--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/Makefile Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/Makefile Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#
# CDDL HEADER END
#
-# Copyright (c) 2011, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (c) 2011, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
#
export PARFAIT_BUILD=no
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
# update the files which have been under continuous development. We rather copy
# the files to the right directories and let OpenSSL makefiles build it.
COMPONENT_PRE_BUILD_ACTION = \
- ( $(LN) -fs $(COMPONENT_DIR)/engines/pkcs11/* $(@D)/crypto/engine; )
+ ( $(LN) -fs $(COMPONENT_DIR)/engines/pkcs11/* $(@D)/engines; )
# OpenSSL does not install into <dir>/$(MACH64) for 64-bit install so no such
# directory is created and Userland install code would fail when installing lint
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.c Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,3714 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
+#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
+ * information.
+ */
+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
+#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
+ */
+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "e_pk11.h"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
+#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
+#include "e_pk11_err.c"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.c"
+#include "e_pk11_pub.c"
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
+ * initialization.
+ */
+int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
+int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
+int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
+ */
+int *hw_cnids;
+int *hw_dnids;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
+ * logging into the token.
+ */
+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+/*
+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
+ * PK11_SESSION object.
+ *
+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
+ *
+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
+ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
+ * list) for given algorithm type
+ */
+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
+ * without losing the secret key objects.
+ */
+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
+enum pk11_cipher_id {
+ PK11_DES_CBC,
+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
+ PK11_DES_ECB,
+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
+ PK11_RC4,
+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
+};
+
+/* Index for the supported digests */
+enum pk11_digest_id {
+ PK11_MD5,
+ PK11_SHA1,
+ PK11_SHA224,
+ PK11_SHA256,
+ PK11_SHA384,
+ PK11_SHA512,
+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
+};
+
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
+ {
+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
+ int nid;
+ int iv_len;
+ int min_key_len;
+ int max_key_len;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
+ } PK11_CIPHER;
+
+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
+ {
+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
+ int nid;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
+ } PK11_DIGEST;
+
+/* ENGINE level stuff */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
+/* These functions are also used in other files */
+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ const int **nids, int nid);
+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+ const int **nids, int nid);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+ int key_len);
+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+ size_t count);
+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
+ int *local_cipher_nids);
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
+ int *local_digest_nids);
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
+ int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+ PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+ int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
+ PK11_DIGEST *digest);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
+ { \
+ if (uselock) \
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
+ { \
+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
+ sp->persistent); \
+ } \
+ if (uselock) \
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
+ }
+
+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+static int cipher_count = 0;
+static int digest_count = 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
+/*
+ * Static list of ciphers.
+ * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
+ * thus ciphers[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
+ */
+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
+ {
+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32,
+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+ };
+
+/*
+ * Static list of digests.
+ * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
+ * thus digests[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
+ */
+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
+ {
+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
+ };
+
+/*
+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
+ {
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ *
+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
+ */
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
+ {
+ NID_des_cbc,
+ 8, 8, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
+ {
+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+ 8, 24, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
+ {
+ NID_des_ecb,
+ 8, 8, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
+ {
+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+ 8, 24, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
+ {
+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
+ 16, 16, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
+ {
+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
+ 16, 24, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
+ {
+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
+ 16, 32, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
+ {
+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
+ 16, 16, 0,
+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
+ {
+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
+ 16, 24, 0,
+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
+ {
+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
+ 16, 32, 0,
+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
+ {
+ NID_undef,
+ 16, 16, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
+ {
+ NID_undef,
+ 16, 24, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
+ {
+ NID_undef,
+ 16, 32, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
+ {
+ NID_bf_cbc,
+ 8, 16, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
+ {
+ NID_rc4,
+ 1, 16, 0,
+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+ pk11_cipher_init,
+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
+ {
+ NID_md5,
+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 0,
+ pk11_digest_init,
+ pk11_digest_update,
+ pk11_digest_final,
+ pk11_digest_copy,
+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ MD5_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ };
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
+ {
+ NID_sha1,
+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 0,
+ pk11_digest_init,
+ pk11_digest_update,
+ pk11_digest_final,
+ pk11_digest_copy,
+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ SHA_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ };
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
+ {
+ NID_sha224,
+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 0,
+ pk11_digest_init,
+ pk11_digest_update,
+ pk11_digest_final,
+ pk11_digest_copy,
+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ };
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
+ {
+ NID_sha256,
+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 0,
+ pk11_digest_init,
+ pk11_digest_update,
+ pk11_digest_final,
+ pk11_digest_copy,
+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ };
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
+ {
+ NID_sha384,
+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 0,
+ pk11_digest_init,
+ pk11_digest_update,
+ pk11_digest_final,
+ pk11_digest_copy,
+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ };
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
+ {
+ NID_sha512,
+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 0,
+ pk11_digest_init,
+ pk11_digest_update,
+ pk11_digest_final,
+ pk11_digest_copy,
+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+ };
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+ {
+ {
+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
+ "SO_PATH",
+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+ },
+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+
+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
+ {
+ pk11_rand_seed,
+ pk11_rand_bytes,
+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
+ pk11_rand_add,
+ pk11_rand_bytes,
+ pk11_rand_status
+ };
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
+
+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
+/*
+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
+ */
+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
+/* Needed in e_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static int pk11_pid = 0;
+
+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+ {
+ int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
+ goto malloc_err;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+ if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
+ goto malloc_err;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
+ goto malloc_err;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
+ goto malloc_err;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+ {
+ session_cache[type].lock =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
+ goto malloc_err;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+
+malloc_err:
+ pk11_free_all_locks();
+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+ {
+ int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+ {
+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
+ */
+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+ return (0);
+
+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
+ return (0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
+ {
+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+ return (0);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
+ {
+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
+ return (0);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
+ {
+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
+ return (0);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ if (pk11_have_random)
+ {
+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
+ return (0);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
+ }
+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
+ return (0);
+
+/*
+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+ {
+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
+ return (0);
+
+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
+ return (0);
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+ {
+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+ }
+
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+ {
+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+ }
+
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+ {
+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+ }
+
+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+ return;
+
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
+ }
+
+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
+ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+ }
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ }
+
+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+ {
+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_INFO info;
+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+ int any_slot_found;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
+ * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
+ * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
+ * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
+ * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
+ * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
+ * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
+ * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
+ * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
+ */
+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
+ {
+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ /*
+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
+ * engine first.
+ */
+ pk11_free_all_locks();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ /*
+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
+ * NIDs there.
+ */
+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
+ if (!p)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
+ * because no slot was present.
+ */
+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
+ */
+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
+ == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
+ digest_count = 0;
+ }
+
+ pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+ pk11_pid = getpid();
+ /*
+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
+ * will do the cleanup.
+ */
+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+ /*
+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+ active_list[i] = NULL;
+
+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
+ {
+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+
+err:
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+ {
+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
+ * library.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* free all active lists */
+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ /*
+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+ * may have side-effects.
+ */
+#if 0
+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL;
+ if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) {
+ ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr);
+ if (ob != NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+ }
+ if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) {
+ ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr);
+ if (ob != NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+ }
+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) {
+ ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr);
+ if (ob != NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pk11_dso = NULL;
+ pFuncList = NULL;
+ pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+ pk11_pid = 0;
+ /*
+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
+ * the engine before calling fork().
+ */
+ pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+ return (1);
+
+err:
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
+ {
+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
+ if (p == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (initialized)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+ {
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
+ */
+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+ {
+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
+ }
+
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
+ switch (optype)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case OP_RSA:
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case OP_DSA:
+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case OP_DH:
+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
+PK11_SESSION *
+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+ static pid_t pid = 0;
+ pid_t new_pid;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ switch (optype)
+ {
+ case OP_RSA:
+ case OP_DSA:
+ case OP_DH:
+ case OP_RAND:
+ case OP_DIGEST:
+ case OP_CIPHER:
+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
+ * here, with no PID information.
+ */
+ if (pid == 0)
+ pid = getpid();
+
+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+ sp = freelist;
+
+ /*
+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
+ * structure from the freelist.
+ */
+ if (sp == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+
+ /*
+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
+ * mark them as unused.
+ */
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+ else
+ freelist = sp->next;
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
+ */
+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
+ {
+ pid = new_pid;
+
+ /*
+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
+ * head of the list).
+ */
+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
+ {
+ freelist = sp1->next;
+ /*
+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
+ */
+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
+ }
+
+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
+ /* Initialize the process */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
+ rv);
+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
+ sp = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
+ * information.
+ */
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
+ rv);
+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
+ sp = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
+ * re-initialization.
+ */
+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
+ sp = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
+ * the caller cope with the situation.
+ */
+ freelist = sp;
+ sp = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sp->pid == 0)
+ {
+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
+ sp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
+err:
+ if (sp != NULL)
+ sp->next = NULL;
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+
+ return (sp);
+ }
+
+
+void
+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
+ */
+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
+ return;
+
+ switch (optype)
+ {
+ case OP_RSA:
+ case OP_DSA:
+ case OP_DH:
+ case OP_RAND:
+ case OP_DIGEST:
+ case OP_CIPHER:
+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+ sp->next = freelist;
+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+ }
+
+
+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
+ * return 0 on exit.
+ */
+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+ {
+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
+ * return an error on return.
+ */
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ switch (optype)
+ {
+ case OP_RSA:
+ case OP_DSA:
+ case OP_DH:
+ case OP_RAND:
+ case OP_DIGEST:
+ case OP_CIPHER:
+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+ {
+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ freelist = sp->next;
+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
+ }
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+
+static int
+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
+ switch (optype)
+ {
+ case OP_RSA:
+ case OP_DSA:
+ case OP_DH:
+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
+ break;
+ case OP_RAND:
+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
+ break;
+ case OP_DIGEST:
+ case OP_CIPHER:
+ myslot = SLOTID;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We are probably a child process so force the
+ * reinitialize of the session
+ */
+ pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
+ return (0);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+ }
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ sp->pid = getpid();
+
+ switch (optype)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case OP_RSA:
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+ break;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case OP_DSA:
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+ break;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case OP_DH:
+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+ break;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ case OP_CIPHER:
+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
+ */
+ sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
+ * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
+ * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
+ * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
+ */
+static void
+destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+ {
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+ destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+ destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+ CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+ if (session != NULL)
+ local_free_session = session;
+ else
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
+ uselock = CK_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+ */
+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
+ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+ * destroy operations fails.
+ */
+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session == NULL)
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+ CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+ if (session != NULL)
+ local_free_session = session;
+ else
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
+ uselock = CK_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+ */
+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
+ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+ * destroy operations fails.
+ */
+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session == NULL)
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
+ ret, uselock, OP_DH);
+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
+ *
+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+ CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+ if (session != NULL)
+ local_free_session = session;
+ else
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
+ uselock = CK_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
+ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+ * destroy operations fails.
+ */
+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+err:
+ if (session == NULL)
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+static int
+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ /*
+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
+ */
+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
+ return (1);
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
+ rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+
+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
+
+static int
+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
+ return (ciphers[i].id);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+ {
+ if (cipher_count > 0)
+ *nids = cipher_nids;
+ else
+ *nids = NULL;
+ return (cipher_count);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+ {
+ if (digest_count > 0)
+ *nids = digest_nids;
+ else
+ *nids = NULL;
+ return (digest_count);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
+ */
+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+ /*
+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
+ * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+ {
+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
+ /*
+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
+ */
+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+ {
+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
+ {
+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
+ if (ctx->encrypt)
+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+ else
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
+ int index;
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
+
+ state->sp = NULL;
+
+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
+ return (0);
+
+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
+ /*
+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
+ * code serves as a sanity check.
+ *
+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
+ */
+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
+
+ /*
+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
+ */
+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
+ {
+ state->sp = sp;
+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
+ * needs to be created.
+ */
+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
+ }
+
+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
+ {
+ /*
+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
+ */
+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
+ {
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
+ state->sp = sp;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
+ * that it needs not be recreated.
+ *
+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+ {
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ unsigned long outl = inl;
+
+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
+
+ if (!inl)
+ return (1);
+
+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (ctx->encrypt)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
+ * the same size of input.
+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
+ * correctly aligned buffers.
+ */
+ if (inl != outl)
+ return (0);
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
+ * rid of the context.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt)
+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+ else
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+ state->sp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ const int **nids, int nid)
+ {
+ if (!cipher)
+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+ switch (nid)
+ {
+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_des_cbc:
+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
+ break;
+ case NID_des_ecb:
+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
+ break;
+ case NID_bf_cbc:
+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_rc4:
+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
+ break;
+ default:
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+ /*
+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
+ * here are not constants.
+ */
+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
+ else
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+ *cipher = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (*cipher != NULL);
+ }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+ const int **nids, int nid)
+ {
+ if (!digest)
+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
+
+ switch (nid)
+ {
+ case NID_md5:
+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha1:
+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha224:
+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha256:
+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha384:
+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512:
+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *digest = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (*digest != NULL);
+ }
+
+
+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
+
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
+ * terminate the active operation.
