24710405 Upgrade OpenSSL version to 1.0.1u
24703800 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
24703856 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
24703866 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
24703911 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
24703934 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
24703939 problem in LIBRARY/OPENSSL
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/Makefile Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/Makefile Tue Sep 27 10:50:55 2016 -0700
@@ -32,18 +32,18 @@
COMPONENT_NAME = openssl-fips-140
# Note that this is the OpenSSL version that is used to build FIPS-140 certified
# libraries. However, we use the FIPS canister version for the IPS package.
-COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.1t
+COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.1u
IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION = 2.0.6
COMPONENT_PROJECT_URL= http://www.openssl.org/
COMPONENT_SRC_NAME = openssl
COMPONENT_SRC = $(COMPONENT_SRC_NAME)-$(COMPONENT_VERSION)
COMPONENT_ARCHIVE = $(COMPONENT_SRC).tar.gz
COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_HASH= \
- sha256:4a6ee491a2fdb22e519c76fdc2a628bb3cec12762cd456861d207996c8a07088
+ sha256:4312b4ca1215b6f2c97007503d80db80d5157f76f8f7d3febbe6b4c56ff26739
COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL = $(COMPONENT_PROJECT_URL)source/$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE)
COMPONENT_BUGDB= library/openssl
-TPNO= 28138
+TPNO= 31796
# OpenSSL FIPS directory
OPENSSL_FIPS_DIR = $(COMPONENT_DIR)/../openssl-fips
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-seed
# Disable SSLv2 protocol
-CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ssl2 no-ssl2-method
+CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ssl2
# We define our own compiler and linker option sets for Solaris. See Configure
# for more information.
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140.license Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140.license Tue Sep 27 10:50:55 2016 -0700
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
---------------
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/42_rm_sslv2.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/42_rm_sslv2.patch Tue Sep 27 10:50:55 2016 -0700
@@ -1,54 +1,6 @@
#
# This was developed in house. Not applicable to the upstream.
#
---- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_meth.c Fri May 8 09:38:33 2015
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_meth.c.new Fri May 8 09:51:53 2015
[email protected]@ -74,6 +74,13 @@
- ssl2_accept, ssl2_connect, ssl2_get_method)
- #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-+/* stub function */
-+const SSL_METHOD *
-+SSLv2_method(void)
-+{
-+ return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- # if PEDANTIC
- static void *dummy = &dummy;
- # endif
---- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_clnt.c Fri May 8 09:37:51 2015
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/ss2_clnt.c.new Fri May 8 09:53:12 2015
[email protected]@ -1087,6 +1087,13 @@
- }
- #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-+/* stub function */
-+const SSL_METHOD *
-+SSLv2_client_method(void)
-+{
-+ return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- # if PEDANTIC
- static void *dummy = &dummy;
- # endif
---- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_srvr.c Fri May 8 09:38:02 2015
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_srvr.c.new Fri May 8 09:53:43 2015
[email protected]@ -1150,6 +1150,13 @@
- }
- #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-+/* stub function */
-+const SSL_METHOD *
-+SSLv2_server_method(void)
-+{
-+ return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- # if PEDANTIC
- static void *dummy = &dummy;
- # endif
--- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/ssl.h Tue May 26 11:13:15 2015
+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/ssl.h.new Tue May 26 11:32:09 2015
@@ -2016,12 +2016,28 @@--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/43_cve-2016-2177.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
-# from the upstream.
---- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
[email protected]@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
-+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
-- if (p + j > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1114,14 +1114,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /* cookie stuff */
-- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
-- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- p += cookie_len;
- }
-
-- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- }
-
- /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
-- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
[email protected]@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
-- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
---- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
[email protected]@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- int r;
- #endif
-
-- if (session_id + len > limit) {
-+ if (limit - session_id < len) {
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- }
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
[email protected]@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
-- if (data >= (limit - 2))
-+ if (limit - data <= 2)
- return;
- data += 2;
-
-- if (data > (limit - 4))
-+ if (limit - data < 4)
- return;
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
[email protected]@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
-- if (data + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- return;
- data += size;
-
[email protected]@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
-- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
[email protected]@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
-- if (data + len != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
[email protected]@ -1019,19 +1019,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- if (data == limit)
- goto ri_check;
-
-- if (data > (limit - 2))
-+ if (limit - data < 2)
- goto err;
-
- n2s(data, len);
-
-- if (data + len != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != len)
- goto err;
-
-- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
-+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > (limit))
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- goto err;
- # if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
[email protected]@ -1460,20 +1460,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
- # endif
-
-- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
-+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
- goto ri_check;
-
- n2s(data, length);
-- if (data + length != d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
-- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
-+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > (d + n))
-+ if ((d + n) - data < size)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
[email protected]@ -2179,29 +2179,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- i = *(p++);
-- p += i;
-- if (p >= limit)
-+
-+ if (limit - p <= i)
- return -1;
-+
-+ p += i;
- }
- /* Skip past cipher list */
- n2s(p, i);
-- p += i;
-- if (p >= limit)
-+ if (limit - p <= i)
- return -1;
-+ p += i;
-+
- /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
- i = *(p++);
-- p += i;
-- if (p > limit)
-+ if (limit - p < i)
- return -1;
-+ p += i;
-+
- /* Now at start of extensions */
-- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-+ if (limit - p <= 2)
- return 0;
- n2s(p, i);
-- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
-+ while (limit - p >= 4) {
- unsigned short type, size;
- n2s(p, type);
- n2s(p, size);
-- if (p + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - p < size)
- return 0;
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- int r;--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/44_cve-2016-2178.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
-# from the upstream.
