17777796 Change the pkcs11 engine into a dynamic engine for FIPS version
authorjenny.yung@oracle.com <jenny.yung@oracle.com>
Tue, 17 Dec 2013 15:19:48 -0800
changeset 1604 b6e3e1ed52a5
parent 1603 0833aec637f6
child 1605 7fc7910b6d94
17777796 Change the pkcs11 engine into a dynamic engine for FIPS version
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/Makefile
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.c
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.h
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_err.c
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_err.h
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_pub.c
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_uri.c
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_uri.h
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140.p5m
components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/Makefile	Tue Dec 17 10:05:22 2013 -0800
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/Makefile	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
 # We also copy some FIPS specific header files needed to build FIPS version
 # of OpenSSL from FIPS module (openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.5).
 COMPONENT_PRE_BUILD_ACTION = \
-    ( $(LN) -fs $(COMPONENT_DIR)/engines/pkcs11/*     $(@D)/crypto/engine; \
+    ( $(LN) -fs $(COMPONENT_DIR)/engines/pkcs11/*     $(@D)/engines; \
       $(MKDIR) $(@D)/bin; \
       $(LN) -fs $(OPENSSL_FIPS_DIR)/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.5/fips/fips.h $(@D)/include/openssl; \
       $(LN) -fs $(OPENSSL_FIPS_DIR)/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.5/fips/fipssyms.h $(@D)/include/openssl; \
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.c	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,3594 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
+#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
+ * information.
+ */
+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
+#define	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
+#endif
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "e_pk11.h"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
+#define	PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
+#include "e_pk11_err.c"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.c"
+#include "e_pk11_pub.c"
+
+/*
+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
+ */
+int *hw_cnids;
+int *hw_dnids;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
+ * logging into the token.
+ */
+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+/*
+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
+ * PK11_SESSION object.
+ *
+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
+ *
+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
+ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
+ * list) for given algorithm type
+ */
+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
+ * without losing the secret key objects.
+ */
+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
+enum pk11_cipher_id
+	{
+	PK11_DES_CBC,
+	PK11_DES3_CBC,
+	PK11_DES_ECB,
+	PK11_DES3_ECB,
+	PK11_RC4,
+	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
+	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
+	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
+	};
+
+/* Index for the supported digests */
+enum pk11_digest_id
+	{
+	PK11_MD5,
+	PK11_SHA1,
+	PK11_SHA224,
+	PK11_SHA256,
+	PK11_SHA384,
+	PK11_SHA512,
+	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
+	};
+
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	int			iv_len;
+	int			min_key_len;
+	int			max_key_len;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_CIPHER;
+
+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_DIGEST;
+
+/* ENGINE level stuff */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
+/* These functions are also used in other files */
+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+    CK_BBOOL persistent);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len);
+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+	size_t count);
+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
+    int *local_cipher_nids);
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
+    int *local_digest_nids);
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
+    PK11_DIGEST *digest);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type)	\
+	{								\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
+		{							\
+		retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
+		    sp->persistent);					\
+		}							\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	}
+
+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+static int cipher_count		= 0;
+static int digest_count		= 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
+/*
+ * Static list of ciphers.
+ * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
+ * thus ciphers[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
+ */
+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
+	{
+	{ PK11_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_CBC,	NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_ECB,	NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
+		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
+		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CTR,	NID_aes_128_ctr,	16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CTR,	NID_aes_192_ctr,	16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CTR,	NID_aes_256_ctr,	16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Static list of digests.
+ * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
+ * thus digests[i].id == i
+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
+ */
+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
+	{
+	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
+	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
+	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
+	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
+	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
+	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
+	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
+	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ *
+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
+ */
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_cbc,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ecb,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	16, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	16, 24, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	16, 32, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_ctr,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_ctr,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_ctr,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_bf_cbc,
+	8, 16, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
+	{
+	NID_rc4,
+	1, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
+	{
+	NID_md5,
+	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	MD5_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
+	{
+	NID_sha1,
+	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
+	{
+	NID_sha224,
+	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
+	{
+	NID_sha256,
+	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
+	{
+	NID_sha384,
+	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
+	{
+	NID_sha512,
+	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
+#define	PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+	{
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
+		"SO_PATH",
+		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+	};
+
+
+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
+	{
+	pk11_rand_seed,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_cleanup,
+	pk11_rand_add,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_status
+	};
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
+
+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
+/*
+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
+ */
+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
+/* Needed in e_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static int pk11_pid = 0;
+
+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+	{
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		session_cache[type].lock =
+		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
+			goto malloc_err;
+		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+malloc_err:
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+	{
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
+			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
+			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
+ */
+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
+	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+			return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
+		return (0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	if (pk11_have_random)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
+			return (0);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
+		}
+	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
+		return (0);
+
+/*
+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+	pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
+	pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
+	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+	{
+	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(e))
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	}
+
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+	}
+
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
+	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+	}
+
+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
+ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	}
+
+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	return (pk11_library_init(e));
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_INFO info;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+	int any_slot_found;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
+	 * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
+	 * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
+	 * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
+	 * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
+	 * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
+	 * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
+	 * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
+	 * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_library_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
+			{
+			return (1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			/*
+			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
+			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
+			 * engine first.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_all_locks();
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
+	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
+		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
+	if (!p)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	rv = p(&pFuncList);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
+	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
+	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
+	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
+	 * because no slot was present.
+	 */
+	if (any_slot_found == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
+			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
+	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
+	 */
+	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
+			== CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
+		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
+		digest_count = 0;
+		}
+
+	pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+	pk11_pid = getpid();
+	/*
+	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
+	 * will do the cleanup.
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
+		goto err;
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
+	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		active_list[i] = NULL;
+
+	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
+		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
+ * library.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
+	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* free all active lists */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
+	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
+	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects.
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	pk11_dso = NULL;
+	pFuncList = NULL;
+	pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+	pk11_pid = 0;
+	/*
+	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
+	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
+	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
+	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
+	 * the engine before calling fork().
+	 */
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
+	{
+	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		if (initialized)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
+	default:
+		break;
+		}
+
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+	{
+	return;
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
+	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
+	 */
+	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+	{
+	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
+PK11_SESSION *
+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	static pid_t pid = 0;
+	pid_t new_pid;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
+	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
+	 * here, with no PID information.
+	 */
+	if (pid == 0)
+		pid = getpid();
+
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp = freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
+	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
+	 * structure from the freelist.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+
+		/*
+		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
+		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
+		 * mark them as unused.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	else
+		freelist = sp->next;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
+	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
+	 */
+	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
+		{
+		pid = new_pid;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
+		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
+		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
+		 * head of the list).
+		 */
+		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
+			{
+			freelist = sp1->next;
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
+			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
+			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
+			}
+
+		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
+		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
+		/* Initialize the process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
+		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
+		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
+		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
+		 * information.
+		 */
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+			goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
+		 * re-initialization.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
+			 * the caller cope with the situation.
+			 */
+			freelist = sp;
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->pid == 0)
+		{
+		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
+	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
+err:
+	if (sp != NULL)
+		sp->next = NULL;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+
+	return (sp);
+	}
+
+
+void
+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
+	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
+	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
+		return;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return;
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp->next = freelist;
+	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+	}
+
+
+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
+	 * return 0 on exit.
+	 */
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
+ * return an error on return.
+ */
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
+	pid_t mypid = getpid();
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+		{
+		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+				ret = 0;
+				}
+			}
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
+		OPENSSL_free(sp);
+		}
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static int
+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_RAND:
+			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			myslot = SLOTID;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
+			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are probably a child process so force the
+		 * reinitialize of the session
+		 */
+		pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
+			return (0);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+		}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->pid = getpid();
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
+	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
+	 */
+	sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
+ * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
+ * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
+ * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
+ */
+static void
+destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		}
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+		}
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DH);
+		sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
+ *
+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
+ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
+		uselock = CK_FALSE;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+err:
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+static int
+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+    CK_BBOOL persistent)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
+	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
+	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
+	 */
+	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
+		return (1);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
+
+static int
+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
+			return (ciphers[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (cipher_count > 0)
+		*nids = cipher_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (cipher_count);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (digest_count > 0)
+		*nids = digest_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (digest_count);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
+ */
+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
+	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
+
+	/*
+	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
+	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
+	 * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
+
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+		{
+		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
+		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
+		/*
+		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
+		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
+		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
+		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
+		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
+		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
+		 */
+		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		(void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
+			{
+			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
+			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+	else
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
+		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
+	/*
+	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
+	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
+	 * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
+	 * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
+	 * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
+	 * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
+	 * code serves as a sanity check.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
+	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
+	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
+	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
+	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
+	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
+	 * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
+	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
+	    sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		state->sp = sp;
+		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+			return (0);
+
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
+	 * needs to be created.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
+			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
+		 * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
+			{
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
+	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
+ * that it needs not be recreated.