+ */
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Save the key information used in this session.
+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
+ */
+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
+ PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
+err:
+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+static int
+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+ return (digests[i].id);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
+ int index;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+ state->sp = NULL;
+
+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
+ return (0);
+
+ pdp = &digests[index];
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ state->sp = sp;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
+ if (count == 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
+ count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+ state->sp = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ unsigned long len;
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
+
+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+ state->sp = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
+ return (0);
+
+ /*
+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
+ * to the pool
+ */
+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+ state->sp = NULL;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int ret = 0;
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+
+ /* The copy-from state */
+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
+ goto err;
+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
+
+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
+ &ul_state_len);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
+ if (pstate == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
+ &ul_state_len);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ if (pstate != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
+static int
+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
+ * will return the session to the cache.
+ */
+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
+ * prefix.
+ */
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+ int key_len)
+ {
+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
+ {
+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+
+ if (session != NULL)
+ local_free_session = session;
+ else
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
+ }
+
+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+ {
+ local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ /*
+ * The secret key object is created in the
+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
+ */
+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+
+ if (session == NULL)
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * CKM_DSA
+ *
+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
+ * public key slot.
+ *
+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
+ * CKM_DES_CBC
+ * CKM_AES_CBC
+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
+ * CKM_DES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_CTR
+ * CKM_RC4
+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
+ *
+ * Digests optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_MD5
+ * CKM_SHA_1
+ * CKM_SHA224
+ * CKM_SHA256
+ * CKM_SHA384
+ * CKM_SHA512
+ *
+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+ {
+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+ int i;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar;
+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+ int slot_n_cipher = 0;
+ int slot_n_digest = 0;
+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+
+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+
+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+ *any_slot_found = 0;
+
+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+ {
+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+ /* Check if slot has random support. */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ continue;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+ token_info.label);
+
+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+ "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+ {
+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ continue;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+ token_info.label);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /*
+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+ */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+ &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
+ */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
+ {
+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ /*
+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
+ */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
+ &mech_info);
+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+ {
+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
+ }
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /*
+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
+ * derivation.
+ */
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
+ {
+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+ if (!found_candidate_slot &&
+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
+ /*
+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
+ * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
+ */
+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
+ PK11_DBG);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best slot so far: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+ best_slot_sofar);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
+ }
+ } /* for */
+
+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
+ {
+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+ }
+
+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+ best_slot_sofar = 0;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+
+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+ current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+
+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
+
+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+ current_slot_n_cipher);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+ current_slot_n_digest);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best cipher/digest slot so far: %d\n",
+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
+
+ /*
+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
+ */
+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
+ sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
+
+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+ *any_slot_found = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+ int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+ PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
+ {
+ if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
+ mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
+ " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
+ cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
+ mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
+ return;
+ }
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
+ cipher->nid;
+ }
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+ " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+ }
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+ }
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+ int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
+ {
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
+ digest->nid;
+ }
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+ " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+ }
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+ }
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
+ {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+ int nid;
+
+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
+ {
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* will return NID_undef on error */
+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+
+ return (nid);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
+ * have to help ourselves here.
+ */
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+ {
+ /* are we already set? */
+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
+ return (1);
+
+ /*
+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
+ * follow the format of those that exist.
+ */
+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
+ NID_undef)
+ goto err;
+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
+ NID_undef)
+ goto err;
+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
+ NID_undef)
+ goto err;
+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
+ return (1);
+
+err:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
+ {
+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
+ current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
+ {
+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
+ local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
+ *
+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
+ * asymmetric operations.
+ *
+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
+ *
+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
+ * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
+ * the code won't be used.
+ */
+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#else
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
+ */
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
+ {
+ int i;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ void *handle;
+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
+ PK11_DBG);
+ /*
+ * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own
+ * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions
+ * from the top-level PKCS#11 library.
+ */
+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* this means empty tables */
+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also
+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
+ * search.
+ */
+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
+ * is zero now.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
+ PK11_DBG);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
+ continue;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+ token_info.label);
+
+ /*
+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
+ */
+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
+ * dlclose(3C).
+ */
+#if 0
+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+ (void) dlclose(handle);
+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
+
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
+ return (1);
+
+err:
+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
+ * non-existent).
+ */
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
+ * table.
+ */
+ if (nid_table == NULL)
+ return (1);
+
+ /*
+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one
+ * NID_undef.
+ */
+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
+ {
+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
+ {
+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.h Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11.h */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef E_PK11_H
+#define E_PK11_H
+
+#include "e_pk11_err.h"
+
+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
+
+/*
+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
+ *
+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
+ {
+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
+ CK_BBOOL persistent; /* is that a keystore object? */
+ union
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ struct
+ {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
+ } u_RSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ struct
+ {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
+ } u_DSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ struct
+ {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
+ } u_DH;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ struct
+ {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
+ int key_len; /* priv key len */
+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
+ } u_cipher;
+ } opdata_u;
+ } PK11_SESSION;
+
+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
+
+/*
+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
+ * 1) asymmetric operations
+ * 2) random operations
+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations
+ *
+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
+ * only a single group of operations.
+ *
+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
+ *
+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
+ */
+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
+ {
+ OP_RAND,
+ OP_RSA,
+ OP_DSA,
+ OP_DH,
+ OP_CIPHER,
+ OP_DIGEST,
+ OP_MAX
+ } PK11_OPTYPE;
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
+ * and locks associated with the lists.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
+ {
+ PK11_SESSION *head;
+ pthread_mutex_t *lock;
+ } PK11_CACHE;
+
+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
+typedef struct PK11_active_st
+ {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
+ unsigned int refcnt;
+ struct PK11_active_st *prev;
+ struct PK11_active_st *next;
+ } PK11_active;
+
+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
+/*
+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
+ * e_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
+ */
+extern char *passphrasedialog;
+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
+
+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+#endif /* E_PK11_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_err.c Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11_err.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_pk11_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
+{
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
+{
+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork failed" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login failed on token" },
+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" },
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen dialog command" },
+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe failed" },
+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" },
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" },
+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf failed" },
+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap failed" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock failed" },
+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork failed" },
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
+
+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] =
+{
+{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME},
+{0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static void
+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
+ {
+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+ if (pk11_error_init)
+ {
+ pk11_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+ pk11_engine_lib_name->error =
+ ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+ ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
+ {
+ if (pk11_error_init == 0)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+ ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
+#endif
+
+ pk11_error_init = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
+
+void
+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
+{
+ char tmp_buf[20];
+
+ PK11err(function, reason);
+ (void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
+}
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_err.h Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef E_PK11_ERR_H
+#define E_PK11_ERR_H
+
+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+
+#define PK11_F_INIT 100
+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159
+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160
+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161
+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162
+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163
+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164
+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165
+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167
+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168
+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169
+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170
+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171
+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172
+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173
+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174
+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175
+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176
+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177
+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178
+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179
+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180
+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181
+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182
+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183
+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183
+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184
+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185
+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186
+
+#endif /* E_PK11_ERR_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_pub.c Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,3235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "e_pk11.h"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+
+/*
+ * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
+ * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
+ */
+char *passphrasedialog;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+ const RSA *rsa);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DSA stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DH stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
+#endif
+
+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+
+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
+#else
+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
+ * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
+ * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
+ * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
+ * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
+ * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
+ * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
+ * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
+ */
+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
+ { \
+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
+ { \
+ var = CK_TRUE; \
+ if (unlock) \
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
+ goto label; \
+ } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+ {
+ PK11_active *entry;
+
+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
+ if (entry->h == h)
+ return (entry);
+
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+ {
+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* search for entry in the active list */
+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
+ entry->refcnt++;
+ else
+ {
+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
+ if (entry == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ entry->h = h;
+ entry->refcnt = 1;
+ entry->prev = NULL;
+ entry->next = NULL;
+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
+ if (active_list[type] == NULL)
+ active_list[type] = entry;
+ else /* make the entry first in the list */
+ {
+ entry->next = active_list[type];
+ active_list[type]->prev = entry;
+ active_list[type] = entry;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (entry->refcnt);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+void
+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+ {
+ PK11_active *prev_entry;
+
+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+ {
+ prev_entry->next = entry->next;
+ if (entry->next != NULL)
+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ active_list[type] = entry->next;
+ /* we were the first but not the only one */
+ if (entry->next != NULL)
+ entry->next->prev = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* sanitization */
+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ entry->prev = NULL;
+ entry->next = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(entry);
+ }
+
+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
+void
+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
+ {
+ PK11_active *entry;
+
+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case OP_RSA:
+ case OP_DSA:
+ case OP_DH:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
+ *
+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+ {
+ PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
+ entry->refcnt--;
+ if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+ {
+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
+ {
+ "PKCS#11 RSA method",
+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
+ NULL, /* app_data */
+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
+ };
+
+RSA_METHOD *
+PK11_RSA(void)
+ {
+ return (&pk11_rsa);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
+ {
+ "PKCS#11 DSA method",
+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL /* app_data */
+ };
+
+DSA_METHOD *
+PK11_DSA(void)
+ {
+ return (&pk11_dsa);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
+ * enough.
+ */
+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
+
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
+ {
+ "PKCS#11 DH method",
+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */
+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL, /* app_data */
+ NULL /* generate_params */
+ };
+
+DH_METHOD *
+PK11_DH(void)
+ {
+ return (&pk11_dh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
+
+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
+ * should be catched in the padding functions
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+ }
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM f;
+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&f);
+
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* make data into a big number */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+ /*
+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
+ if (buf[j] != 0)
+ break;
+
+ p = buf + j;
+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+ BN_clear_free(&f);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+ }
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM f;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&f);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* PK11 functions are called here */
+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+ /*
+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+ * Needs to skip these 0's here
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
+ if (buf[i] != 0)
+ break;
+
+ p = buf + i;
+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+ BN_clear_free(&f);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
+ int retval = -1;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+ h_pub_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ retval = bytes_encrypted;
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (retval);
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
+ int retval = -1;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+ h_priv_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
+ rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ retval = ul_sig_len;
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (retval);
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+ int retval = -1;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+ h_priv_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (retval);
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+ int retval = -1;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
+ p_mech, h_pub_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ retval = bytes_decrypted;
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (retval);
+ }
+
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
+ */
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
+ * structures.
+ */
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ X509_SIG sig;
+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR algor;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
+ /* Encode the digest */
+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sig.algor = &algor;
+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
+
+ sig.digest = &digest;
+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+ }
+
+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+ if (s == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = s;
+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+ }
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+
+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ulsiglen = j;
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
+ *siglen = ulsiglen;
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+ const RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ X509_SIG sig;
+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR algor;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Encode the digest */
+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ s = (unsigned char *)m;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sig.algor = &algor;
+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
+ sig.digest = &digest;
+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+ }
+
+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+ if (s == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = s;
+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+ }
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+
+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+ h_pub_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
+ (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+ {
+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+#define MAXATTR 1024
+/*
+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ FILE *privkey;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+ const char *file;
+ int ret;
+ pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
+
+ /* We look for private keys only. */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
+ * never ask for private components.
+ */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
+ };
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
+ * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
+ * the 'privkey_id' parameter.
+ */
+ ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
+ if (ret == 1)
+ {
+ if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+ &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+ * if we can't find it.
+ */
+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+ &ks_key) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+ * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
+ * is done.
+ */
+ pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
+ * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
+ * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
+ * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
+ * many times. We do not check the return value because even in
+ * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
+ * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+ sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
+ * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
+ */
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+
+ /*
+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
+ * care of handle management ourselves.
+ */
+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+
+ /*
+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+ */
+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+ /*
+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
+ * in the keystore.
+ */
+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+ {
+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ (void) fclose(privkey);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
+ rsa);
+
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (pkey);
+err:
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+ return (pkey);
+ }
+
+/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ FILE *pubkey;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
+ /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
+ int ret;
+ const char *file;
+ pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
+
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
+ */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
+ };
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (ret == 1)
+ {
+ if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+ &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+ &ks_key) == 0)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+ * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
+ */
+ pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+ /*
+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
+ * structure. No cache hit is possible.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
+
+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
+ */
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
+ /*
+ * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+ */
+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling
+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
+ */
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+ {
+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ (void) fclose(pubkey);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This will always destroy the RSA
+ * object since we have a new RSA
+ * structure here.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
+ rsa);
+
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+ return (pkey);
+err:
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+ return (pkey);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
+ * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
+ * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
+ * session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
+ *
+ * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
+ * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_ULONG found;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+ CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ int i;
+
+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+ (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+ if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
+
+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
+
+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+ ul_key_attr_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (found == 0)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
+err:
+ if (rollback)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+ * since we are doing rollback.
+ */
+ if (found == 0)
+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+ for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
+ {
+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
+ * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
+ * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
+ * NULL here.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ int i;
+ CK_ULONG found;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
+ CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+ */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ };
+
+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+ /*
+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
+ * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
+ * use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
+ */
+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
+ {
+ ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+ /*
+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
+ * session keys.
