23599994 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL s11u3-sru
authorRonald Jordan <ron.jordan@oracle.com>
Wed, 22 Jun 2016 17:06:49 -0700
branchs11u3-sru
changeset 6269 0134818ac836
parent 6246 251b7e39d489
child 6270 774c76b1f10a
23599994 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL 23598249 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/43_cve-2016-2177.patch
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/44_cve-2016-2178.patch
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/43_cve-2016-2177.patch
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/44_cve-2016-2178.patch
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/43_cve-2016-2177.patch	Wed Jun 22 17:06:49 2016 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
+# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7
+# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
+# from the upstream.
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
[email protected]@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ 
+-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     /* get the session-id */
+     j = *(p++);
+ 
+-    if (p + j > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1114,14 +1114,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+         /* cookie stuff */
+-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+         }
+         cookie_len = *(p++);
+ 
+-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+         p += cookie_len;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     }
+ 
+     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
[email protected]@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     /* compression */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
[email protected]@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     int r;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    if (session_id + len > limit) {
++    if (limit - session_id < len) {
+         fatal = 1;
+         goto err;
+     }
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
[email protected]@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+     };
+ 
+-    if (data >= (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data <= 2)
+         return;
+     data += 2;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 4))
++    if (limit - data < 4)
+         return;
+     n2s(data, type);
+     n2s(data, size);
[email protected]@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (data + size > limit)
++    if (limit - data < size)
+         return;
+     data += size;
+ 
[email protected]@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+             return;
[email protected]@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     } else {
+         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+             return;
[email protected]@ -1019,19 +1019,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+     if (data == limit)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data < 2)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     n2s(data, len);
+ 
+-    if (data + len != limit)
++    if (limit - data != len)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (limit))
++        if (limit - data < size)
+             goto err;
+ # if 0
+         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
[email protected]@ -1460,20 +1460,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+ 
+-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+     n2s(data, length);
+-    if (data + length != d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (d + n))
++        if ((d + n) - data < size)
+             goto ri_check;
+ 
+         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
[email protected]@ -2179,29 +2179,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+     if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+         i = *(p++);
+-        p += i;
+-        if (p >= limit)
++
++        if (limit - p <= i)
+             return -1;
++
++        p += i;
+     }
+     /* Skip past cipher list */
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p > limit)
++    if (limit - p < i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Now at start of extensions */
+-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= 2)
+         return 0;
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++    while (limit - p >= 4) {
+         unsigned short type, size;
+         n2s(p, type);
+         n2s(p, size);
+-        if (p + size > limit)
++        if (limit - p < size)
+             return 0;
+         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+             int r;
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/44_cve-2016-2178.patch	Wed Jun 22 17:06:49 2016 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
+# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
+# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
+# from the upstream.
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2016-06-20 08:06:46.793733045 -0700
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2016-06-20 08:07:42.133601060 -0700
[email protected]@ -248,9 +248,6 @@
+         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+             goto err;
+     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+-    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+-        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+-    }
+ 
+     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
[email protected]@ -282,6 +279,11 @@
+     } else {
+         K = &k;
+     }
++
++    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++    }
++
+     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+                    dsa->method_mont_p);
+     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/43_cve-2016-2177.patch	Wed Jun 22 17:06:49 2016 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
+# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7
+# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
+# from the upstream.
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
[email protected]@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ 
+-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     /* get the session-id */
+     j = *(p++);
+ 
+-    if (p + j > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1114,14 +1114,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+         /* cookie stuff */
+-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+         }
+         cookie_len = *(p++);
+ 
+-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+         p += cookie_len;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     }
+ 
+     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
[email protected]@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     /* compression */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
[email protected]@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     int r;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    if (session_id + len > limit) {
++    if (limit - session_id < len) {
+         fatal = 1;
+         goto err;
+     }
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
[email protected]@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+     };
+ 
+-    if (data >= (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data <= 2)
+         return;
+     data += 2;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 4))
++    if (limit - data < 4)
+         return;
+     n2s(data, type);
+     n2s(data, size);
[email protected]@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (data + size > limit)
++    if (limit - data < size)
+         return;
+     data += size;
+ 
[email protected]@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+             return;
[email protected]@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     } else {
+         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+             return;
[email protected]@ -1019,19 +1019,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+     if (data == limit)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data < 2)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     n2s(data, len);
+ 
+-    if (data + len != limit)
++    if (limit - data != len)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (limit))
++        if (limit - data < size)
+             goto err;
+ # if 0
+         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
[email protected]@ -1460,20 +1460,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+ 
+-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+     n2s(data, length);
+-    if (data + length != d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (d + n))
++        if ((d + n) - data < size)
+             goto ri_check;
+ 
+         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
[email protected]@ -2179,29 +2179,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+     if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+         i = *(p++);
+-        p += i;
+-        if (p >= limit)
++
++        if (limit - p <= i)
+             return -1;
++
++        p += i;
+     }
+     /* Skip past cipher list */
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p > limit)
++    if (limit - p < i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Now at start of extensions */
+-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= 2)
+         return 0;
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++    while (limit - p >= 4) {
+         unsigned short type, size;
+         n2s(p, type);
+         n2s(p, size);
+-        if (p + size > limit)
++        if (limit - p < size)
+             return 0;
+         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+             int r;
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/44_cve-2016-2178.patch	Wed Jun 22 17:06:49 2016 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
+# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
+# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
+# from the upstream.
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2016-06-20 08:06:46.793733045 -0700
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2016-06-20 08:07:42.133601060 -0700
[email protected]@ -248,9 +248,6 @@
+         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+             goto err;
+     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+-    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+-        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+-    }
+ 
+     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
[email protected]@ -282,6 +279,11 @@
+     } else {
+         K = &k;
+     }
++
++    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++    }
++
+     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+                    dsa->method_mont_p);
+     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))