+ *
+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long outl = inl;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
+
+	if (!inl)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
+	 * the same size of input.
+	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
+	 * correctly aligned buffers.
+	 */
+	if (inl != outl)
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
+		 * rid of the context.
+		 */
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+		else
+			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!cipher)
+		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
+			break;
+		case NID_bf_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_rc4:
+			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*cipher = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*cipher != NULL);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!digest)
+		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+			*digest = &pk11_md5;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha1:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha1;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha224:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha224;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha256:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha256;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha384:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha384;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha512:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha512;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*digest = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*digest != NULL);
+	}
+
+
+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
+	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
+	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
+	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
+	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
+	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
+	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
+	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
+	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
+	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
+	 * terminate the active operation.
+	 */
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the key information used in this session.
+	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
+	 */
+	sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
+		PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
+	(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
+err:
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+static int
+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
+		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+			return (digests[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	pdp = &digests[index];
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
+	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
+	if (count == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
+		count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long len;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
+		return (0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
+	 * to the pool
+	 */
+	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+
+	/* The copy-from state */
+	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
+	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
+		goto err;
+	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
+
+	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (ul_state_len == 0)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
+	if (pstate == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
+		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
+		    PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (pstate != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
+static int
+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
+	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
+		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
+		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
+		 * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
+		 * will return the session to the cache.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
+ * prefix.
+ */
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
+	    memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
+		{
+		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * The secret key object is created in the
+			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
+			 */
+			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
+				sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			}
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+
+	if (session == NULL)
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * CKM_DSA
+ *
+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
+ * public key slot.
+ *
+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
+ * CKM_DES_CBC
+ * CKM_AES_CBC
+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
+ * CKM_DES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_CTR
+ * CKM_RC4
+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
+ *
+ * Digests optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_MD5
+ * CKM_SHA_1
+ * CKM_SHA224
+ * CKM_SHA256
+ * CKM_SHA384
+ * CKM_SHA512
+ *
+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+	{
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar;
+	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	int slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int slot_n_digest = 0;
+	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+
+	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+
+	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 0;
+
+	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot);
+		/* Check if slot has random support. */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
+			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
+			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+			&mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+				(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
+			 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
+			 */
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+			    CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
+
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
+				{
+				slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
+			&mech_info);
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
+			}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
+		 * derivation.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+		    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+				CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
+				{
+				slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+		if (!found_candidate_slot &&
+		    (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
+			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
+			pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
+			pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
+			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
+			/*
+			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
+			 * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
+			 */
+			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
+			    PK11_DBG);
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best slot so far: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			    best_slot_sofar);
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
+			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
+			}
+		} /* for */
+
+	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+		}
+
+	found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	best_slot_sofar = 0;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+
+	SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot);
+
+		current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+		current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+		(void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+		(void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
+
+		pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_cipher);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_digest);
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: best cipher/digest slot so far: %d\n",
+			PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
+		 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
+		 * otherwise leave it where it is.
+		 */
+		if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
+		    (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
+				PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+			best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
+			cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
+			digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
+			(void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+			(void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+			}
+		}
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
+
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 1;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
+		{
+		if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
+		    mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
+			    " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
+			    cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
+			    mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
+			return;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
+			    cipher->nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+		}
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
+		{
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
+			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
+			    digest->nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
+			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
+		}
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
+		    current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
+		    local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
+ *
+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
+ * asymmetric operations.
+ *
+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
+ *
+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
+ * goal of that whole exercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
+ * the code won't be used.