+ */
+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+ ul_key_attr_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (found == 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
+ * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
+ * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
+ * types we just create a new session key using the private
+ * components from the RSA structure.
+ */
+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
+ * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
+ * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
+ * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
+ * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
+ * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
+ * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
+ */
+ if (rsa->d != NULL)
+ {
+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
+ * 'n'/'e' components as well.
+ */
+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+
+err:
+ if (rollback)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+ * since we are doing rollback.
+ */
+ if (found == 0)
+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+ /*
+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
+ */
+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+ {
+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+ * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+ * cache miss.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+ *
+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
+ * both data signing and verifying.
+ */
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
+ BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+ {
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ return (1);
+ else
+ /*
+ * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
+ * structure with potentially existing private key
+ * object. We can just create a public object and move
+ * on with this session structure.
+ */
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+ * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+ * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+ * cache miss.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+ * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
+ * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
+ * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
+ * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
+ * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
+ * about why we compare the handle as well.
+ */
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
+ BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+ {
+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ return (1);
+ else
+ /*
+ * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
+ * structure with potentially existing public key
+ * object. We can just create a private object and move
+ * on with this session structure.
+ */
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+ * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* The DSA function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+
+static DSA_SIG *
+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ int i;
+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
+
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+
+ /*
+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
+ * each is 20 bytes long
+ */
+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
+
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+ if (dlen > i)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+ goto ret;
+
+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
+
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ dsa_sig->r = r;
+ dsa_sig->s = s;
+
+ret:
+ if (dsa_sig == NULL)
+ {
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BN_free(r);
+ if (s != NULL)
+ BN_free(s);
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+ return (dsa_sig);
+ }
+
+static int
+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
+ DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ int i;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int retval = 0;
+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+
+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
+
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+
+ if (dlen > i)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+ goto ret;
+
+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
+
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
+
+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+ h_pub_key);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+ rv);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
+ */
+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ retval = 1;
+ret:
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+ return (retval);
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_ULONG found;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+ CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+ int i;
+
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
+ };
+
+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+ ul_key_attr_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (found == 0)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
+ *key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+ if (rollback)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+ * since we are doing rollback.
+ */
+ if (found == 0)
+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
+ {
+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ int i;
+ CK_ULONG found;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
+ CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+ */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+ {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
+ };
+
+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+ /* Put the private key components into the template */
+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+ ul_key_attr_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (found == 0)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
+ *key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+ if (rollback)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+ * since we are doing rollback.
+ */
+ if (found == 0)
+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+ /*
+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
+ */
+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
+ {
+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+ */
+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+ */
+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* The DH function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
+ {
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Generate DH key-pair.
+ *
+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+ */
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG i;
+ CK_RV rv, rv1;
+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
+ };
+
+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
+ */
+ pub_key_template[1].pValue =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
+ }
+ else
+ goto err;
+
+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
+ {
+ pub_key_template[2].pValue =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
+ DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
+ }
+ else
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
+ */
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
+ &mechanism,
+ pub_key_template,
+ ul_pub_key_attr_count,
+ priv_key_template,
+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+ &h_pub_key,
+ &h_priv_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
+ * should be sufficient for reuse.
+ */
+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
+ {
+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+ {
+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */
+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+ {
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+
+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
+ {
+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+ DH *dh)
+ {
+ int i;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+ };
+
+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+ };
+
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int ret = -1;
+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
+
+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
+
+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
+ &mechanism,
+ h_key,
+ priv_key_template,
+ ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+ &h_derived_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ priv_key_result[0].pValue =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
+ */
+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+ {
+ /*
+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
+ * pre-master secret.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
+ {
+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
+ }
+
+err:
+
+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+ }
+ }
+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (mechanism.pParameter)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ }
+
+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
+ CK_ULONG found;
+ CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+ int i;
+
+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
+ {
+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+ {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+ };
+
+ key_template[0].pValue = &class;
+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
+
+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
+
+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto malloc_err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
+
+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
+ ul_key_attr_count);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (found == 0)
+ {
+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rollback = CK_TRUE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+ if (key_ptr != NULL)
+ *key_ptr = dh;
+
+err:
+ if (rollback)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+ * since we are doing rollback.
+ */
+ if (found == 0)
+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+
+malloc_err:
+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
+ {
+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (h_key);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ *
+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
+ */
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
+ * in PK11_SESSION structure.
+ */
+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
+ {
+ /*
+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+ */
+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Local function to simplify key template population
+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+ */
+static int
+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG len;
+
+ /*
+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
+ * check that here than individually in the callers.
+ */
+ if (bn != NULL)
+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+
+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ *ul_value_len = len;
+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
+ if (*p_value == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+static void
+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
+ {
+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
+ * if we find more objects based on the template we got.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 OK
+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
+ */
+static int
+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_ULONG objcnt;
+
+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
+ rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (objcnt > 1)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ if (objcnt == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+ return (1);
+err:
+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_uri.c Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "e_pk11.h"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
+
+/*
+ * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one
+ * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI
+ * processing.
+ */
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+/*
+ * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not
+ * cache the PIN by default.
+ */
+static char *token_pin;
+
+static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin);
+static char *run_askpass(char *dialog);
+
+/*
+ * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to
+ * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using
+ * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated
+ * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take
+ * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted
+ * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN.
+ *
+ * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after
+ * the fork.
+ *
+ * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock"
+ * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL)
+ * 1 if we got the PIN
+ */
+#define EXEC_SPEC "exec:"
+#define BUILTIN_SPEC "builtin"
+int
+pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin)
+ {
+ /* Initialize as an error. */
+ *pin = NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0)
+ {
+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+ /* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */
+ *pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: ");
+ if (*pin == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *pw;
+
+ /*
+ * getpassphrase() uses an internal buffer to hold the
+ * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer
+ * with '\0'.
+ */
+ if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */
+ memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin));
+ *pin = pw;
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output
+ * of an external command.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0)
+ {
+ dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC);
+ if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog
+ * keyword.
+ */
+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+err:
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the
+ * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present
+ * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes
+ * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct'
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN
+ * 1 if all is OK
+ * 2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string
+ * pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points
+ * inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present.
+ */
+int
+pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+ const char **file)
+ {
+ char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name;
+
+ /* Check the "file://" case. */
+ if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0)
+ {
+ *file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX);
+ return (2);
+ }
+
+ /* This is the "pkcs11:" case. */
+ if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0)
+ {
+ /* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */
+ *file = (const char *)uristr;
+ return (2);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */
+ uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX));
+ if (uristr2 == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the structure. */
+ memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct));
+
+ /*
+ * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We
+ * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first
+ * and the last character in the URI.
+ */
+ if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' ||
+ (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';'))
+ goto bad_uri;
+
+ tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1);
+ for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1))
+ {
+ /* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */
+ name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2);
+ /* Check whether there is '=' at all. */
+ if (l2 == NULL)
+ goto bad_uri;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit
+ * attributes.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->token == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->serial == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->model == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+ {
+ uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2);
+ if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0)
+ if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ else
+ goto bad_uri;
+ }
+
+ /* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */
+ if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ free(uristr2);
+ return (1);
+bad_uri:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI);
+ if (uristr2 != NULL)
+ free(uristr2);
+ return (0);
+no_mem:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err:
+ pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE);
+ if (uristr2 != NULL)
+ free(uristr2);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside.
+ */
+void
+pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself)
+ {
+ if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->token);
+ if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->manuf);
+ if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->serial);
+ if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->model);
+ if (uri_struct->object != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->object);
+ if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->objecttype);
+ if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+ free(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+ if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE)
+ OPENSSL_free(uri_struct);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is
+ * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that
+ * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note
+ * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to
+ * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see
+ * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11
+ * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+ static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL;
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+ if (token_info == NULL)
+ {
+ token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO));
+ if (token_info == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+ if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label,
+ strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 :
+ strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0)
+ {
+ goto urierr;
+ }
+
+ if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+ if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf,
+ (char *)token_info->manufacturerID,
+ strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 :
+ strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0)
+ goto urierr;
+
+ if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+ if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model,
+ strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 :
+ strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0)
+ goto urierr;
+
+ if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+ if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial,
+ (char *)token_info->serialNumber,
+ strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 :
+ strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0)
+ goto urierr;
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ return (1);
+
+urierr:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH);
+ /* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */
+err:
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the
+ * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will
+ * not have any affect on the policy.
+ *
+ * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked.
+ *
+ * Returns the caching policy number.
+ */
+int
+pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void)
+ {
+ char *value = NULL;
+ static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+ return (policy);
+
+ value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY");
+
+ if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
+ {
+ policy = POLICY_NONE;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0)
+ {
+ policy = POLICY_MEMORY;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0)
+ {
+ policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE);
+done:
+ return (policy);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or
+ * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_cache_pin(char *pin)
+ {
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+ /* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */
+ if (token_pin != NULL)
+ goto ok;
+
+ if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY)
+ if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY)
+ {
+ if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ok:
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ return (1);
+err:
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to
+ * the normal memory caching.
+ *
+ * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock"
+ * mutex.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure
+ */
+static int
+mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin)
+ {
+ void *addr = NULL;
+ long pagesize = 0;
+
+ /* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */
+ if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */
+ if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */
+ if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common
+ * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues.
+ */
+ if (errno == EPERM)
+ PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING);
+ else
+ PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED);
+
+ /*
+ * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check
+ * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet
+ * anyway.
+ */
+ (void) munmap(addr, pagesize);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */
+ token_pin = (char *)addr;
+ strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+ return (1);
+err:
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+ pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even
+ * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to
+ * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may
+ * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the
+ * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set.
+ */
+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ||
+ is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags &
+ CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into
+ * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we
+ * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in
+ * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded
+ * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a
+ * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before
+ * C_Login().
+ */
+ if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE)
+ {
+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+ uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+ uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+ {
+ if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass,
+ &uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
+ * the engine.
+ *
+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
+ */
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+ {
+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin,
+ strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+ goto err_locked;
+ }
+
+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which
+ * would need to relogin).
+ */
+ if (passphrasedialog == NULL &&
+ uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+ {
+ passphrasedialog =
+ strdup(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+ if (passphrasedialog == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv);
+ goto err_locked;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might
+ * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required -
+ * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory.
+ */
+ if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() ==
+ POLICY_WRONG_VALUE)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID);
+ goto err_locked;
+ }
+
+ if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE)
+ if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+ goto err_locked;
+ }
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * If token does not require login we take it as the
+ * login was done.
+ */
+ *login_done = CK_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that
+ * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the
+ * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the
+ * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with
+ * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it.
+ */
+ if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+ memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+
+ return (1);
+
+err_locked:
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+err:
+ /* Always get rid of the PIN. */
+ if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+ memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There
+ * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite
+ * different so we need a separate function for this.
+ *
+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+ {
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ /*
+ * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again.
+ * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session
+ * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token
+ * then.
+ */
+ if (passphrasedialog != NULL)
+ {
+ char *pin = NULL;
+
+ /* If we cached the PIN then use it. */
+ if (token_pin != NULL)
+ pin = token_pin;
+ else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK)
+ {
+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+
+ /* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */
+ if (pin != token_pin)
+ {
+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
+ OPENSSL_free(pin);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+err:
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we
+ * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able
+ * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we
+ * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed
+ * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose().
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * allocated buffer on success
+ * NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *
+run_askpass(char *dialog)
+ {
+ pid_t pid;
+ int n, p[2];
+ char *buf = NULL;
+
+ if (pipe(p) == -1)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ switch (pid = fork())
+ {
+ case -1:
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED);
+ return (NULL);
+ /* child */
+ case 0:
+ /*
+ * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on
+ * file descriptor shortage.
+ */
+ close(p[0]);
+ (void) dup2(p[1], 1);
+ close(p[1]);
+ /*
+ * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are
+ * in the child. However, parent will get read() error
+ * so do not worry.
+ */
+ (void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ /* parent */
+ default:
+ /* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */
+ buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ close(p[1]);
+ n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN);
+ if (n == -1 || n == 0)
+ {
+ PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ buf[n] = '\0';
+
+ (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ return (buf);
+ }
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_uri.h Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef E_PK11_URI_H
+#define E_PK11_URI_H
+
+#include <security/pkcs11t.h>
+
+/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */
+#define PK11_URI_PREFIX "pkcs11:"
+#define FILE_URI_PREFIX "file://"
+#define PK11_TOKEN "token"
+#define PK11_MANUF "manuf"
+#define PK11_SERIAL "serial"
+#define PK11_MODEL "model"
+#define PK11_OBJECT "object"
+#define PK11_OBJECTTYPE "objecttype"
+#define PK11_ASKPASS "passphrasedialog"
+
+/* PIN caching policy. */
+#define POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED 0
+#define POLICY_NONE 1
+#define POLICY_MEMORY 2
+#define POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY 3
+#define POLICY_WRONG_VALUE 4
+
+/*
+ * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports.
