ - session_cache[optype].head = freelist; - -err: - if (sp != NULL) - sp->next = NULL; - - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); - - return (sp); - } - - -void -pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; - PK11_SESSION *freelist; - - /* - * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and - * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the - * next time we will ask for a new session. - */ - if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) - return; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - case OP_RAND: - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return; - } - - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); - freelist = session_cache[optype].head; - sp->next = freelist; - session_cache[optype].head = sp; - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); - } - - -/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ -static int pk11_free_all_sessions() - { - int ret = 1; - int type; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); - - /* - * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will - * return 0 on exit. - */ - for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) - { - if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) - ret = 0; - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many - * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we - * return an error on return. - */ -static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - CK_RV rv; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; - pid_t mypid = getpid(); - pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; - int ret = 1; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - case OP_RAND: - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return (0); - } - - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); - freelist = session_cache[optype].head; - while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) - { - if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, - PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); - ret = 0; - } - } - freelist = sp->next; - pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); - OPENSSL_free(sp); - } - - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); - return (ret); - } - - -static int -pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_SLOT_ID myslot; - - switch (optype) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; - break; - case OP_RAND: - myslot = rand_SLOTID; - break; - case OP_DIGEST: - case OP_CIPHER: - myslot = SLOTID; - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, - PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); - return (0); - } - - sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); - if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) - { - /* - * We are probably a child process so force the - * reinitialize of the session - */ - pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; - if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) - return (0); - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); - } - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); - return (0); - } - - sp->pid = getpid(); - - switch (optype) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case OP_RSA: - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case OP_DSA: - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - case OP_DH: - sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dh = NULL; - sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - case OP_CIPHER: - sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; - break; - } - - /* - * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent - * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. - */ - sp->persistent = CK_FALSE; - return (1); - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* - * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code, - * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the - * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying - * a public or a private key, we always free what we can. - */ -static void -destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; - } - if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - } - } - -/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, - ret, uselock, OP_RSA); - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; - destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, - ret, uselock, OP_RSA); - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; - destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all - * objects in the free list. - */ -int -pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; - uselock = CK_FALSE; - } - - /* - * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects - */ - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - /* - * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the - * destroy operations fails. - */ - if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - } - - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); - - return (ret); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, - ret, uselock, OP_DSA); - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; - if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; - } - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, - ret, uselock, OP_DSA); - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; - if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; - } - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all - * objects in the free list. - */ -int -pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; - uselock = CK_FALSE; - } - - /* - * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects - */ - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - /* - * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the - * destroy operations fails. - */ - if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - } - - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); - - return (ret); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ -int -pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) - { - int ret = 0; - - if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, - ret, uselock, OP_DH); - sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - sp->opdata_dh = NULL; - if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) - { - BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); - sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; - } - } - - return (ret); - } - -/* - * Destroy DH key object wrapper. - * - * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure - * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list - */ -int -pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; - uselock = CK_FALSE; - } - - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - /* - * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the - * destroy operations fails. - */ - if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) - { - ret = 0; - continue; - } - } -err: - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); - - return (ret); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - -static int -pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, - CK_BBOOL persistent) - { - CK_RV rv; - - /* - * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects - * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so - * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. - */ - if (persistent == CK_TRUE) - return (1); - - rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, - rv); - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - - -/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ - -static int -cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) - if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) - return (ciphers[i].id); - return (-1); - } - -static int -pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) - { - if (cipher_count > 0) - *nids = cipher_nids; - else - *nids = NULL; - return (cipher_count); - } - -static int -pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) - { - if (digest_count > 0) - *nids = digest_nids; - else - *nids = NULL; - return (digest_count); - } - -/* - * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. - */ -static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, - PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; - - /* - * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and - * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before - * pk11_init_symmetric() is called. - */ - OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL); - OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); - OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); - - if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || - ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || - ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) - { - pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); - pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); - /* - * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, - * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 - * needs. For more information on internal structure of the - * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can - * add code so that the counter length can be set via - * ENGINE_ctrl() function. - */ - ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - } - else - { - if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) - { - pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; - pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; - } - } - - /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ - if (ctx->encrypt) - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, - sp->opdata_cipher_key); - else - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, - sp->opdata_cipher_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? - PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) - { - CK_MECHANISM mech; - int index; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; - - state->sp = NULL; - - index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); - if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) - return (0); - - p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; - /* - * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the - * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our - * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From - * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a - * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key - * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this - * code serves as a sanity check. - * - * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be - * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs - * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES - * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. - */ - if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || - ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || - ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); - return (0); - } - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) - return (0); - - /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ - mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - - /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ - (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); - - /* - * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then - * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the - * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). - */ - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && - sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) - { - state->sp = sp; - if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) - return (0); - - return (1); - } - - /* - * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object - * needs to be created. - */ - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( - ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); - } - - if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) - { - /* - * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to - * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. - */ - if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) - { - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - } - - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - - /* now initialize the context with a new key */ - if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) - return (0); - - sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; - state->sp = sp; - - return (1); - } - -/* - * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a - * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session - * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so - * that it needs not be recreated. - * - * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this - * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return - * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good - * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix - * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. - */ -static int -pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - CK_RV rv; - - rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); - return (0); - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, - NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -/* - * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient - * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. - */ -static int -pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) - { - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - CK_RV rv; - unsigned long outl = inl; - - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - return (0); - - sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; - - if (!inl) - return (1); - - /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ - if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) - return (0); - - if (ctx->encrypt) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, - PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); - return (0); - } - } - else - { - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, - PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); - return (0); - } - } - - /* - * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always - * the same size of input. - * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with - * correctly aligned buffers. - */ - if (inl != outl) - return (0); - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() - * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's - * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but - * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't - * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with - * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, - * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used - * context is initialized without finalizing it first. - */ -static int -pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; - CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; - - if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) - { - /* - * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get - * rid of the context. - */ - if (ctx->encrypt) - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( - state->sp->session, buf, &len); - else - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( - state->sp->session, buf, &len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? - PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); - return (0); - } - - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); - state->sp = NULL; - } - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with - * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the - * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, - const int **nids, int nid) - { - if (!cipher) - return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); - - switch (nid) - { - case NID_des_ede3_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; - break; - case NID_des_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; - break; - case NID_des_ede3_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; - break; - case NID_des_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_128_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_192_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_256_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_128_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_192_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_256_ecb: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; - break; - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; - break; - case NID_aes_256_ctr: - *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; - break; - case NID_bf_cbc: - *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; - break; - case NID_rc4: - *cipher = &pk11_rc4; - break; - default: - *cipher = NULL; - break; - } - return (*cipher != NULL); - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, - const int **nids, int nid) - { - if (!digest) - return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); - - switch (nid) - { - case NID_md5: - *digest = &pk11_md5; - break; - case NID_sha1: - *digest = &pk11_sha1; - break; - case NID_sha224: - *digest = &pk11_sha224; - break; - case NID_sha256: - *digest = &pk11_sha256; - break; - case NID_sha384: - *digest = &pk11_sha384; - break; - case NID_sha512: - *digest = &pk11_sha512; - break; - default: - *digest = NULL; - break; - } - return (*digest != NULL); - } - - -/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; - - CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, - {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, - }; - - /* - * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions - * can use the key handles. Here is why: - * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. - * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. - * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with - * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES - * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and - * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session - * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key - * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to - * terminate the active operation. - */ - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; - a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; - a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; - a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; - a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; - - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, - a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, - rv); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Save the key information used in this session. - * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. - */ - sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ? - PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len; - (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); -err: - - return (h_key); - } - -static int -md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) - if (digests[i].nid == nid) - return (digests[i].id); - return (-1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech; - int index; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - PK11_DIGEST *pdp; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; - - state->sp = NULL; - - index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); - if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) - return (0); - - pdp = &digests[index]; - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) - return (0); - - /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ - mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - - rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); - return (0); - } - - state->sp = sp; - - return (1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) - { - CK_RV rv; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; - - /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ - if (count == 0) - return (1); - - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - return (0); - - rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, - count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); - state->sp = NULL; - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) - { - CK_RV rv; - unsigned long len; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; - len = ctx->digest->md_size; - - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - return (0); - - rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); - state->sp = NULL; - return (0); - } - - if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) - return (0); - - /* - * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session - * to the pool - */ - pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); - state->sp = NULL; - - return (1); - } - -static int -pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) - { - CK_RV rv; - int ret = 0; - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; - CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; - CK_ULONG ul_state_len; - - /* The copy-from state */ - state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; - if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) - goto err; - - /* Initialize the copy-to state */ - if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) - goto err; - state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; - - /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, - &ul_state_len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, - rv); - goto err; - } - if (ul_state_len == 0) - { - goto err; - } - - pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); - if (pstate == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, - &ul_state_len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, - rv); - goto err; - } - - /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ - rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, - ul_state_len, 0, 0); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, - PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); - goto err; - } - - ret = 1; -err: - if (pstate != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(pstate); - - return (ret); - } - -/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ -static int -pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) - { - PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; - unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - - if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) - { - /* - * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not - * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory - * that might have been allocated in the token when - * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() - * will return the session to the cache. - */ - if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) - return (0); - } - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key - * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key - * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for - * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first - * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same - * prefix. - */ -static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, - int key_len) - { - if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || - memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) - { - (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); - return (0); - } - return (1); - } - -/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ -static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) - { - int ret = 0; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; - - if (session != NULL) - local_free_session = session; - else - { - (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); - local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; - } - - while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) - { - local_free_session = sp->next; - - if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - /* - * The secret key object is created in the - * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). - */ - if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, - sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) - goto err; - sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - } - ret = 1; -err: - - if (session == NULL) - (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); - - return (ret); - } - - -/* - * Public key mechanisms optionally supported - * - * CKM_RSA_X_509 - * CKM_RSA_PKCS - * CKM_DSA - * - * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a - * public key slot. - * - * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported - * - * CKM_DES3_CBC - * CKM_DES_CBC - * CKM_AES_CBC - * CKM_DES3_ECB - * CKM_DES_ECB - * CKM_AES_ECB - * CKM_AES_CTR - * CKM_RC4 - * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC - * - * Digests optionally supported - * - * CKM_MD5 - * CKM_SHA_1 - * CKM_SHA224 - * CKM_SHA256 - * CKM_SHA384 - * CKM_SHA512 - * - * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which - * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of - * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global - * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key - * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. - */ -static int -pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) - { - CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; - CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; - int i; - CK_RV rv; - CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar; - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; - int best_number_of_mechs = 0; - int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; - int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; - - /* let's initialize the output parameter */ - if (any_slot_found != NULL) - *any_slot_found = 0; - - /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); - return (0); - } - - /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ - if (ulSlotCount == 0) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); - return (1); - } - - pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); - - if (pSlotList == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - - /* Get the slot list for processing */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - return (0); - } - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); - - pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; - for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) - { - current_slot = pSlotList[i]; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking slot: %d ==\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot); - rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - continue; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, - token_info.label); - pk11_choose_rand_slot(token_info, current_slot); - - pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(mech_info, token_info, current_slot, - rv, best_number_of_mechs, best_pubkey_slot_sofar); - - pk11_choose_cipher_digest(&local_cipher_nids, - &local_digest_nids, pFuncList, current_slot); - } - - if (best_number_of_mechs == 0) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); - } - else - { - pubkey_SLOTID = best_pubkey_slot_sofar; - } - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); - - if (pSlotList != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); - OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - - if (any_slot_found != NULL) - *any_slot_found = 1; - return (1); - } - -static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking rand slots\n", PK11_DBG); - - if (((token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) != 0) && !pk11_have_random) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); - pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; - rand_SLOTID = current_slot; - } - } - -static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info, - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv, - int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar) - { - CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; - CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; - int current_number_of_mechs = 0; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking pubkey slots\n", PK11_DBG); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of signing and - * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, - &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) - { - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, - * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) - { - slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; - current_number_of_mechs++; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of signing and - * verifying with CKM_DSA. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, - &mech_info); - if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) - { - slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; - current_number_of_mechs++; - } - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* - * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and - * derivation. - */ - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); - - if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, - CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); - if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) - { - slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; - current_number_of_mechs++; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - - if (current_number_of_mechs > best_number_of_mechs) - { - best_pubkey_slot_sofar = current_slot; - pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; - pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; - pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; - best_number_of_mechs = current_number_of_mechs; - /* - * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if - * RSA keys by reference feature is used. - */ - pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to " - "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); - } - } - -static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids, - int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot) - { - int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; - int current_slot_n_digest = 0; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking cipher/digest\n", PK11_DBG); - - (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); - (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); - - pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, - ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); - - pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, - ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot_n_cipher); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, - current_slot_n_digest); - - /* - * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than - * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, - * otherwise leave it where it is. - */ - if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > - (cipher_count + digest_count)) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n", - PK11_DBG, current_slot); - SLOTID = current_slot; - cipher_count = current_slot_n_cipher; - digest_count = current_slot_n_digest; - (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, - sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); - (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, - sizeof (local_digest_nids)); - } - } - -static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, - PK11_CIPHER *cipher) - { - static CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - static CK_RV rv; - static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE last_checked_mech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)-1; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type); - if (cipher->mech_type != last_checked_mech) - { - rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, - &mech_info); - } - - last_checked_mech = cipher->mech_type; - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n"); - return; - } - - if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && - (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) - { - if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len || - mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not" - " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n", - cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len, - mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize); - return; - } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids)) -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n"); - local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = - cipher->nid; - } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - " rejected, software implementation only\n"); - } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - } - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n"); - } - - return; - } - -static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, - int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest) - { - CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; - CK_RV rv; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type); - rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n"); - return; - } - - if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) - { -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids)) -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n"); - local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = - digest->nid; - } -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL( - " rejected, software implementation only\n"); - } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - } - else - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n"); - } - - return; - } - -/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ -static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) - { - pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, - current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]); - } - } - -/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ -static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, - CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) - { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) - { - pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest, - local_digest_nids, &digests[i]); - } - } - -#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION -/* - * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library - * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation - * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code - * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the - * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some - * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a - * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, - * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the - * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte - * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products - * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression - * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the - * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. - * - * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for - * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same - * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 - * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without - * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use - * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since - * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said - * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with - * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code - * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for - * asymmetric operations. - * - * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what - * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can - * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be - * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, - * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. - * - * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find - * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric - * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table - * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays - * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the - * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token - * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more - * information. - * - * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined - * the code won't be used. - */ -#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) -static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -#else -static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; -#endif - -/* - * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, - * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware - * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. - */ -static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) - { - int i; - CK_RV rv; - void *handle; - CK_C_GetFunctionList p; - CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; - CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; - int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; - CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; - CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; - int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; - int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", - PK11_DBG); - /* - * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own - * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions - * from the top-level PKCS#11 library. - */ - if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, - PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ - if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); - if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, - PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); - goto err; - } - - /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ - if (ulSlotCount == 0) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); - hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); - hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); - if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, - PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - /* this means empty tables */ - hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; - hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; - return (1); - } - - pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); - if (pSlotList == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Get the slot list for processing */ - if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); - goto err; - } - - /* - * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also - * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the - * search. - */ - hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; - hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; - tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); - tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); - if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef - * is zero now. - */ - for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) - tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; - for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) - tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", - PK11_DBG); - - for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) - { - if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) - continue; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, - token_info.label); - - /* - * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are - * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. - */ - pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], - &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); - pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], - &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); - } - - /* - * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function - * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by - * dlclose(3C). - */ -#if 0 - pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); -#endif - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - (void) dlclose(handle); - hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; - hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; - - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); - return (1); - -err: - if (pSlotList != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); - if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); - if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); - - return (0); - } - -/* - * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., - * non-existent). - */ -static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) - { - int i = 0; - - /* - * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new - * table. - */ - if (nid_table == NULL) - return (1); - - /* - * the table is never full, there is always at least one - * NID_undef. - */ - while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) - { - if (nid_table[i++] == nid) - { - DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); - return (1); - } - } - - return (0); - } -#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ diff -r c59d67c9d1d7 -r 6f932ca78947 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c Thu Jan 23 09:56:38 2014 -0700 +++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 @@ -1,307 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. - * - */ - -/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ -/* - * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for - * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). - * - * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by - * Afchine Madjlessi. - */ -/* - * ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include "hw_pk11_err.h" - -/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= -{ -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, -{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, -{ 0, NULL} -}; - -static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= -{ -{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, -{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, -{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, -{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, -{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, -{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, -{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, -{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, -{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, -{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, -{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, -{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, -{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, -{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, -{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, -{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, -{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, -{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, -{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, -{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, -{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, -{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, -{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, -{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, -{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, -{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, -{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, -{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, -{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, -{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, -{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, -{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, -{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, -{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, -{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, -{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, -{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, -{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, -{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, -{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, -{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, -{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, -{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, -{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, -{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, -{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, -{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, -{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, -{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, -{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork failed" }, -{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login failed on token" }, -{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, -{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, -{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, -{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, -{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen dialog command" }, -{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe failed" }, -{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, -{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, -{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, -{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, -{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, -{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, -{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, -{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, -{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, -{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf failed" }, -{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap failed" }, -{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, -{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock failed" }, -{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork failed" }, -{ 0, NULL} -}; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ - -static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; -static int pk11_error_init = 1; - -#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME -static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] = -{ -{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME}, -{0, NULL} -}; -#endif - -static void -ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) - { - if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) - pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); - - if (pk11_error_init) - { - pk11_error_init = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR - ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); - ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -#endif - -#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME - pk11_engine_lib_name->error = - ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0); - ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name); -#endif - } - } - -static void -ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) - { - if (pk11_error_init == 0) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR - ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); - ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); -#endif - -#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME - ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name); -#endif - - pk11_error_init = 1; - } - } - -void -ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) - { - if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) - pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); - ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); - } - -void -PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) - { - char tmp_buf[20]; - - PK11err(function, reason); - (void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); - } diff -r c59d67c9d1d7 -r 6f932ca78947 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c Thu Jan 23 09:56:38 2014 -0700 +++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 @@ -1,3239 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. - * - */ - -/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ -/* - * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for - * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). - * - * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by - * Afchine Madjlessi. - */ -/* - * ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -#include -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -#include -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 - -#include -#include -#include "hw_pk11.h" -#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" - -static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; -extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; - -/* - * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the - * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent. - */ -char *passphrasedialog; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* RSA stuff */ -static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, - unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, - unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, - const RSA *rsa); -EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id, - UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id, - UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); - -static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); - -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); - -static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); -#endif - -/* DSA stuff */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); -static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); -static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, - DSA *dsa); -static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); - -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, - BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, - BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); - -static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); -#endif - -/* DH stuff */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); -static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); -static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); -static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, - const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); - -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, - BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); - -static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); -#endif - -static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); -static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, - CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); -static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); - -/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ -#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL -static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; -#else -static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; -#endif - -/* - * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11 - * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if - * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list - * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from - * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the - * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to - * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy(). - * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY. - */ -#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ - { \ - if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ - { \ - var = CK_TRUE; \ - if (unlock) \ - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ - goto label; \ - } \ - } - -/* - * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the - * entry otherwise return NULL. - * - * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list - * held. - */ -static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) - { - PK11_active *entry; - - for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) - if (entry->h == h) - return (entry); - - return (NULL); - } - -/* - * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a - * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of - * failure. - * - * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list - * held. - */ -int -pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) - { - PK11_active *entry = NULL; - - if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); - return (-1); - } - - /* search for entry in the active list */ - if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) - entry->refcnt++; - else - { - /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ - entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); - if (entry == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - entry->h = h; - entry->refcnt = 1; - entry->prev = NULL; - entry->next = NULL; - /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ - if (active_list[type] == NULL) - active_list[type] = entry; - else /* make the entry first in the list */ - { - entry->next = active_list[type]; - active_list[type]->prev = entry; - active_list[type] = entry; - } - } - - return (entry->refcnt); - } - -/* - * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. - * - * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list - * held. - */ -void -pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) - { - PK11_active *prev_entry; - - /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ - if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) - { - prev_entry->next = entry->next; - if (entry->next != NULL) - entry->next->prev = prev_entry; - } - else - { - active_list[type] = entry->next; - /* we were the first but not the only one */ - if (entry->next != NULL) - entry->next->prev = NULL; - } - - /* sanitization */ - entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - entry->prev = NULL; - entry->next = NULL; - OPENSSL_free(entry); - } - -/* Free all entries from the active list. */ -void -pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) - { - PK11_active *entry; - - /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ - switch (type) - { - case OP_RSA: - case OP_DSA: - case OP_DH: - break; - default: - return; - } - - /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); - while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) - pk11_active_remove(entry, type); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); - } - -/* - * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, - * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. - * - * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, - * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. - * - * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list - * held. - */ -int -pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) - { - PK11_active *entry = NULL; - - if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); - return (-1); - } - - OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); - entry->refcnt--; - if (entry->refcnt == 0) - { - pk11_active_remove(entry, type); - return (1); - } - - return (0); - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = - { - "PKCS#11 RSA method", - pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ - pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ - pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ - pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ - NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ - NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ - pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ - pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ - RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ - NULL, /* app_data */ - pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ - pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ - }; - -RSA_METHOD * -PK11_RSA(void) - { - return (&pk11_rsa); - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = - { - "PKCS#11 DSA method", - pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ - NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ - pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ - NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ - NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ - pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ - pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ - 0, /* flags */ - NULL /* app_data */ - }; - -DSA_METHOD * -PK11_DSA(void) - { - return (&pk11_dsa); - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -/* - * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for - * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but - * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by - * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be - * enough. - */ -#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 - -/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = - { - "PKCS#11 DH method", - pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ - pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ - NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ - pk11_DH_init, /* init */ - pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ - 0, /* flags */ - NULL, /* app_data */ - NULL /* generate_params */ - }; - -DH_METHOD * -PK11_DH(void) - { - return (&pk11_dh); - } -#endif - -/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ -#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 - -/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ -#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 -#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 - -static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; -static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* - * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to - * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not - * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. - * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. - */ -static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - int i, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); - break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); - break; -#endif - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) goto err; - - /* PK11 functions are called here */ - r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -err: - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return (r); - } - - -/* - * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors - * should be catched in the padding functions - */ -static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - int i, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) goto err; - - /* PK11 functions are called here */ - r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); -err: - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return (r); - } - -/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM f; - int j, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - BN_init(&f); - - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - - if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things - * and chops off the top '0' bytes - */ - if (flen > num) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, - PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - /* make data into a big number */ - if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, - PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - /* PK11 functions are called here */ - r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); - - /* - * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. - * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. - */ - for (j = 0; j < r; j++) - if (buf[j] != 0) - break; - - p = buf + j; - j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); - break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); - break; -#endif - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - -err: - BN_clear_free(&f); - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return (r); - } - -/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ -static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM f; - int i, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - - BN_init(&f); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (buf == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things - * and chops off the top '0' bytes - */ - if (flen > num) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, - PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - /* PK11 functions are called here */ - r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); - - /* - * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. - * Needs to skip these 0's here - */ - for (i = 0; i < r; i++) - if (buf[i] != 0) - break; - - p = buf + i; - i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); - break; - default: - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - -err: - BN_clear_free(&f); - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return (r); - } - -/* - * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and - * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. - * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. - */ -static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, - const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) - { - CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; - int retval = -1; - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - return (-1); - - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); - - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; - if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = - pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - - if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, - h_pub_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, - PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, - PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - retval = bytes_encrypted; - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (retval); - } - - -/* - * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and - * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. - * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. - */ -static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, - const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) - { - CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; - int retval = -1; - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - return (-1); - - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); - - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; - if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = - pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - - if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, - h_priv_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, - PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, - rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - - retval = ul_sig_len; - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (retval); - } - - -/* - * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and - * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. - * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. - */ -static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, - const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) - { - CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; - int retval = -1; - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - return (-1); - - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); - - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; - if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = - pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - - if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, - h_priv_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, - PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, - PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - retval = bytes_decrypted; - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (retval); - } - - -/* - * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit - * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. - * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. - */ -static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, - const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) - { - CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; - int retval = -1; - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - return (-1); - - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); - - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; - if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = - pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - - if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, - p_mech, h_pub_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, - PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, - (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, - PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (-1); - } - retval = bytes_decrypted; - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (retval); - } - -static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) - { - /* - * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, - * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. - */ - rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; - - return (1); - } - -static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) - { - /* - * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need - * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum - * structures. - */ - if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - - return (1); - } - -/* - * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from - * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. - * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c - */ -static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, - unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) - { - X509_SIG sig; - ASN1_TYPE parameter; - int i, j; - unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; - X509_ALGOR algor; - ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - int ret = 0; - unsigned long ulsiglen; - - /* Encode the digest */ - /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ - if (type == NID_md5_sha1) - { - if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, - PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - goto err; - } - i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; - s = (unsigned char *)m; - } - else - { - sig.algor = &algor; - sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); - if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, - PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, - PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); - goto err; - } - parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; - parameter.value.ptr = NULL; - sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; - - sig.digest = &digest; - sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; - sig.digest->length = m_len; - - i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); - } - - j = RSA_size(rsa); - if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); - goto err; - } - - if (type != NID_md5_sha1) - { - s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); - if (s == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - p = s; - (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); - } - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - goto err; - - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); - - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; - if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = - pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); - - if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - ulsiglen = j; - rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, - (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); - *siglen = ulsiglen; - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); - goto err; - } - ret = 1; - } - -err: - if (type != NID_md5_sha1) - { - (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); - OPENSSL_free(s); - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (ret); - } - -static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, - unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, - const RSA *rsa) - { - X509_SIG sig; - ASN1_TYPE parameter; - int i, j; - unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; - X509_ALGOR algor; - ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - int ret = 0; - - /* Encode the digest */ - /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ - if (type == NID_md5_sha1) - { - if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, - PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - goto err; - } - i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; - s = (unsigned char *)m; - } - else - { - sig.algor = &algor; - sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); - if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, - PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, - PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); - goto err; - } - parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; - parameter.value.ptr = NULL; - sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; - sig.digest = &digest; - sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; - sig.digest->length = m_len; - i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); - } - - j = RSA_size(rsa); - if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); - goto err; - } - - if (type != NID_md5_sha1) - { - s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); - if (s == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - p = s; - (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); - } - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - goto err; - - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); - - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; - if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = - pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); - - if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, - h_pub_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, - rv); - goto err; - } - rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf, - (CK_ULONG)siglen); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); - goto err; - } - ret = 1; - } - -err: - if (type != NID_md5_sha1) - { - (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen); - OPENSSL_free(s); - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (ret); - } - -#define MAXATTR 1024 -/* - * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the - * PKCS#11 token. - */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id, - UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) - { - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - FILE *privkey; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - RSA *rsa = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ - const char *file; - int ret; - pkcs11_uri uri_struct; - CK_RV rv; - CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; - CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; - CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR]; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ - - /* We look for private keys only. */ - CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = - { - {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, - {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, - {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} - }; - - /* - * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA - * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we - * never ask for private components. - */ - CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = - { - {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ - {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ - }; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - return (NULL); - - /* - * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in - * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in - * the 'privkey_id' parameter. - */ - ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); - - if (ret == 0) - goto err; - - /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */ - if (ret == 1) - { - if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) - goto err; - - search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; - search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); - - if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, - &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0) - goto err; - - /* - * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure - * if we can't find it. - */ - if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, - &ks_key) == 0) - goto err; - - /* - * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field - * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find - * is done. - */ - pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); - - /* - * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to - * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL - * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate - * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used - * many times. We do not check the return value because even in - * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer - * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports - * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); - - sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; - /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ - sp->persistent = CK_TRUE; - - if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) - goto err; - - if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, - get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, - PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now - * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons. - */ - sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; - - /* - * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take - * care of handle management ourselves. - */ - KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); - - /* - * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export - * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). - */ - attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); - attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); - /* - * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as - * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key - * in the keystore. - */ - attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); - - if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) - goto err; - } - else - if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) - { - pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); - (void) fclose(privkey); - if (pkey != NULL) - { - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); - if (rsa != NULL) - { - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, - rsa); - - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = - pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - goto err; - } - else - goto err; - } - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (pkey); -err: - if (rsa != NULL) - RSA_free(rsa); - if (pkey != NULL) - { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey = NULL; - } - return (pkey); - } - -/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id, - UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) - { - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - FILE *pubkey; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - RSA *rsa = NULL; - PK11_SESSION *sp; - /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */ - int ret; - const char *file; - pkcs11_uri uri_struct; - CK_RV rv; - CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; - CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ - - CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = - { - {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, - {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, - {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} - }; - - /* - * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA - * structure with something we can use to look up the key. - */ - CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = - { - {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ - {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ - }; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) - return (NULL); - - ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); - - if (ret == 0) - goto err; - - if (ret == 1) - { - if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) - goto err; - - search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; - search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); - - if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, - &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0) - goto err; - - if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, - &ks_key) == 0) - { - goto err; - } - - /* - * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field - * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done. - */ - pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); - /* - * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA - * structure. No cache hit is possible. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); - sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; - - if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) - goto err; - - if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, - get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, - PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. - */ - sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; - - /* - * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export - * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). - */ - attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); - attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); - - if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) - goto err; - - /* - * Create a session object from it so that when calling - * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The - * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA - * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for - * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears - * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if - * we always have a session key. Note that this is different - * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that - * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore - * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. - */ - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = - pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - goto err; - } - else - if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) - { - pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); - (void) fclose(pubkey); - if (pkey != NULL) - { - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); - if (rsa != NULL) - { - /* - * This will always destroy the RSA - * object since we have a new RSA - * structure here. - */ - (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, - rsa); - - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = - pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); - if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey = NULL; - } - } - else - { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey = NULL; - } - } - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); - return (pkey); -err: - if (rsa != NULL) - RSA_free(rsa); - if (pkey != NULL) - { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - pkey = NULL; - } - return (pkey); - } - -/* - * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the - * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and - * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new - * session object is created and put also onto the active object list. - * - * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in - * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively. - */ -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_ULONG found; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; - CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; - - CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, - {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} - }; - - int i; - - a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; - a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; - - a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( - (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen); - if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue); - - a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); - a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( - (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); - if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue); - - /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, - ul_key_attr_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (found == 0) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, - a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); - goto err; - } - } - - if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - - if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - - /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ - KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); - sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; - -err: - if (rollback) - { - /* - * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() - * since we are doing rollback. - */ - if (found == 0) - (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); - h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - -malloc_err: - for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++) - { - if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); - a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; - } - } - - return (h_key); - } - -/* - * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e' - * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference - * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be - * NULL here. - */ -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE -pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - int i; - CK_ULONG found; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; - CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; - - /* - * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys - */ - CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, - {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, - }; - - a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; - a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; - - /* Put the private key components into the template */ - if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, - &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, - &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, - &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, - &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, - &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, - &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, - &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, - &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - - /* - * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL. - * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can - * use only public components for searching for the private key handle. - */ - if (rsa->d == NULL) - { - ul_key_attr_count = 8; - /* - * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing - * session keys. - */ - a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, - ul_key_attr_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (found == 0) - { - /* - * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we - * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was - * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key - * types we just create a new session key using the private - * components from the RSA structure. - */ - if (rsa->d == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, - a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, - PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); - goto err; - } - } - - /* - * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private - * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we - * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented - * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it - * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no - * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read - * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage. - */ - if (rsa->d != NULL) - { - if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - } - else - sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; - - /* - * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well - * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache - * 'n'/'e' components as well. - */ - if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); - sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - - /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ - KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); - sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; - -err: - if (rollback) - { - /* - * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() - * since we are doing rollback. - */ - if (found == 0) - (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); - h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); - -malloc_err: - /* - * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. - * They need to be freed upon exit or error. - */ - for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) - { - if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) - { - (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, - a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); - OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); - a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; - } - } - - return (h_key); - } - -/* - * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, - * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for - * cache miss. - */ -static int -pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) - { - /* - * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the - * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA - * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values - * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. - * - * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public - * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we - * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public - * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for - * both data signing and verifying. - */ - if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa && - BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && - BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) - { - if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - return (1); - else - /* - * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA - * structure with potentially existing private key - * object. We can just create a public object and move - * on with this session structure. - */ - return (0); - } - - /* - * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously - * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); - return (0); - } - -/* - * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, - * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for - * cache miss. - */ -static int -pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) - { - /* - * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the - * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA - * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should - * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component - * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are - * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub() - * about why we compare the handle as well. - */ - if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa && - BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && - BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) - { - if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - return (1); - else - /* - * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA - * structure with potentially existing public key - * object. We can just create a private object and move - * on with this session structure. - */ - return (0); - } - - /* - * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously - * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); - (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); - return (0); - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -/* The DSA function implementation */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) - { - return (1); - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) - { - return (1); - } - - -static DSA_SIG * -pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) - { - BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; - int i; - DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; - - CK_RV rv; - CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; - - /* - * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, - * each is 20 bytes long - */ - unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; - unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; - unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; - - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - - if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); - goto ret; - } - - i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ - if (dlen > i) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - goto ret; - } - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) - goto ret; - - (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); - - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; - if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = - pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, - &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, - &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); - - if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); - goto ret; - } - - (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); - rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, - (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret, - (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); - goto ret; - } - } - - - if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto ret; - } - - if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto ret; - } - - if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto ret; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || - BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto ret; - } - - dsa_sig->r = r; - dsa_sig->s = s; - -ret: - if (dsa_sig == NULL) - { - if (r != NULL) - BN_free(r); - if (s != NULL) - BN_free(s); - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); - return (dsa_sig); - } - -static int -pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, - DSA *dsa) - { - int i; - CK_RV rv; - int retval = 0; - CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; - - unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; - unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; - unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; - - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - - if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, - PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); - goto ret; - } - - if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, - PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); - goto ret; - } - - i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ - - if (dlen > i) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, - PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - goto ret; - } - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) - goto ret; - - (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); - - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; - if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = - pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, - &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); - - if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, - h_pub_key); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, - rv); - goto ret; - } - - /* - * The representation of each of the two big numbers could - * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need - * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. - */ - (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); - BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); - BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - - BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); - - rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, - (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); - goto ret; - } - } - - retval = 1; -ret: - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); - return (retval); - } - - -/* - * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. - * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. - */ -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, - DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_ULONG found; - CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; - CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; - int i; - - CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, - {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ - {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ - {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ - {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ - }; - - a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; - a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; - - if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, - &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, - &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, - &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, - &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, - ul_key_attr_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (found == 0) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, - a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); - goto err; - } - } - - if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) - if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - - /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ - KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); - if (key_ptr != NULL) - *key_ptr = dsa; - -err: - if (rollback) - { - /* - * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() - * since we are doing rollback. - */ - if (found == 0) - (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); - h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - -malloc_err: - for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) - { - if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); - a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; - } - } - - return (h_key); - } - -/* - * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure - * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. - */ -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, - DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - int i; - CK_ULONG found; - CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; - CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; - - /* - * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys - */ - CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, - {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ - {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ - {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ - {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ - }; - - a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; - a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; - - /* Put the private key components into the template */ - if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, - &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, - &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, - &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || - init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, - &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, - ul_key_attr_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (found == 0) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, - a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, - PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); - goto err; - } - } - - if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) - if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - - /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ - KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); - if (key_ptr != NULL) - *key_ptr = dsa; - -err: - if (rollback) - { - /* - * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() - * since we are doing rollback. - */ - if (found == 0) - (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); - h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); - -malloc_err: - /* - * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. - * They need to be freed apon exit or error. - */ - for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) - { - if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) - { - (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, - a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); - OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); - a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; - } - } - - return (h_key); - } - -/* - * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle - * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. - */ -static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) - { - /* - * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the - * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA - * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value - * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. - */ - if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || - (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) - { - /* - * We do not check the return value because even in case of - * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer - * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() - * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); - return (0); - } - return (1); - } - -/* - * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle - * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. - */ -static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) - { - /* - * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the - * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA - * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value - * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. - */ - if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || - (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) - { - /* - * We do not check the return value because even in case of - * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer - * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() - * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); - return (0); - } - return (1); - } -#endif - - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -/* The DH function implementation */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) - { - return (1); - } - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) - { - return (1); - } - -/* - * Generate DH key-pair. - * - * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key - * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key - * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard - * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem - * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. - */ -static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) - { - CK_ULONG i; - CK_RV rv, rv1; - int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; - - CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; - CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, - {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} - }; - - CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; - CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)} - }; - - CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; - CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = - { - {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} - }; - - CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; - CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = - { - {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} - }; - - pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); - if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) - { - /* - * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that - * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of - * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. - */ - pub_key_template[1].pValue = - OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + - DH_BUF_RESERVE); - if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); - } - else - goto err; - - pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); - if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) - { - pub_key_template[2].pValue = - OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + - DH_BUF_RESERVE); - if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); - } - else - goto err; - - /* - * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting - * a session handle. The objects created in this function are - * destroyed before return and thus not cached. - */ - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) - goto err; - - rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, - &mechanism, - pub_key_template, - ul_pub_key_attr_count, - priv_key_template, - ul_priv_key_attr_count, - &h_pub_key, - &h_priv_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory - * should be sufficient for reuse. - */ - if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) - { - reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; - reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; - } - else - { - reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; - reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, - pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); - rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, - priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) - { - rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || - ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); - goto err; - } - - /* Reuse the memory allocated */ - pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; - pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, - pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) - { - if (dh->pub_key == NULL) - if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, - pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); - if (dh->pub_key == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - - /* Reuse the memory allocated */ - priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; - priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, - priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); - goto err; - } - - if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) - { - if (dh->priv_key == NULL) - if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, - priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); - if (dh->priv_key == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - - ret = 1; - -err: - - if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); - } - } - - if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, - PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); - } - } - - for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) - { - if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); - pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; - } - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); - return (ret); - } - -static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, - DH *dh) - { - int i; - CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2; - CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, - }; - - CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; - CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = - { - {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} - }; - - CK_RV rv; - int ret = -1; - PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; - - if (dh->priv_key == NULL) - goto err; - - priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; - priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; - - if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) - goto err; - - mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); - mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); - if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); - - (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); - - h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; - if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = - pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, - &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); - - if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, - &mechanism, - h_key, - priv_key_template, - ul_priv_key_attr_count, - &h_derived_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, - priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, - rv); - goto err; - } - - if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); - goto err; - } - priv_key_result[0].pValue = - OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); - if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, - priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, - rv); - goto err; - } - - /* - * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same - * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key - */ - if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) - { - /* - * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip - * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, - * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The - * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was - * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading - * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the - * pre-master secret. - */ - for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) - { - if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) - break; - } - - (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, - priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); - ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; - } - -err: - - if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, - PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); - } - } - if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) - { - OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); - priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; - } - - if (mechanism.pParameter) - { - OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); - mechanism.pParameter = NULL; - } - - pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); - return (ret); - } - - -static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, - DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; - CK_ULONG found; - CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; - int i; - - CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; - CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = - { - {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, - {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, - {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, - {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, - {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, - {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, - {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, - }; - - key_template[0].pValue = &class; - key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; - - key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); - key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( - (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); - if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); - - key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); - key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( - (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); - if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); - - key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); - key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( - (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); - if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto malloc_err; - } - - BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); - - /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ - LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, - ul_key_attr_count); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); - - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, - rv); - goto err; - } - - if (found == 0) - { - rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, - key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, - rv); - goto err; - } - } - - if (dh_priv_num != NULL) - if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rollback = CK_TRUE; - goto err; - } - - /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ - KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); - if (key_ptr != NULL) - *key_ptr = dh; - -err: - if (rollback) - { - /* - * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() - * since we are doing rollback. - */ - if (found == 0) - (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); - h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - } - - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); - -malloc_err: - for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) - { - if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); - key_template[i].pValue = NULL; - } - } - - return (h_key); - } - -/* - * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle - * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. - * - * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh - * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. - */ -static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) - { - /* - * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the - * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key - * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached - * in PK11_SESSION structure. - */ - if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || - (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) - { - /* - * We do not check the return value because even in case of - * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer - * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() - * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. - */ - (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE); - return (0); - } - return (1); - } -#endif - -/* - * Local function to simplify key template population - * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error - */ -static int -init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, - CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) - { - CK_ULONG len; - - /* - * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to - * check that here than individually in the callers. - */ - if (bn != NULL) - len = BN_num_bytes(bn); - - if (bn == NULL || len == 0) - return (1); - - *ul_value_len = len; - *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); - if (*p_value == NULL) - return (0); - - BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); - - return (1); - } - -static void -attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) - { - if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) - *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); - } - -/* - * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or - * if we find more objects based on the template we got. - * - * Returns: - * 1 OK - * 0 no object or more than 1 object found - */ -static int -find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_ULONG objcnt; - - LOCK_OBJSTORE(op); - if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, - PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); - goto err; - } - - rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); - if (rv != CKR_OK) - { - PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, - rv); - goto err; - } - - if (objcnt > 1) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, - PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); - goto err; - } - else - if (objcnt == 0) - { - PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); - goto err; - } - - (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); - return (1); -err: - UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); - return (0); - } - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ diff -r c59d67c9d1d7 -r 6f932ca78947 components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h --- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h Thu Jan 23 09:56:38 2014 -0700 +++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#ifndef HW_PK11_URI_H -#define HW_PK11_URI_H - -#include - -/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */ -#define PK11_URI_PREFIX "pkcs11:" -#define FILE_URI_PREFIX "file://" -#define PK11_TOKEN "token" -#define PK11_MANUF "manuf" -#define PK11_SERIAL "serial" -#define PK11_MODEL "model" -#define PK11_OBJECT "object" -#define PK11_OBJECTTYPE "objecttype" -#define PK11_ASKPASS "passphrasedialog" - -/* PIN caching policy. */ -#define POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 -#define POLICY_NONE 1 -#define POLICY_MEMORY 2 -#define POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY 3 -#define POLICY_WRONG_VALUE 4 - -/* - * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports. - */ -#define PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN 256 - -/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */ -typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct - { - char *object; /* object label, the only mandatory info */ - char *objecttype; /* (private|public|cert), currently unused */ - char *token; /* token label */ - char *manuf; /* manufacturer label */ - char *serial; /* serial number label */ - char *model; /* model label */ - char *askpass; /* full path to the command to get the PIN */ - /* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */ - char *pin; /* token PIN */ - } pkcs11_uri; - -/* For URI processing. */ -extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; - -int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin); -int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void); -int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, - const char **file); -int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct); -void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself); -int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin); -int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, - pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private); -int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); - -#endif /* HW_PK11_URI_H */