+ */
+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#else
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
+ */
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	void *handle;
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
+	int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+	/*
+	 * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own
+	 * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions
+	 * from the top-level PKCS#11 library.
+	 */
+	if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
+	    PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+		    PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
+		hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		/* this means empty tables */
+		hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't care about duplicate mechanisms in multiple slots and also
+	 * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
+	 * search.
+	 */
+	hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
+	hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
+	tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
+	tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
+	 * is zero now.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
+		    token_info.label);
+
+		/*
+		 * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
+		 * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
+		 */
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
+		pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
+	 * dlclose(3C).
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+	OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	(void) dlclose(handle);
+	hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
+	hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
+
+	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
+	if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
+ * non-existent).
+ */
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
+	{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
+	 * table.
+	 */
+	if (nid_table == NULL)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * the table is never full, there is always at least one
+	 * NID_undef.
+	 */
+	while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
+		{
+		if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
+			{
+			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
+			return (1);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11.h	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11.h */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef	E_PK11_H
+#define	E_PK11_H
+
+#include "e_pk11_err.h"
+
+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
+#define	PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX			32
+
+/*
+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
+ *
+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
+	{
+	struct PK11_st_SESSION	*next;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;	/* PK11 session handle */
+	pid_t			pid;		/* Current process ID */
+	CK_BBOOL		persistent;	/* is that a keystore object? */
+	union
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+			RSA			*rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
+			RSA			*rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
+			} u_RSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+			DSA			*dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
+			DSA			*dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
+			} u_DSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dh_key; /* key handle */
+			DH			*dh; /* dh key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
+			} u_DH;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	cipher_key; /* key handle */
+			unsigned char		key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
+			int			key_len; /* priv key len */
+			int			encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
+			} u_cipher;
+		} opdata_u;
+	} PK11_SESSION;
+
+#define	opdata_rsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
+#define	opdata_rsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
+#define	opdata_rsa_pub		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
+#define	opdata_rsa_priv		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
+#define	opdata_rsa_n_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_e_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_d_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
+#define	opdata_dh_key		opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
+#define	opdata_dh		opdata_u.u_DH.dh
+#define	opdata_dh_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
+#define	opdata_cipher_key	opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
+#define	opdata_key		opdata_u.u_cipher.key
+#define	opdata_key_len		opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
+#define	opdata_encrypt		opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
+
+/*
+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
+ *   1) asymmetric operations
+ *   2) random operations
+ *   3) symmetric and digest operations
+ *
+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
+ * only a single group of operations.
+ *
+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
+ *
+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
+ */
+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
+	{
+	OP_RAND,
+	OP_RSA,
+	OP_DSA,
+	OP_DH,
+	OP_CIPHER,
+	OP_DIGEST,
+	OP_MAX
+	} PK11_OPTYPE;
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
+ * and locks associated with the lists.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *head;
+	pthread_mutex_t *lock;
+	} PK11_CACHE;
+
+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
+typedef struct PK11_active_st
+	{
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
+	unsigned int refcnt;
+	struct PK11_active_st *prev;
+	struct PK11_active_st *next;
+	} PK11_active;
+
+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
+/*
+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
+ * e_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
+ */
+extern char *passphrasedialog;
+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
+#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
+
+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+#endif /* E_PK11_H */
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_err.c	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11_err.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_pk11_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
+{
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0),			"PK11_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0),		"PK11_DESTROY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0),			"PK11_CTRL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_RSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0),		"PK11_RAND_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0),		"PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_GET_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DH_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DH_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0),		"PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0),		"PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0),	"PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0),		"PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0),		"PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0),			"ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0),	"PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0),	"PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0),	"PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0),	"PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0),		"PK11_GET_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0),		"PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0),	"PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0),		"PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
+{
+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED,		"PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE,			"unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED,			"PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER,		"null parameter passed"},
+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE,			"C_Initialize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE,			"C_Finalize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GETINFO,			"C_GetInfo faile"},
+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST,			"C_GetSlotList failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT,	"no modulus or no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID,	"attr sensitive or invalid"},
+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,		"C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS,			"no modulus"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT,			"no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,		"C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,			"C_FindObjects failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,		"C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,			"C_CreateObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,			"C_DestroyObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION,			"C_OpenSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION,			"C_CloseSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT,			"C_EncryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT,			"C_Encrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT,			"C_SignInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGN,				"C_Sign failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT,			"C_DecryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT,			"C_Decrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFY,			"C_Verify failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT,		"C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY,			"C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM,			"C_SeedRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM,		"C_GenerateRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH,	"invalid message length"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE,	"unknown algorithm type"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,	"unknown asn1 onject id"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE,		"unknown padding type"},