+ */
+#define PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN 256
+
+/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */
+typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct {
+ char *object; /* object label, the only mandatory info */
+ char *objecttype; /* (private|public|cert), currently unused */
+ char *token; /* token label */
+ char *manuf; /* manufacturer label */
+ char *serial; /* serial number label */
+ char *model; /* model label */
+ char *askpass; /* full path to the command to get the PIN */
+ /* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */
+ char *pin; /* token PIN */
+} pkcs11_uri;
+
+/* For URI processing. */
+extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
+
+int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin);
+int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void);
+int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+ const char **file);
+int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct);
+void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself);
+int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin);
+int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+ pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private);
+int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+#endif /* E_PK11_URI_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,3780 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <strings.h>
-
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/dso.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/aes.h>
-#include <cryptlib.h>
-#include <dlfcn.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-
-/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-/*
- * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
- * information.
- */
-#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
-#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
-#else
-#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
- * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
- * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
- * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
- * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
- */
-#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-#include <security/pkcs11.h>
-#include "hw_pk11.h"
-#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
-
-#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
-#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-/*
- * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
- * initialization.
- */
-int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
-int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
-int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-
-/*
- * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
- * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
- * RSA keys by reference feature.
- */
-pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-/*
- * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
- * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
- */
-int *hw_cnids;
-int *hw_dnids;
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-
-/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-
-/*
- * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
- * logging into the token.
- */
-CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-
-/*
- * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
- * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
- * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
- * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
- * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
- * PK11_SESSION object.
- *
- * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
- * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
- * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
- * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
- * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
- *
- * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
- * They are also used for active list protection.
- */
-pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-
-/*
- * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
- * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
- * list) for given algorithm type
- */
-PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-
-/*
- * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
- * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
- * without losing the secret key objects.
- */
-static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-
-/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-enum pk11_cipher_id {
- PK11_DES_CBC,
- PK11_DES3_CBC,
- PK11_DES_ECB,
- PK11_DES3_ECB,
- PK11_RC4,
- PK11_AES_128_CBC,
- PK11_AES_192_CBC,
- PK11_AES_256_CBC,
- PK11_AES_128_ECB,
- PK11_AES_192_ECB,
- PK11_AES_256_ECB,
- PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- PK11_AES_128_CTR,
- PK11_AES_192_CTR,
- PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
- PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-};
-
-/* Index for the supported digests */
-enum pk11_digest_id {
- PK11_MD5,
- PK11_SHA1,
- PK11_SHA224,
- PK11_SHA256,
- PK11_SHA384,
- PK11_SHA512,
- PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-};
-
-typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
- {
- enum pk11_cipher_id id;
- int nid;
- int iv_len;
- int min_key_len;
- int max_key_len;
- CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
- CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
- } PK11_CIPHER;
-
-typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
- {
- enum pk11_digest_id id;
- int nid;
- CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
- } PK11_DIGEST;
-
-/* ENGINE level stuff */
-static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
-static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-
-/* RAND stuff */
-static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-
-/* These functions are also used in other files */
-PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-
-/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-#endif
-
-/* Local helper functions */
-static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
- CK_BBOOL persistent);
-static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-
-/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
-static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
- const int **nids, int nid);
-static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
- const int **nids, int nid);
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
- int key_len);
-static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
- size_t count);
-static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-
-static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
- CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
- int *local_cipher_nids);
-static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
- CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
- int *local_digest_nids);
-static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
- int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
- PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
-static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
- int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
- PK11_DIGEST *digest);
-
-static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-
-#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
- { \
- if (uselock) \
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
- if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
- { \
- retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
- sp->persistent); \
- } \
- if (uselock) \
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
- }
-
-static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-static int cipher_count = 0;
-static int digest_count = 0;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-
-/*
- * Static list of ciphers.
- * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
- * thus ciphers[i].id == i
- * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
- */
-static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
- {
- { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
- CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
- { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
- CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
- { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
- CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
- { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
- CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
- { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
- CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
- { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
- { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
- { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
- { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
- { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
- { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
- { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
- CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
- { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
- { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
- { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32,
- CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
- };
-
-/*
- * Static list of digests.
- * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
- * thus digests[i].id == i
- * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
- */
-static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
- {
- {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
- {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
- {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
- {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
- {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
- {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
- {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
- };
-
-/*
- * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
- * session in multiple cipher_update calls
- */
-typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
- {
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-
-
-/*
- * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
- * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
- *
- * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
- */
-
-/* DES CBC EVP */
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
- {
- NID_des_cbc,
- 8, 8, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
- {
- NID_des_ede3_cbc,
- 8, 24, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-/*
- * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
- * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
- */
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
- {
- NID_des_ecb,
- 8, 8, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
- {
- NID_des_ede3_ecb,
- 8, 24, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
-
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
- {
- NID_aes_128_cbc,
- 16, 16, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
- {
- NID_aes_192_cbc,
- 16, 24, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
- {
- NID_aes_256_cbc,
- 16, 32, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-/*
- * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
- * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
- */
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
- {
- NID_aes_128_ecb,
- 16, 16, 0,
- EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
- {
- NID_aes_192_ecb,
- 16, 24, 0,
- EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
- {
- NID_aes_256_ecb,
- 16, 32, 0,
- EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-/*
- * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
- * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
- * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
- */
-static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
- {
- NID_undef,
- 16, 16, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
- {
- NID_undef,
- 16, 24, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
- {
- NID_undef,
- 16, 32, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
- {
- NID_bf_cbc,
- 8, 16, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
- {
- NID_rc4,
- 1, 16, 0,
- EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
- pk11_cipher_init,
- pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
- pk11_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
-
-static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
- {
- NID_md5,
- NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- 0,
- pk11_digest_init,
- pk11_digest_update,
- pk11_digest_final,
- pk11_digest_copy,
- pk11_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- MD5_CBLOCK,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- };
-
-static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
- {
- NID_sha1,
- NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- 0,
- pk11_digest_init,
- pk11_digest_update,
- pk11_digest_final,
- pk11_digest_copy,
- pk11_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- SHA_CBLOCK,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- };
-
-static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
- {
- NID_sha224,
- NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
- SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- 0,
- pk11_digest_init,
- pk11_digest_update,
- pk11_digest_final,
- pk11_digest_copy,
- pk11_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
- SHA256_CBLOCK,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- };
-
-static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
- {
- NID_sha256,
- NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
- SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- 0,
- pk11_digest_init,
- pk11_digest_update,
- pk11_digest_final,
- pk11_digest_copy,
- pk11_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- SHA256_CBLOCK,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- };
-
-static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
- {
- NID_sha384,
- NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
- SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- 0,
- pk11_digest_init,
- pk11_digest_update,
- pk11_digest_final,
- pk11_digest_copy,
- pk11_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
- SHA512_CBLOCK,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- };
-
-static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
- {
- NID_sha512,
- NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
- SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- 0,
- pk11_digest_init,
- pk11_digest_update,
- pk11_digest_final,
- pk11_digest_copy,
- pk11_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- SHA512_CBLOCK,
- sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
- };
-
-/*
- * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
- * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
- */
-#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
- {
- {
- PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
- "SO_PATH",
- "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
- },
- {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
- };
-
-
-static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
- {
- pk11_rand_seed,
- pk11_rand_bytes,
- pk11_rand_cleanup,
- pk11_rand_add,
- pk11_rand_bytes,
- pk11_rand_status
- };
-
-
-/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
-
-CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-
-/*
- * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
- * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
- * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
- */
-static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
-/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
-static int pk11_pid = 0;
-
-static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-
-/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
- {
- int type;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
- if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
- goto malloc_err;
- (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
- if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
- goto malloc_err;
- (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
- if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
- goto malloc_err;
- (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
- if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
- goto malloc_err;
- (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
- for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
- {
- session_cache[type].lock =
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
- if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
- goto malloc_err;
- (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
- }
-
- return (1);
-
-malloc_err:
- pk11_free_all_locks();
- PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
-
-static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
- {
- int type;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
- OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
- find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
- OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
- find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
- OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
- find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
- for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
- {
- if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
- OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
- session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
- }
- }
- }
-
-/*
- * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
- */
-static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
- RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
- if (!pk11_library_initialized)
- if (!pk11_library_init(e))
- return (0);
-
- if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
- !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
- !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
- !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
- return (0);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
- {
- if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
- !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
- !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
- return (0);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
- {
- if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
- return (0);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
- {
- if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
- return (0);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
- if (pk11_have_random)
- {
- if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
- return (0);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
- }
- if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
- !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
- !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
- !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
- !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
- return (0);
-
-/*
- * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
- * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
- * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
- * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
- pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
- /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
- ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
-#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
- {
- if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
- return (0);
-
- if (!bind_pk11(e))
- return (0);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-
-#else
-static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
- {
- ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-
- if (!ret)
- return (NULL);
-
- if (!bind_pk11(ret))
- {
- ENGINE_free(ret);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-void
-ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
- {
- ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
- * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
- */
- /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
- if (!pk11_dso)
- pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-
- if (pk11_dso == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- return;
- }
-
- e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
- if (!e_pk11)
- {
- DSO_free(pk11_dso);
- pk11_dso = NULL;
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
- * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
- * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
- * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
- */
- if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
- {
- DSO_free(pk11_dso);
- pk11_dso = NULL;
- ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
- return;
- }
-
- ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-
- ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-
-/*
- * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
- * the function symbol names to bind to.
- */
-static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-
-static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
- {
- if (PK11_LIBNAME)
- return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-
- return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
- }
-
-static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
- {
- if (PK11_LIBNAME)
- OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-
- PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
- }
-
-static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
- {
- free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-
- return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
- }
-
-/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (!pk11_library_initialized)
- return;
-
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
- for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
- }
- }
-
-/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (!pk11_library_initialized)
- return;
-
- for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
- }
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- }
-
-/*
- * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
- * accessible to all threads.
- */
-static void pk11_fork_child(void)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (!pk11_library_initialized)
- return;
-
- for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
- }
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- }
-
-/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-{
- return (pk11_library_init(e));
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
- * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
- * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
- * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
- * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
- {
- CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
- CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
- CK_INFO info;
- CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
- int any_slot_found;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
- * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
- * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
- * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
- * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
- * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
- * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
- * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
- * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
- */
- if (pk11_library_initialized)
- {
- if (pk11_pid == getpid())
- {
- return (1);
- }
- else
- {
- global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- /*
- * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
- * the application calls fork() without finishing the
- * engine first.
- */
- pk11_free_all_locks();
- }
- }
-
- if (pk11_dso == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- /*
- * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
- * NIDs there.
- */
- if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
- goto err;
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
- goto err;
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-
- /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
- p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
- PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
- if (!p)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
- rv = p(&pFuncList);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
- if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
- * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
- * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
- * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
- * because no slot was present.
- */
- if (any_slot_found == 0)
- return (1);
-
- if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- /* Open the global_session for the new process */
- rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
- NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
- PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
- * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
- */
- if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
- == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
- "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
- digest_count = 0;
- }
-
- pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
- pk11_pid = getpid();
- /*
- * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
- * will do the cleanup.
- */
- if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
- goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
- session_cache[i].head = NULL;
- /*
- * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
- * for asymmetric ciphers.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
- active_list[i] = NULL;
-
- if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
- {
- if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
- pk11_fork_child) != 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
- }
-
- return (1);
-
-err:
- return (0);
- }
-
-/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
- {
- free_PK11_LIBNAME();
- ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
- * library.
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (pk11_dso == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-
- if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* free all active lists */
- for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
- pk11_free_active_list(i);
-
- pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
- global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-
- /*
- * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
- * may have side-effects.
- */
-#if 0
- pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-#endif
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- {
- ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL;
- if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) {
- ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr);
- if (ob != NULL)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
- }
- if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) {
- ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr);
- if (ob != NULL)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
- }
- if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) {
- ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr);
- if (ob != NULL)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- pk11_dso = NULL;
- pFuncList = NULL;
- pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
- pk11_pid = 0;
- /*
- * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
- * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
- * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
- * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
- * the engine before calling fork().
- */
- pk11_free_all_locks();
-
- return (1);
-
-err:
- return (0);
- }
-
-/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
- {
- int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-
- switch (cmd)
- {
- case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
- if (p == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (initialized)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-
- return (0);
- }
-
-
-/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
- {
- return;
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
- {
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
- * the calling functions do not care anyway
- */
- pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-
- return;
- }
-
-static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
- {
- pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
- }
-
-static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
- return (0);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-static int pk11_rand_status(void)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
- {
- switch (optype)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case OP_RSA:
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- }
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
- }
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case OP_DSA:
- if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
- }
- if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case OP_DH:
- if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
- sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
- }
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
-
-/*
- * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
- * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
- * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
- * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
- */
-PK11_SESSION *
-pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
- {
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
- pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
- static pid_t pid = 0;
- pid_t new_pid;
- CK_RV rv;
-
- switch (optype)
- {
- case OP_RSA:
- case OP_DSA:
- case OP_DH:
- case OP_RAND:
- case OP_DIGEST:
- case OP_CIPHER:
- freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
- PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
- return (NULL);
- }
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-
- /*
- * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
- * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
- * here, with no PID information.