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c 2016-06-20 08:06:46.793733045 -0700
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c 2016-06-20 08:07:42.133601060 -0700
[email protected]@ -248,9 +248,6 @@
- if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
- goto err;
- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
-- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-- }
-
- if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
[email protected]@ -282,6 +279,11 @@
- } else {
- K = &k;
- }
-+
-+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+ }
-+
- DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
- dsa->method_mont_p);
- if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/46_cve-2016-6302.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/baaabfd8fdcec04a691695fad9a664bea43202b6
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
-# from the upstream.
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
[email protected]@ -3401,9 +3401,7 @@
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
-- if (eticklen < 48)
-- return 2;
-+
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
[email protected]@ -3437,6 +3435,12 @@
- if (mlen < 0) {
- goto err;
- }
-+ /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
-+ if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
-+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-+ return 2;
-+ }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/48_large_crl.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1eef756cc1948e
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available from the upstream.
---- a/crypto/asn1/x_name.c 2016-07-12 15:17:45.766267352 -0700
-+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_name.c 2016-07-12 15:18:02.542842140 -0700
[email protected]@ -199,10 +199,8 @@
- int i, j, ret;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
-- if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) {
-- ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
-- return 0;
-- }
-+ if (len > X509_NAME_MAX)
-+ len = X509_NAME_MAX;
- q = p;
-
- /* Get internal representation of Name */--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/Makefile Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/Makefile Tue Sep 27 10:50:55 2016 -0700
@@ -28,20 +28,20 @@
# When upgrading OpenSSL, please, DON'T FORGET TO TEST WANBOOT too.
# For more information about wanboot-openssl testing, please refer to
# ../README.
-COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.1t
+COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.1u
# Version for IPS. It is easier to do it manually than convert the letter to a
# number while taking into account that there might be no letter at all.
-IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.1.20
+IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.1.21
COMPONENT_PROJECT_URL= http://www.openssl.org/
COMPONENT_SRC = $(COMPONENT_NAME)-$(COMPONENT_VERSION)
COMPONENT_ARCHIVE = $(COMPONENT_SRC).tar.gz
COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_HASH= \
- sha256:4a6ee491a2fdb22e519c76fdc2a628bb3cec12762cd456861d207996c8a07088
+ sha256:4312b4ca1215b6f2c97007503d80db80d5157f76f8f7d3febbe6b4c56ff26739
COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL = $(COMPONENT_PROJECT_URL)source/$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE)
COMPONENT_BUGDB= library/openssl
-TPNO= 28138
+TPNO= 31796
include $(WS_MAKE_RULES)/prep.mk
include $(WS_MAKE_RULES)/configure.mk
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-seed
# Disable SSLv2 protocol
-CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ssl2 no-ssl2-method
+CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ssl2
# We use both no-whirlpool and no-whrlpool since there is an inconsistency in
# the OpenSSL code and one needs both to build OpenSSL successfully with
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/openssl-1.0.1.license Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/openssl-1.0.1.license Tue Sep 27 10:50:55 2016 -0700
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
---------------
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/42_rm_sslv2.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/42_rm_sslv2.patch Tue Sep 27 10:50:55 2016 -0700