- */
- if (pid == 0)
- pid = getpid();
-
- freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
- sp = freelist;
-
- /*
- * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
- * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
- * structure from the freelist.
- */
- if (sp == NULL)
- {
- if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-
- /*
- * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
- * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
- * mark them as unused.
- */
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
- else
- freelist = sp->next;
-
- /*
- * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
- * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
- */
- if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
- {
- pid = new_pid;
-
- /*
- * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
- * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
- * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
- * head of the list).
- */
- while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
- {
- freelist = sp1->next;
- /*
- * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
- * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
- * sessions and destroy all objects.
- */
- pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
- OPENSSL_free(sp1);
- }
-
- /* we have to free the active list as well. */
- pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-
- /* Initialize the process */
- rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
- if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
- rv);
- OPENSSL_free(sp);
- sp = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
- * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
- * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
- * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
- * information.
- */
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
- goto err;
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
- if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Open the global_session for the new process */
- rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
- NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
- rv);
- OPENSSL_free(sp);
- sp = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
- * re-initialization.
- */
- if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(sp);
- sp = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
- if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
- {
- /*
- * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
- * the caller cope with the situation.
- */
- freelist = sp;
- sp = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (sp->pid == 0)
- {
- /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
- if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(sp);
- sp = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
- session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-
-err:
- if (sp != NULL)
- sp->next = NULL;
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-
- return (sp);
- }
-
-
-void
-pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
- {
- pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
- PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-
- /*
- * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
- * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
- * next time we will ask for a new session.
- */
- if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
- return;
-
- switch (optype)
- {
- case OP_RSA:
- case OP_DSA:
- case OP_DH:
- case OP_RAND:
- case OP_DIGEST:
- case OP_CIPHER:
- freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
- PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
- return;
- }
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
- freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
- sp->next = freelist;
- session_cache[optype].head = sp;
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
- }
-
-
-/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
- {
- int ret = 1;
- int type;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
- (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-
- /*
- * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
- * return 0 on exit.
- */
- for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
- {
- if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/*
- * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
- * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
- * return an error on return.
- */
-static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
- pid_t mypid = getpid();
- pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
- int ret = 1;
-
- switch (optype)
- {
- case OP_RSA:
- case OP_DSA:
- case OP_DH:
- case OP_RAND:
- case OP_DIGEST:
- case OP_CIPHER:
- freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
- PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
- freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
- while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
- {
- if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
- PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
- ret = 0;
- }
- }
- freelist = sp->next;
- pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
- OPENSSL_free(sp);
- }
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-
-static int
-pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-
- switch (optype)
- {
- case OP_RSA:
- case OP_DSA:
- case OP_DH:
- myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
- break;
- case OP_RAND:
- myslot = rand_SLOTID;
- break;
- case OP_DIGEST:
- case OP_CIPHER:
- myslot = SLOTID;
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
- PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
- rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
- NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
- if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
- {
- /*
- * We are probably a child process so force the
- * reinitialize of the session
- */
- pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
- if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
- return (0);
- rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
- NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
- }
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
- return (0);
- }
-
- sp->pid = getpid();
-
- switch (optype)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case OP_RSA:
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
- sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
- break;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case OP_DSA:
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
- break;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case OP_DH:
- sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
- sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
- break;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
- case OP_CIPHER:
- sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
- * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
- */
- sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
- return (1);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/*
- * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
- * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
- * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
- * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
- */
-static void
-destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- }
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
- }
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
- }
- }
-
-/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-int
-pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
- {
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
- ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
- destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-int
-pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
- {
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
- ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
- destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/*
- * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
- * objects in the free list.
- */
-int
-pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
- {
- int ret = 1;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
- CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
-
- if (session != NULL)
- local_free_session = session;
- else
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
- local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
- uselock = CK_FALSE;
- }
-
- /*
- * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
- */
- while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
- {
- local_free_session = sp->next;
-
- /*
- * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
- * destroy operations fails.
- */
- if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- if (session == NULL)
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-
- return (ret);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-int
-pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
- {
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
- ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
- if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
- sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-int
-pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
- {
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
- ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
- if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
- sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/*
- * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
- * objects in the free list.
- */
-int
-pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
- {
- int ret = 1;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
- CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
-
- if (session != NULL)
- local_free_session = session;
- else
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
- local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
- uselock = CK_FALSE;
- }
-
- /*
- * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
- */
- while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
- {
- local_free_session = sp->next;
-
- /*
- * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
- * destroy operations fails.
- */
- if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- if (session == NULL)
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
-
- return (ret);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-int
-pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
- {
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
- ret, uselock, OP_DH);
- sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
- if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
- {
- BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
- sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/*
- * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
- *
- * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
- * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
- */
-int
-pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
- {
- int ret = 1;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
- CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
-
- if (session != NULL)
- local_free_session = session;
- else
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
- local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
- uselock = CK_FALSE;
- }
-
- while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
- {
- local_free_session = sp->next;
-
- /*
- * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
- * destroy operations fails.
- */
- if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- }
-err:
- if (session == NULL)
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
-
- return (ret);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
-static int
-pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
- CK_BBOOL persistent)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
-
- /*
- * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
- * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
- * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
- */
- if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
- return (1);
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
- rv);
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-
-/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
-
-static int
-cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
- {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
- if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
- return (ciphers[i].id);
- return (-1);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
- {
- if (cipher_count > 0)
- *nids = cipher_nids;
- else
- *nids = NULL;
- return (cipher_count);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
- {
- if (digest_count > 0)
- *nids = digest_nids;
- else
- *nids = NULL;
- return (digest_count);
- }
-
-/*
- * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
- */
-static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
- PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-
- /*
- * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
- * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
- * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
- OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
- OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
- ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
- ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
- {
- pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
- pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
- /*
- * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
- * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
- * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
- * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
- * add code so that the counter length can be set via
- * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
- */
- ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
- OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
- else
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
- {
- if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
- {
- pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
- pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
- }
- }
-
- /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
- if (ctx->encrypt)
- rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
- sp->opdata_cipher_key);
- else
- rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
- sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
- PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
- {
- CK_MECHANISM mech;
- int index;
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-
- state->sp = NULL;
-
- index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
- if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
- return (0);
-
- p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
- /*
- * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
- * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
- * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
- * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
- * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
- * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
- * code serves as a sanity check.
- *
- * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
- * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
- * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
- * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
- */
- if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
- ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
- ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
- mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
- mech.pParameter = NULL;
- mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-
- /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
- (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
-
- /*
- * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
- * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
- * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
- */
- if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
- sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
- {
- state->sp = sp;
- if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
- return (0);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
- /*
- * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
- * needs to be created.
- */
- if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
- ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
- }
-
- if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
- {
- /*
- * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
- * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
- */
- if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
- {
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* now initialize the context with a new key */
- if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
- return (0);
-
- sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
- state->sp = sp;
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
- * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
- * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
- * that it needs not be recreated.
- *
- * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
- * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
- * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
- * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
- * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
- */
-static int
-pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
- return (0);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
- NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
- * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
- */
-static int
-pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
- {
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- CK_RV rv;
- unsigned long outl = inl;
-
- if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-
- if (!inl)
- return (1);
-
- /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
- if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
- return (0);
-
- if (ctx->encrypt)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
- PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
- return (0);
- }
- }
- else
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
- PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
- * the same size of input.
- * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
- * correctly aligned buffers.
- */
- if (inl != outl)
- return (0);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
- * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
- * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
- * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
- * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
- * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
- * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
- * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
- */
-static int
-pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-
- if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
- {
- /*
- * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
- * rid of the context.
- */
- if (ctx->encrypt)
- rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
- state->sp->session, buf, &len);
- else
- rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
- state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
- PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
- pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
- return (0);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
- state->sp = NULL;
- }
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
- * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
- * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
- const int **nids, int nid)
- {
- if (!cipher)
- return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-
- switch (nid)
- {
- case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
- *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_des_cbc:
- *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
- *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
- break;
- case NID_des_ecb:
- *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
- break;
- case NID_aes_128_cbc:
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_aes_192_cbc:
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_aes_256_cbc:
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_aes_128_ecb:
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
- break;
- case NID_aes_192_ecb:
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
- break;
- case NID_aes_256_ecb:
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
- break;
- case NID_bf_cbc:
- *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_rc4:
- *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
- break;
- default:
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
- /*
- * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
- * here are not constants.
- */
- if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
- else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
- else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
- *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
- else
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
- *cipher = NULL;
- break;
- }
- return (*cipher != NULL);
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
- const int **nids, int nid)
- {
- if (!digest)
- return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-
- switch (nid)
- {
- case NID_md5:
- *digest = &pk11_md5;
- break;
- case NID_sha1:
- *digest = &pk11_sha1;
- break;
- case NID_sha224:
- *digest = &pk11_sha224;
- break;
- case NID_sha256:
- *digest = &pk11_sha256;
- break;
- case NID_sha384:
- *digest = &pk11_sha384;
- break;
- case NID_sha512:
- *digest = &pk11_sha512;
- break;
- default:
- *digest = NULL;
- break;
- }
- return (*digest != NULL);
- }
-
-
-/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
- };
-
- /*
- * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
- * can use the key handles. Here is why:
- * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
- * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
- * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
- * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
- * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
- * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
- * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
- * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
- * terminate the active operation.
- */
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
- a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
- a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Save the key information used in this session.
- * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
- */
- sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
- PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
- (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-err:
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-static int
-md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
- {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
- if (digests[i].nid == nid)
- return (digests[i].id);
- return (-1);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech;
- int index;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-
- state->sp = NULL;
-
- index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
- if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
- return (0);
-
- pdp = &digests[index];
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
- mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
- mech.pParameter = NULL;
- mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
- return (0);
- }
-
- state->sp = sp;
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-
- /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
- if (count == 0)
- return (1);
-
- if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
- count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
- pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
- state->sp = NULL;
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- unsigned long len;
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
- len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-
- if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
- pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
- state->sp = NULL;
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
- return (0);
-
- /*
- * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
- * to the pool
- */
- pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
- state->sp = NULL;
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- int ret = 0;
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
- CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
- CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-
- /* The copy-from state */
- state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
- if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Initialize the copy-to state */
- if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
- goto err;
- state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-
- /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
- &ul_state_len);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ul_state_len == 0)
- {
- goto err;
- }
-
- pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
- if (pstate == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
- &ul_state_len);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
- rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
- ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
- PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-err:
- if (pstate != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-static int
-pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
- {
- PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
- unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
- if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
- {
- /*
- * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
- * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
- * that might have been allocated in the token when
- * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
- * will return the session to the cache.
- */
- if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
- * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
- * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
- * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
- * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
- * prefix.
- */
-static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
- int key_len)
- {
- if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
- memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
- {
- (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
- {
- int ret = 0;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-
- if (session != NULL)
- local_free_session = session;
- else
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
- local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
- }
-
- while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
- {
- local_free_session = sp->next;
-
- if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- /*
- * The secret key object is created in the
- * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
- */
- if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
- sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
- goto err;
- sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
-err:
-
- if (session == NULL)
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
-
- return (ret);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
- *
- * CKM_RSA_X_509
- * CKM_RSA_PKCS
- * CKM_DSA
- *
- * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
- * public key slot.
- *
- * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
- *
- * CKM_DES3_CBC
- * CKM_DES_CBC
- * CKM_AES_CBC
- * CKM_DES3_ECB
- * CKM_DES_ECB
- * CKM_AES_ECB
- * CKM_AES_CTR
- * CKM_RC4
- * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
- *
- * Digests optionally supported
- *
- * CKM_MD5
- * CKM_SHA_1
- * CKM_SHA224
- * CKM_SHA256
- * CKM_SHA384
- * CKM_SHA512
- *
- * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
- * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
- * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
- * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
- * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
- */
-static int
-pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
- {
- CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
- CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
- CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
- CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
- int i;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar;
- CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
- int slot_n_cipher = 0;
- int slot_n_digest = 0;
- CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
- int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
- int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-
- int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
- int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-
- /* let's initialize the output parameter */
- if (any_slot_found != NULL)
- *any_slot_found = 0;
-
- /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
- if (ulSlotCount == 0)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
- return (1);
- }
-
- pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-
- if (pSlotList == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* Get the slot list for processing */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
- OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
- return (0);
- }
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
- for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
- {
- current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
- /* Check if slot has random support. */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- continue;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
- token_info.label);
-
- if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
- "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
- pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
- rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-
- pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
- for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
- {
- CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
- CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
- CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
- current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- continue;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
- token_info.label);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- /*
- * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
- * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
- */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
- &mech_info);
-
- if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
- {
- /*
- * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
- * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
- */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
- CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-
- if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
- {
- slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- /*
- * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
- * verifying with CKM_DSA.
- */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
- &mech_info);
- if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
- {
- slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
- }
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- /*
- * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
- * derivation.
- */
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
- CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-
- if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
- CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
- if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
- {
- slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
- if (!found_candidate_slot &&
- (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
- "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
- best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
- pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
- pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
- pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
- found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
- /*
- * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
- * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
- */
- pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
- "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
- PK11_DBG);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best slot so far: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
- best_slot_sofar);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
- "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
- }
- else
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
- }
- } /* for */
-
- if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
- {
- pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
- }
-
- found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
- best_slot_sofar = 0;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-
- SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
- for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-
- current_slot = pSlotList[i];
- current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
- current_slot_n_digest = 0;
- (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
- (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-
- pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
- ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-
- pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
- ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
- current_slot_n_cipher);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
- current_slot_n_digest);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best cipher/digest slot so far: %d\n",
- PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-
- /*
- * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
- * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
- * otherwise leave it where it is.
- */
- if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
- (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
- PK11_DBG, current_slot);
- best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
- cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
- digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
- (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
- sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
- (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
- sizeof (local_digest_nids));
- }
- }
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-
- if (pSlotList != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
- OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-
- if (any_slot_found != NULL)
- *any_slot_found = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
-static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
- int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
- PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
- {
- CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
- CK_RV rv;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
- rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, &mech_info);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
- return;
- }
-
- if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
- (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
- {
- if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
- mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
- " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
- cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
- mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
- return;
- }
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
- local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
- cipher->nid;
- }
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- else
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
- " rejected, software implementation only\n");
- }
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
- }
- else
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
- }
-
- return;
- }
-
-static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
- int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
- {
- CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
- CK_RV rv;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
- rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
- return;
- }
-
- if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
- {
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
- local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
- digest->nid;
- }
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
- else
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
- " rejected, software implementation only\n");
- }
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
- }
- else
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
- }
-
- return;
- }
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
-static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
- {
- ASN1_OBJECT *o;
- int nid;
-
- if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
- 1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
- {
- return (0);
- }
-
- /* will return NID_undef on error */
- nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
-
- return (nid);
- }
-
-/*
- * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
- * have to help ourselves here.
- */
-static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
- {
- /* are we already set? */
- if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
- return (1);
-
- /*
- * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
- * follow the format of those that exist.
- */
- if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
- NID_undef)
- goto err;
- ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
- if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
- NID_undef)
- goto err;
- ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
- if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
- NID_undef)
- goto err;
- ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
- return (1);
-
-err:
- PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
- return (0);
- }
-#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-
-/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
- CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
- {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
- {
- pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
- current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
- }
- }
-
-/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
- CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
- {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
- {
- pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
- local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
- }
- }
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-/*
- * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
- * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
- * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
- * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
- * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
- * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
- * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
- * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
- * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
- * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
- * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
- * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
- * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
- *
- * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
- * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
- * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
- * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
- * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
- * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
- * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
- * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
- * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
- * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
- * asymmetric operations.
- *
- * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
- * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
- * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
- * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
- * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
- *
- * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
- * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
- * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
- * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
- * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
- * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
- * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
- * information.
- *
- * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
- * the code won't be used.
- */
-#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
-static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-#else
-static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
- * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
- * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
- */
-static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
- {
- int i;
- CK_RV rv;
- void *handle;
- CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
- CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
- CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
- int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
- CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
- int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
- int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
- PK11_DBG);
- /*
- * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own
- * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions
- * from the top-level PKCS#11 library.
- */
- if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
- PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
- if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
- if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
- PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
- if (ulSlotCount == 0)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
- hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
- hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
- if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- /* this means empty tables */
- hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
- hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
- return (1);
- }
-
- pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
- if (pSlotList == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get the slot list for processing */
- if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also
- * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
- * search.
- */
- hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
- hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
- tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
- tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
- if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
- * is zero now.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
- tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
- for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
- tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
- PK11_DBG);
-
- for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
- {
- if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
- continue;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
- token_info.label);
-
- /*
- * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
- * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
- */
- pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
- &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
- pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
- &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
- }
-
- /*
- * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
- * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
- * dlclose(3C).
- */
-#if 0
- pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
-#endif
- OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
- (void) dlclose(handle);
- hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
- hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
-
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
- return (1);
-
-err:
- if (pSlotList != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
- if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
- if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
-
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
- * non-existent).
- */
-static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
- {
- int i = 0;
-
- /*
- * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
- * table.
- */
- if (nid_table == NULL)
- return (1);
-
- /*
- * the table is never full, there is always at least one
- * NID_undef.
- */
- while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
- {
- if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
- {
- DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
- return (1);
- }
- }
-
- return (0);
- }
-#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.h */
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef HW_PK11_H
-#define HW_PK11_H
-
-#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-
-/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32
-
-/*
- * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
- * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
- * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
- * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
- * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
- * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
- *
- * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
- * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
- * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
- */
-typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
- {
- struct PK11_st_SESSION *next;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */
- pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */
- CK_BBOOL persistent; /* is that a keystore object? */
- union
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- struct
- {
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
- RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
- BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
- BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
- RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
- BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
- } u_RSA;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- struct
- {
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
- DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
- BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
- DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
- BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
- } u_DSA;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- struct
- {
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */
- DH *dh; /* dh key addr */
- BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
- } u_DH;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
- struct
- {
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */
- unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
- int key_len; /* priv key len */
- int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
- } u_cipher;
- } opdata_u;
- } PK11_SESSION;
-
-#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
-
-/*
- * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
- * 1) asymmetric operations
- * 2) random operations
- * 3) symmetric and digest operations
- *
- * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
- * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
- * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
- * only a single group of operations.
- *
- * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
- * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
- * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
- *
- * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
- * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
- */
-typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
- {
- OP_RAND,
- OP_RSA,
- OP_DSA,
- OP_DH,
- OP_CIPHER,
- OP_DIGEST,
- OP_MAX
- } PK11_OPTYPE;
-
-/*
- * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
- * and locks associated with the lists.
- */
-typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
- {
- PK11_SESSION *head;
- pthread_mutex_t *lock;
- } PK11_CACHE;
-
-/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-typedef struct PK11_active_st
- {
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
- unsigned int refcnt;
- struct PK11_active_st *prev;
- struct PK11_active_st *next;
- } PK11_active;
-
-extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-extern PK11_active *active_list[];
-/*
- * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
- * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
- */
-extern char *passphrasedialog;
-extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-
-#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
-#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
-
-extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
-extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-
-#endif /* HW_PK11_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
-{
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
-{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
-{ 0, NULL}
-};
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
-{
-{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
-{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
-{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
-{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"},
-{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"},
-{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"},
-{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"},
-{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"},
-{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"},
-{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"},
-{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"},
-{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
-{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"},
-{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"},
-{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
-{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"},
-{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
-{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"},
-{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"},
-{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"},
-{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"},
-{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"},
-{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"},
-{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"},
-{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"},
-{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
-{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"},
-{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
-{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"},
-{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"},
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"},
-{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"},
-{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"},
-{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"},
-{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"},
-{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"},
-{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"},
-{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"},
-{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"},
-{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"},
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"},
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"},
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"},
-{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"},
-{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"},
-{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"},
-{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"},
-{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
-{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"},
-{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"},
-{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"},
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
-{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"},
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"},
-{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" },
-{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork failed" },
-{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login failed on token" },
-{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" },
-{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
-{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" },
-{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" },
-{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen dialog command" },
-{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe failed" },
-{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" },
-{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" },
-{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" },
-{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" },
-{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
-{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" },
-{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" },
-{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" },
-{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
-{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf failed" },
-{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap failed" },
-{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
-{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock failed" },
-{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork failed" },
-{ 0, NULL}
-};
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
-
-static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
-static int pk11_error_init = 1;
-
-#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
-static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] =
-{
-{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME},
-{0, NULL}
-};
-#endif
-
-static void
-ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
- {
- if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
- pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
-
- if (pk11_error_init)
- {
- pk11_error_init = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
- ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
- ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
- pk11_engine_lib_name->error =
- ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
- ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
-#endif
- }
-}
-
-static void
-ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
- {
- if (pk11_error_init == 0)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
- ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
- ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
- ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
-#endif
-
- pk11_error_init = 1;
- }
-}
-
-void
-ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-{
- if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
- pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
- ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
-}
-
-void
-PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
-{
- char tmp_buf[20];
-
- PK11err(function, reason);
- (void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
-}
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H
-#define HW_PK11_ERR_H
-
-void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
-
-/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-
-#define PK11_F_INIT 100
-#define PK11_F_FINISH 101
-#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102
-#define PK11_F_CTRL 103
-#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104
-#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105
-#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106
-#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107
-#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112
-#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113
-#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114
-#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115
-#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116
-#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117
-#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118
-#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119
-#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123
-#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124
-#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125
-#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126
-#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127
-#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128
-#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129
-#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130
-#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131
-#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132
-#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133
-#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134
-#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135
-#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136
-#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137
-#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138
-#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139
-#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140
-#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141
-#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142
-#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143
-#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144
-#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145
-#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146
-#define PK11_F_LOAD 147
-#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148
-#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149
-#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150
-#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151
-#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152
-#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153
-#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154
-#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155
-#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156
-#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157
-#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158
-#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159
-#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160
-#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161
-#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162
-#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163
-#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164
-#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165
-#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100
-#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101
-#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102
-#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103
-#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104
-#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105
-#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106
-#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107
-#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108
-#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109
-#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110
-#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111
-#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112
-#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113
-#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114
-#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115
-#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116
-#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118
-#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119
-#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120
-#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121
-#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122
-#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123
-#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124
-#define PK11_R_SIGN 125
-#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126
-#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127
-#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128
-#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129
-#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130
-#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131
-#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132
-#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133
-#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135
-#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136
-#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137
-#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138
-#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139
-#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140
-#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141
-#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142
-#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143
-#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144
-#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148
-#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149
-#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150
-#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151
-#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152
-#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153
-#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154
-#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155
-#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156
-#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157
-#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158
-#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159
-#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160
-#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162
-#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164
-#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165
-#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166
-#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167
-#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168
-#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169
-#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170
-#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171
-#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172
-#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173
-#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174
-#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175
-#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176
-#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177
-#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178
-#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179
-#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180
-#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181
-#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182
-#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183
-#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183
-#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184
-#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185
-#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186
-
-#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,3239 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2012, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <strings.h>
-
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/dso.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <cryptlib.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
-#include <libgen.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-#include <security/pkcs11.h>
-#include "hw_pk11.h"
-#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
-
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-
-/*
- * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
- * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
- */
-char *passphrasedialog;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* RSA stuff */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- const RSA *rsa);
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-
-static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-#endif
-
-/* DSA stuff */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA *dsa);
-static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
- BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
- BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-
-static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-#endif
-
-/* DH stuff */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
- const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
- BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-
-static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-#endif
-
-static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
- CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-
-/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-#else
-static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
- * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
- * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
- * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
- * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
- * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
- * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
- * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
- */
-#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
- { \
- if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
- { \
- var = CK_TRUE; \
- if (unlock) \
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
- goto label; \
- } \
- }
-
-/*
- * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
- * entry otherwise return NULL.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry;
-
- for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
- if (entry->h == h)
- return (entry);
-
- return (NULL);
- }
-
-/*
- * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
- * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
- * failure.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-int
-pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-
- if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* search for entry in the active list */
- if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
- entry->refcnt++;
- else
- {
- /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
- entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
- if (entry == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (-1);
- }
- entry->h = h;
- entry->refcnt = 1;
- entry->prev = NULL;
- entry->next = NULL;
- /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
- if (active_list[type] == NULL)
- active_list[type] = entry;
- else /* make the entry first in the list */
- {
- entry->next = active_list[type];
- active_list[type]->prev = entry;
- active_list[type] = entry;
- }
- }
-
- return (entry->refcnt);
- }
-
-/*
- * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-void
-pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *prev_entry;
-
- /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
- if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
- {
- prev_entry->next = entry->next;
- if (entry->next != NULL)
- entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
- }
- else
- {
- active_list[type] = entry->next;
- /* we were the first but not the only one */
- if (entry->next != NULL)
- entry->next->prev = NULL;
- }
-
- /* sanitization */
- entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- entry->prev = NULL;
- entry->next = NULL;
- OPENSSL_free(entry);
- }
-
-/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-void
-pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry;
-
- /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
- switch (type)
- {
- case OP_RSA:
- case OP_DSA:
- case OP_DH:
- break;
- default:
- return;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
- while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
- pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
- }
-
-/*
- * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
- * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
- *
- * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
- * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-int
-pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-
- if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
- entry->refcnt--;
- if (entry->refcnt == 0)
- {
- pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
- return (1);
- }
-
- return (0);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
- {
- "PKCS#11 RSA method",
- pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
- pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
- pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
- pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
- NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
- NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
- pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
- pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
- RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
- NULL, /* app_data */
- pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
- pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
- };
-
-RSA_METHOD *
-PK11_RSA(void)
- {
- return (&pk11_rsa);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
- {
- "PKCS#11 DSA method",
- pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
- NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
- pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
- NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
- NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
- pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
- pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL /* app_data */
- };
-
-DSA_METHOD *
-PK11_DSA(void)
- {
- return (&pk11_dsa);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/*
- * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
- * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
- * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
- * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
- * enough.