@@ -1,54 +1,6 @@
#
# This was developed in house. Not applicable to the upstream.
#
---- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_meth.c Fri May 8 09:38:33 2015
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_meth.c.new Fri May 8 09:51:53 2015
[email protected]@ -74,6 +74,13 @@
- ssl2_accept, ssl2_connect, ssl2_get_method)
- #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-+/* stub function */
-+const SSL_METHOD *
-+SSLv2_method(void)
-+{
-+ return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- # if PEDANTIC
- static void *dummy = &dummy;
- # endif
---- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_clnt.c Fri May 8 09:37:51 2015
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/ss2_clnt.c.new Fri May 8 09:53:12 2015
[email protected]@ -1087,6 +1087,13 @@
- }
- #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-+/* stub function */
-+const SSL_METHOD *
-+SSLv2_client_method(void)
-+{
-+ return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- # if PEDANTIC
- static void *dummy = &dummy;
- # endif
---- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_srvr.c Fri May 8 09:38:02 2015
-+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/s2_srvr.c.new Fri May 8 09:53:43 2015
[email protected]@ -1150,6 +1150,13 @@
- }
- #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-+/* stub function */
-+const SSL_METHOD *
-+SSLv2_server_method(void)
-+{
-+ return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- # if PEDANTIC
- static void *dummy = &dummy;
- # endif
--- openssl-1.0.1/ssl/ssl.h Tue May 26 11:13:15 2015
+++ openssl-1.0.1/ssl/ssl.h.new Tue May 26 11:32:09 2015
@@ -2016,12 +2016,28 @@--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/43_cve-2016-2177.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
-# from the upstream.
---- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
[email protected]@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
-+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
-- if (p + j > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1114,14 +1114,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /* cookie stuff */
-- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
-- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- p += cookie_len;
- }
-
-- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
[email protected]@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- }
-
- /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
-- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
[email protected]@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
-- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
---- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
[email protected]@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- int r;
- #endif
-
-- if (session_id + len > limit) {
-+ if (limit - session_id < len) {
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- }
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
[email protected]@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
-- if (data >= (limit - 2))
-+ if (limit - data <= 2)
- return;
- data += 2;
-
-- if (data > (limit - 4))
-+ if (limit - data < 4)
- return;
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
[email protected]@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
-- if (data + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- return;
- data += size;
-
[email protected]@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
-- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
[email protected]@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
-- if (data + len != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
[email protected]@ -1019,19 +1019,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- if (data == limit)
- goto ri_check;
-
-- if (data > (limit - 2))
-+ if (limit - data < 2)
- goto err;
-
- n2s(data, len);
-
-- if (data + len != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != len)
- goto err;
-
-- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
-+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > (limit))
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- goto err;
- # if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
[email protected]@ -1460,20 +1460,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
- # endif
-
-- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
-+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
- goto ri_check;
-
- n2s(data, length);
-- if (data + length != d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
-- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
-+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > (d + n))
-+ if ((d + n) - data < size)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
[email protected]@ -2179,29 +2179,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- i = *(p++);
-- p += i;
-- if (p >= limit)
-+
-+ if (limit - p <= i)
- return -1;
-+
-+ p += i;
- }
- /* Skip past cipher list */
- n2s(p, i);
-- p += i;
-- if (p >= limit)
-+ if (limit - p <= i)
- return -1;
-+ p += i;
-+
- /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
- i = *(p++);
-- p += i;
-- if (p > limit)
-+ if (limit - p < i)
- return -1;
-+ p += i;
-+
- /* Now at start of extensions */
-- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-+ if (limit - p <= 2)
- return 0;
- n2s(p, i);
-- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
-+ while (limit - p >= 4) {
- unsigned short type, size;
- n2s(p, type);
- n2s(p, size);
-- if (p + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - p < size)
- return 0;
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- int r;--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/44_cve-2016-2178.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
-# from the upstream.
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c 2016-06-20 08:06:46.793733045 -0700
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c 2016-06-20 08:07:42.133601060 -0700
[email protected]@ -248,9 +248,6 @@
- if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
- goto err;
- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
-- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-- }
-
- if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
[email protected]@ -282,6 +279,11 @@
- } else {
- K = &k;
- }
-+
-+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+ }
-+
- DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
- dsa->method_mont_p);
- if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/46_cve-2016-6302.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/baaabfd8fdcec04a691695fad9a664bea43202b6
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available
-# from the upstream.
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
[email protected]@ -3401,9 +3401,7 @@
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
-- if (eticklen < 48)
-- return 2;
-+
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
[email protected]@ -3437,6 +3435,12 @@
- if (mlen < 0) {
- goto err;
- }
-+ /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
-+ if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
-+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-+ return 2;
-+ }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1/patches/48_large_crl.patch Tue Sep 27 00:30:26 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# The patch is based on the following commit from the upstream:
-# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1eef756cc1948e
-# The fix is patched until the new version becomes available from the upstream.
---- a/crypto/asn1/x_name.c 2016-07-12 15:17:45.766267352 -0700
-+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_name.c 2016-07-12 15:18:02.542842140 -0700
[email protected]@ -199,10 +199,8 @@
- int i, j, ret;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
-- if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) {
-- ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
-- return 0;
-- }
-+ if (len > X509_NAME_MAX)
-+ len = X509_NAME_MAX;
- q = p;
-
- /* Get internal representation of Name */