- */
-#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
-
-/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
- {
- "PKCS#11 DH method",
- pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
- pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
- NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
- pk11_DH_init, /* init */
- pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL, /* app_data */
- NULL /* generate_params */
- };
-
-DH_METHOD *
-PK11_DH(void)
- {
- return (&pk11_dh);
- }
-#endif
-
-/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-
-/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
-
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/*
- * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
- * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
- * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
- * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-err:
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
- * should be catched in the padding functions
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-err:
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f;
- int j, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- BN_init(&f);
-
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-
- if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes
- */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
- PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
- PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-
- /*
- * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
- * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
- if (buf[j] != 0)
- break;
-
- p = buf + j;
- j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f;
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- BN_init(&f);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes
- */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
- PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-
- /*
- * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
- * Needs to skip these 0's here
- */
- for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
- if (buf[i] != 0)
- break;
-
- p = buf + i;
- i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
- * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
- PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
- PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
- retval = bytes_encrypted;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
- * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
- PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
- rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- retval = ul_sig_len;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
- * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
- retval = bytes_decrypted;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
- * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
- p_mech, h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
- retval = bytes_decrypted;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
- * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
- */
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
- * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
- * structures.
- */
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
- * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
- * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
- {
- X509_SIG sig;
- ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i, j;
- unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR algor;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned long ulsiglen;
-
- /* Encode the digest */
- /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
- PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
- s = (unsigned char *)m;
- }
- else
- {
- sig.algor = &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
- goto err;
- }
- parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-
- sig.digest = &digest;
- sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
- sig.digest->length = m_len;
-
- i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
- }
-
- j = RSA_size(rsa);
- if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p = s;
- (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ulsiglen = j;
- rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
- (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
- *siglen = ulsiglen;
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- const RSA *rsa)
- {
- X509_SIG sig;
- ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i, j;
- unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR algor;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Encode the digest */
- /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
- s = (unsigned char *)m;
- }
- else
- {
- sig.algor = &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
- goto err;
- }
- parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
- sig.digest = &digest;
- sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
- sig.digest->length = m_len;
- i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
- }
-
- j = RSA_size(rsa);
- if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p = s;
- (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
- rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
- (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-#define MAXATTR 1024
-/*
- * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
- * PKCS#11 token.
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- FILE *privkey;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
- const char *file;
- int ret;
- pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
- CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-
- /* We look for private keys only. */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
- {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
- {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
- };
-
- /*
- * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
- * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
- * never ask for private components.
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
- };
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- /*
- * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
- * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
- * the 'privkey_id' parameter.
- */
- ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
-
- if (ret == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
- if (ret == 1)
- {
- if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
- search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-
- if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
- &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
- * if we can't find it.
- */
- if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
- &ks_key) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
- * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
- * is done.
- */
- pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
-
- /*
- * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
- * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
- * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
- * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
- * many times. We do not check the return value because even in
- * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
- * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
-
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
- /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
- sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
-
- if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
- get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
- * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
- */
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
-
- /*
- * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
- * care of handle management ourselves.
- */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
-
- /*
- * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
- * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
- */
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
- /*
- * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
- * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
- * in the keystore.
- */
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
- {
- pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- (void) fclose(privkey);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- if (rsa != NULL)
- {
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
- rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (pkey);
-err:
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- return (pkey);
- }
-
-/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- FILE *pubkey;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
- int ret;
- const char *file;
- pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
- CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
- {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
- {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
- };
-
- /*
- * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
- * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
- };
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
-
- if (ret == 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (ret == 1)
- {
- if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
- search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-
- if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
- &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
- &ks_key) == 0)
- {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
- * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
- */
- pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
- /*
- * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
- * structure. No cache hit is possible.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-
- if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
- get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
- */
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
-
- /*
- * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
- * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
- */
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Create a session object from it so that when calling
- * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
- * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
- * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
- * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
- * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
- * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
- * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
- * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
- * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
- */
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
- {
- pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- (void) fclose(pubkey);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- if (rsa != NULL)
- {
- /*
- * This will always destroy the RSA
- * object since we have a new RSA
- * structure here.
- */
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
- rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- }
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (pkey);
-err:
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- return (pkey);
- }
-
-/*
- * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
- * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
- * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
- * session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
- *
- * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
- * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- int i;
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
- if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
-
- a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
- a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
- if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
- * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
- * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
- * NULL here.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- int i;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
-
- /*
- * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
- };
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- /* Put the private key components into the template */
- if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
- &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
- &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
- &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
- &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
- &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
- &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
- &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
- &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
- /*
- * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
- * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
- * use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
- */
- if (rsa->d == NULL)
- {
- ul_key_attr_count = 8;
- /*
- * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
- * session keys.
- */
- a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- /*
- * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
- * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
- * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
- * types we just create a new session key using the private
- * components from the RSA structure.
- */
- if (rsa->d == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
- * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
- * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
- * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
- * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
- * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
- * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
- */
- if (rsa->d != NULL)
- {
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-
- /*
- * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
- * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
- * 'n'/'e' components as well.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- /*
- * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
- * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
- */
- for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
- a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
- * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
- * cache miss.
- */
-static int
-pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
- * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
- * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
- *
- * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
- * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
- * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
- * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
- * both data signing and verifying.
- */
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
- {
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- return (1);
- else
- /*
- * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
- * structure with potentially existing private key
- * object. We can just create a public object and move
- * on with this session structure.
- */
- return (0);
- }
-
- /*
- * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
- * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
- * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
- * cache miss.
- */
-static int
-pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
- * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
- * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
- * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
- * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
- * about why we compare the handle as well.
- */
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
- {
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- return (1);
- else
- /*
- * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
- * structure with potentially existing public key
- * object. We can just create a private object and move
- * on with this session structure.
- */
- return (0);
- }
-
- /*
- * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
- * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/* The DSA function implementation */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-
-static DSA_SIG *
-pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
- {
- BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
- int i;
- DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-
- /*
- * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
- * each is 20 bytes long
- */
- unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
- unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
- unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-
- if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
- if (dlen > i)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
- goto ret;
-
- (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
- &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
- &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
- rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
- (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
- goto ret;
- }
- }
-
-
- if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- dsa_sig->r = r;
- dsa_sig->s = s;
-
-ret:
- if (dsa_sig == NULL)
- {
- if (r != NULL)
- BN_free(r);
- if (s != NULL)
- BN_free(s);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
- return (dsa_sig);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
- DSA *dsa)
- {
- int i;
- CK_RV rv;
- int retval = 0;
- CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-
- unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
- unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
- unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-
- if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-
- if (dlen > i)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
- goto ret;
-
- (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
- &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
- rv);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- /*
- * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
- * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
- * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
- */
- (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
- BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
- BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
- BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
- goto ret;
- }
- }
-
- retval = 1;
-ret:
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
- * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
- DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
- int i;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
- {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
- {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
- };
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
- &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
- &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
- &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
- &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
- if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- if (key_ptr != NULL)
- *key_ptr = dsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
- * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
- DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- int i;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
-
- /*
- * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
- {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
- {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
- };
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- /* Put the private key components into the template */
- if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
- &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
- &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
- &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
- &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
- if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- if (key_ptr != NULL)
- *key_ptr = dsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- /*
- * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
- * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
- */
- for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
- a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
- * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
- */
-static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
- * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
- * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
- (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
- {
- /*
- * We do not check the return value because even in case of
- * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
- * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
- * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
- */
-static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
- * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
- * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
- (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
- {
- /*
- * We do not check the return value because even in case of
- * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
- * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-#endif
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* The DH function implementation */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Generate DH key-pair.
- *
- * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
- * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
- * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
- * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
- * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
- */
-static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
- {
- CK_ULONG i;
- CK_RV rv, rv1;
- int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
-
- CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-
- CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
- };
-
- CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
- {
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
- {
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
- if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
- {
- /*
- * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
- * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
- * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
- */
- pub_key_template[1].pValue =
- OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
- DH_BUF_RESERVE);
- if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
- }
- else
- goto err;
-
- pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
- if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
- {
- pub_key_template[2].pValue =
- OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
- DH_BUF_RESERVE);
- if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
- }
- else
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
- * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
- * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
- */
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
- &mechanism,
- pub_key_template,
- ul_pub_key_attr_count,
- priv_key_template,
- ul_priv_key_attr_count,
- &h_pub_key,
- &h_priv_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
- * should be sufficient for reuse.
- */
- if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
- {
- reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
- reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
- }
- else
- {
- reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
- reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
- pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
- rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
- {
- rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
- ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Reuse the memory allocated */
- pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
- pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
- pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
- {
- if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
- if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
- pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
- if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Reuse the memory allocated */
- priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
- priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
- {
- if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
- if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
- priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
- if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
- }
- }
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
- {
- if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
- pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
- DH *dh)
- {
- int i;
- CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-
- CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
- };
-
- CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
- {
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- CK_RV rv;
- int ret = -1;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-
- if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
- priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
- mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
- if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-
- (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-
- h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
- if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
- pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
- &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-
- if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
- &mechanism,
- h_key,
- priv_key_template,
- ul_priv_key_attr_count,
- &h_derived_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
- goto err;
- }
- priv_key_result[0].pValue =
- OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
- if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
- * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
- */
- if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
- {
- /*
- * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
- * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
- * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
- * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
- * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
- * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
- * pre-master secret.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
- {
- if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
-
- (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
- priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
- ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
- }
-
-err:
-
- if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
- PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
- }
- }
- if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
- priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
- }
-
- if (mechanism.pParameter)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
- mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
- DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
- int i;
-
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
- {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
- {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
- };
-
- key_template[0].pValue = &class;
- key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-
- key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
- key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
- if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
-
- key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
- key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
- if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
-
- key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
- key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
- if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
- if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- if (key_ptr != NULL)
- *key_ptr = dh;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-
-malloc_err:
- for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
- {
- if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
- key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
- * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
- *
- * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
- * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
- */
-static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
- * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
- * in PK11_SESSION structure.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
- (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
- {
- /*
- * We do not check the return value because even in case of
- * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
- * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Local function to simplify key template population
- * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
- */
-static int
-init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
- CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
- {
- CK_ULONG len;
-
- /*
- * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
- * check that here than individually in the callers.
- */
- if (bn != NULL)
- len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-
- if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
- return (1);
-
- *ul_value_len = len;
- *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
- if (*p_value == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static void
-attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
- {
- if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
- *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
- }
-
-/*
- * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
- * if we find more objects based on the template we got.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 OK
- * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
- */
-static int
-find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_ULONG objcnt;
-
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (objcnt > 1)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
- PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if (objcnt == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
-
- (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
- return (1);
-err:
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
- return (0);
- }
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,870 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <strings.h>
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-#include <security/pkcs11.h>
-#include "hw_pk11.h"
-#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
-
-/*
- * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one
- * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI
- * processing.
- */
-extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-
-/*
- * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not
- * cache the PIN by default.
- */
-static char *token_pin;
-
-static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin);
-static char *run_askpass(char *dialog);
-
-/*
- * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to
- * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using
- * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated
- * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take
- * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted
- * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN.
- *
- * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after
- * the fork.
- *
- * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock"
- * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL)
- * 1 if we got the PIN
- */
-#define EXEC_SPEC "exec:"
-#define BUILTIN_SPEC "builtin"
-int
-pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin)
- {
- /* Initialize as an error. */
- *pin = NULL;
-
- if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0)
- {
- /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
- /* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */
- *pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: ");
- if (*pin == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- char *pw;
-
- /*
- * getpassphrase() uses an internal buffer to hold the
- * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer
- * with '\0'.
- */
- if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */
- memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin));
- *pin = pw;
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /*
- * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output
- * of an external command.
- */
- if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0)
- {
- dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC);
- if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- /*
- * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog
- * keyword.
- */
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- return (1);
-err:
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the
- * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present
- * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes
- * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct'
- * structure.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN
- * 1 if all is OK
- * 2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string
- * pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points
- * inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present.
- */
-int
-pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
- const char **file)
- {
- char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name;
-
- /* Check the "file://" case. */
- if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0)
- {
- *file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX);
- return (2);
- }
-
- /* This is the "pkcs11:" case. */
- if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0)
- {
- /* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */
- *file = (const char *)uristr;
- return (2);
- }
- else
- {
- /* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */
- uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX));
- if (uristr2 == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Initialize the structure. */
- memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct));
-
- /*
- * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We
- * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first
- * and the last character in the URI.
- */
- if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' ||
- (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';'))
- goto bad_uri;
-
- tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1);
- for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1))
- {
- /* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */
- name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2);
- /* Check whether there is '=' at all. */
- if (l2 == NULL)
- goto bad_uri;
-
- /*
- * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit
- * attributes.
- */
- if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->token == NULL)
- {
- if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL)
- {
- if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->serial == NULL)
- {
- if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->model == NULL)
- {
- if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
- {
- if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
- {
- uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2);
- if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0)
- if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
- {
- if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
- goto no_mem;
- }
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- else
- goto bad_uri;
- }
-
- /* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */
- if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL);
- goto err;
- }
-
- free(uristr2);
- return (1);
-bad_uri:
- PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI);
- if (uristr2 != NULL)
- free(uristr2);
- return (0);
-no_mem:
- PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err:
- pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE);
- if (uristr2 != NULL)
- free(uristr2);
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside.
- */
-void
-pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself)
- {
- if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->token);
- if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->manuf);
- if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->serial);
- if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->model);
- if (uri_struct->object != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->object);
- if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->objecttype);
- if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
- free(uri_struct->askpass);
-
- if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE)
- OPENSSL_free(uri_struct);
- }
-
-/*
- * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is
- * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that
- * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note
- * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to
- * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see
- * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11
- * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL;
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
- if (token_info == NULL)
- {
- token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO));
- if (token_info == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
- PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
- if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label,
- strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 :
- strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0)
- {
- goto urierr;
- }
-
- if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
- if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf,
- (char *)token_info->manufacturerID,
- strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 :
- strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0)
- goto urierr;
-
- if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
- if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model,
- strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 :
- strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0)
- goto urierr;
-
- if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
- if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial,
- (char *)token_info->serialNumber,
- strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 :
- strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0)
- goto urierr;
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- return (1);
-
-urierr:
- PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH);
- /* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */
-err:
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the
- * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will
- * not have any affect on the policy.
- *
- * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked.
- *
- * Returns the caching policy number.
- */
-int
-pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void)
- {
- char *value = NULL;
- static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED;
-
- if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED)
- return (policy);
-
- value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY");
-
- if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
- {
- policy = POLICY_NONE;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0)
- {
- policy = POLICY_MEMORY;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0)
- {
- policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY;
- goto done;
- }
-
- return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE);
-done:
- return (policy);
- }
-
-/*
- * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or
- * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_cache_pin(char *pin)
- {
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
- /* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */
- if (token_pin != NULL)
- goto ok;
-
- if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY)
- if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY)
- {
- if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
-ok:
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- return (1);
-err:
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to
- * the normal memory caching.
- *
- * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock"
- * mutex.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on failure
- */
-static int
-mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin)
- {
- void *addr = NULL;
- long pagesize = 0;
-
- /* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */
- if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */
- if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */
- if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1)
- {
- /*
- * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common
- * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues.
- */
- if (errno == EPERM)
- PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
- PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING);
- else
- PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
- PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED);
-
- /*
- * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check
- * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet
- * anyway.
- */
- (void) munmap(addr, pagesize);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */
- token_pin = (char *)addr;
- strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
- return (1);
-err:
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
- * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
- * multiple threads.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
- pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
-
- if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
- PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even
- * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to
- * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may
- * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the
- * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set.
- */
- if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ||
- is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags &
- CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into
- * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we
- * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in
- * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded
- * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
- * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a
- * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before
- * C_Login().
- */
- if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE)
- {
- if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
- uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
- PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
- uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
- {
- if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass,
- &uri_struct->pin) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
- PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
- * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
- * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
- * the engine.
- *
- * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
- * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
- */
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
- if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
- {
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
- CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin,
- strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
- PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
- goto err_locked;
- }
-
- *login_done = CK_TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which
- * would need to relogin).
- */
- if (passphrasedialog == NULL &&
- uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
- {
- passphrasedialog =
- strdup(uri_struct->askpass);
-
- if (passphrasedialog == NULL)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv);
- goto err_locked;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might
- * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required -
- * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory.
- */
- if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() ==
- POLICY_WRONG_VALUE)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
- PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID);
- goto err_locked;
- }
-
- if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE)
- if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0)
- goto err_locked;
- }
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- }
- else
- {
- /*
- * If token does not require login we take it as the
- * login was done.
- */
- *login_done = CK_TRUE;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that
- * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the
- * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the
- * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with
- * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it.
- */
- if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
- memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
-
- return (1);
-
-err_locked:
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-err:
- /* Always get rid of the PIN. */
- if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
- memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There
- * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite
- * different so we need a separate function for this.
- *
- * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
- * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 on success
- * 0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
-
- /*
- * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again.
- * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session
- * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token
- * then.
- */
- if (passphrasedialog != NULL)
- {
- char *pin = NULL;
-
- /* If we cached the PIN then use it. */
- if (token_pin != NULL)
- pin = token_pin;
- else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
- (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
- PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
- goto err;
- }
- (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-
- /* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */
- if (pin != token_pin)
- {
- memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
- OPENSSL_free(pin);
- }
- }
-
- return (1);
-err:
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we
- * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able
- * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we
- * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed
- * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose().
- *
- * Returns:
- * allocated buffer on success
- * NULL on failure
- */
-static char *
-run_askpass(char *dialog)
- {
- pid_t pid;
- int n, p[2];
- char *buf = NULL;
-
- if (pipe(p) == -1)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- switch (pid = fork())
- {
- case -1:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED);
- return (NULL);
- /* child */
- case 0:
- /*
- * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on
- * file descriptor shortage.
- */
- close(p[0]);
- (void) dup2(p[1], 1);
- close(p[1]);
- /*
- * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are
- * in the child. However, parent will get read() error
- * so do not worry.
- */
- (void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL);
- exit(1);
- /* parent */
- default:
- /* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */
- buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
- if (buf == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- close(p[1]);
- n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN);
- if (n == -1 || n == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
- PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return (NULL);
- }
- buf[n] = '\0';
-
- (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- return (buf);
- }
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HW_PK11_URI_H
-#define HW_PK11_URI_H
-
-#include <security/pkcs11t.h>
-
-/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */
-#define PK11_URI_PREFIX "pkcs11:"
-#define FILE_URI_PREFIX "file://"
-#define PK11_TOKEN "token"
-#define PK11_MANUF "manuf"
-#define PK11_SERIAL "serial"
-#define PK11_MODEL "model"
-#define PK11_OBJECT "object"
-#define PK11_OBJECTTYPE "objecttype"
-#define PK11_ASKPASS "passphrasedialog"
-
-/* PIN caching policy. */
-#define POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED 0
-#define POLICY_NONE 1
-#define POLICY_MEMORY 2
-#define POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY 3
-#define POLICY_WRONG_VALUE 4
-
-/*
- * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports.
- */
-#define PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN 256
-
-/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */
-typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct {
- char *object; /* object label, the only mandatory info */
- char *objecttype; /* (private|public|cert), currently unused */
- char *token; /* token label */
- char *manuf; /* manufacturer label */
- char *serial; /* serial number label */
- char *model; /* model label */
- char *askpass; /* full path to the command to get the PIN */
- /* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */
- char *pin; /* token PIN */
-} pkcs11_uri;
-
-/* For URI processing. */
-extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
-
-int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin);
-int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void);
-int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
- const char **file);
-int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct);
-void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself);
-int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin);
-int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
- pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private);
-int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-
-#endif /* HW_PK11_URI_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140.p5m Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140.p5m Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#
# CDDL HEADER END
#
-# Copyright (c) 2011, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (c) 2011, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
#
<transform file path=usr.*/man/.+ -> default mangler.man.stability uncommitted>
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@
file $(MACH32)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lcrypto.ln
file llib-lssl path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lssl
file $(MACH32)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lssl.ln
+file $(MACH32)/engines/libpk11.so path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/libpk11.so.1
+link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/libpk11.so target=libpk11.so.1
# 64 bit libraries, lint libraries, and engines.
file $(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.0.9.8
link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.0.9.8
@@ -68,6 +70,8 @@
file $(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln
file llib-lssl path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl
file $(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln
+file $(MACH64)/engines/libpk11.so path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/$(MACH64)/libpk11.so.1
+link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/$(MACH64)/libpk11.so target=libpk11.so.1
# Header files.
#
# Take header files from the 32-bit build. This build has the patched
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch Wed Jan 15 12:43:00 2014 +0100
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch Wed Jan 15 11:24:11 2014 -0800
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
+ s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org
--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org 2010-01-27 08:06:36.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org 2010-09-22 18:32:19.152576100 -0700
@@ -85,39 +85,116 @@
# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile
---- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile 2009-09-27 07:04:32.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile 2010-09-22 18:32:19.109972600 -0700
-@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
- eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
- tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
- tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \
-- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c
-+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \
-+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11_uri.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
- eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
- tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
- tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \
-- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o
-+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \
-+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11_uri.o
+--- openssl-0.9.8y/engines/Makefile.~1~ Wed Jan 8 14:07:33 2014
++++ openssl-0.9.8y/engines/Makefile Wed Jan 8 13:51:03 2014
+@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@
+ APPS=
+
+ LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+-LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec capi
++LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec capi \
++ pk11
+
+ LIBSRC= e_4758cca.c \
+ e_aep.c \
+@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@
+ e_nuron.c \
+ e_sureware.c \
+ e_ubsec.c \
+- e_capi.c
++ e_capi.c \
++ e_pk11.c
+ LIBOBJ= e_4758cca.o \
+ e_aep.o \
+ e_atalla.o \
+@@ -41,7 +43,8 @@
+ e_nuron.o \
+ e_sureware.o \
+ e_ubsec.o \
+- e_capi.o
++ e_capi.o \
++ e_pk11.o
SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
---- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c 2010-02-28 16:30:11.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c 2010-09-22 18:33:15.326949000 -0700
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
- ENGINE_load_padlock();
+@@ -55,7 +58,8 @@
+ e_nuron_err.c e_nuron_err.h \
+ e_sureware_err.c e_sureware_err.h \
+ e_ubsec_err.c e_ubsec_err.h \
+- e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h
++ e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h \
++ e_pk11.h e_pk11_uri.h e_pk11_err.h e_pk11_pub.c e_pk11_uri.c e_pk11_err.c
+
+ ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+
+@@ -70,7 +74,7 @@
+ for l in $(LIBNAMES); do \
+ $(MAKE) -f ../Makefile.shared -e \
+ LIBNAME=$$l LIBEXTRAS=e_$$l.o \
+- LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)' \
++ LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto -lcryptoutil $(EX_LIBS)' \
+ link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ done; \
+ else \
+--- openssl-0.9.8y/crypto/engine/eng_all.c.~1~ Tue Feb 5 03:58:59 2013
++++ openssl-0.9.8y/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Jan 8 14:24:35 2014
+@@ -59,6 +59,16 @@
+ #include "cryptlib.h"
+ #include "eng_int.h"
+
++/*
++ * pkcs11 engine is no longer a build-in engine, and ENGINE_load_pk11() needs to be
++ * defined in libcrypto.so for ssh. Instead of load pkcs11 engine, it loads dynamic
++ * engines.
++ */
++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++ {
++ ENGINE_load_dynamic();
++ }
++
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
+ {
+ /* There's no longer any need for an "openssl" ENGINE unless, one day,
+@@ -72,6 +82,9 @@
+ ENGINE_load_padlock();
#endif
- ENGINE_load_dynamic();
+ ENGINE_load_dynamic();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
+ ENGINE_load_pk11();
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA
+
+--- openssl-0.9.8y/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c.~1~ Wed Jan 8 15:16:36 2014
++++ openssl-0.9.8y/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c Wed Jan 8 15:22:18 2014
+@@ -433,6 +433,26 @@
+ DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME,DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
++/*
++ * For pkcs11 engine, use libpk11.so (instead of libpkcs11.so) to
++ * avoid the name collision with PKCS#11 library.
++ */
++ if (strcmp(filename, "pkcs11") == 0)
++ {
++#ifdef _LP64
++ static const char fullpath[] = "/lib/openssl/engines/64/libpk11.so";
++#else
++ static const char fullpath[] = "/lib/openssl/engines/libpk11.so";
++#endif
++ result = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(fullpath) + 1);
++ if (result == NULL)
++ {
++ DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++ return(NULL);
++ }
++ BUF_strlcpy(result, fullpath, sizeof(fullpath));
++ return(result);
++ }
+ if((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0)
+ {
+ if(dso->name_converter != NULL)
diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h
--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h 2010-02-09 06:18:15.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h 2010-09-22 18:32:19.063758100 -0700