+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED,		"padding check failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG,		"digest too big"},
+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE,		"malloc failure"},
+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"ctl command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN,	"data is bigger than mod"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS,	"data is too larger for mod"},
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT,		"a dsa component is missing"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH,	"invalid signature length"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R,	"missing r in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S,	"missing s in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY,		"inconsistent key type"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE,			"C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE,			"C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT,			"C_DigestInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE,			"C_DigestUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL,			"C_DigestFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL,			"C_EncryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL,			"C_DecryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT,		"Slot does not support PRNG"},
+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO,			"C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY,			"C_DeriveKey failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_GetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_SetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE,		"invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM,		"IV or key length incorrect"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE,	"invalid operation type"},
+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED,		"failed to add NID" },
+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED,			"atfork failed" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED,		"C_Login failed on token" },
+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND,	"more than one object found" },
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI,		"pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN,		"could not read PIN from terminal" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND,	"PIN not read from external command" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND,	"could not popen dialog command" },
+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED,			"pipe failed" },
+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC,		"bad passphrasedialog specification" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED,		"token not initialized" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET,		"token PIN required but not set" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED,	"token PIN required but not provided" },
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL,		"missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH,	"token attrs provided do not match" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND,		"private key not found in keystore" },
+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND,		"specified object not found" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID,	"PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED,		"sysconf failed" },
+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED,			"mmap failed" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING,	"PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED,			"mlock failed" },
+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED,			"fork failed" },
+{ 0,	NULL}
+};
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
+
+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] =
+{
+{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME},
+{0, NULL}
+};
+#endif
+
+static void
+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
+	{
+	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+	if (pk11_error_init)
+		{
+		pk11_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+		pk11_engine_lib_name->error =
+		    ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+		ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
+#endif
+		}
+	}
+
+static void
+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
+	{
+	if (pk11_error_init == 0)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME
+		ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name);
+#endif
+
+		pk11_error_init = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+void
+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+	{
+	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+	ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+	}
+
+void
+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
+	{
+	char tmp_buf[20];
+
+	PK11err(function, reason);
+	(void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
+	ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
+	}
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_err.h	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef	E_PK11_ERR_H
+#define	E_PK11_ERR_H
+
+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
+#define	PK11err(f, r)	ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+
+#define	PK11_F_INIT 				100
+#define	PK11_F_FINISH				101
+#define	PK11_F_DESTROY 				102
+#define	PK11_F_CTRL 				103
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_INIT 			104
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 			105
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 			106
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 		107
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 			108
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 			109
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 			110
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 			111
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 			112
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 			113
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 			114
+#define	PK11_F_RAND_ADD 			115
+#define	PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 			116
+#define	PK11_F_GET_SESSION 			117
+#define	PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 			118
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 			119
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 			120
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 			121
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 		122
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 			123
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 		124
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_SIGN				125
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY			126
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_INIT				127
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_FINISH			128
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY			129
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 		130
+#define	PK11_F_DH_INIT 				131
+#define	PK11_F_DH_FINISH 			132
+#define	PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 			133
+#define	PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 			134
+#define	PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS		135
+#define	PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION			136
+#define	PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT			137
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT			138
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER			139
+#define	PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY			140
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT			141
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE			142
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL			143
+#define	PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT			144
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL			145
+#define	PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 			146
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD 				147
+#define	PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY			148
+#define	PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 			149
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 			150
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP			151
+#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD			152
+#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE			153
+#define	PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS		154
+#define	PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC			155
+#define	PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS			156
+#define	PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS			157
+#define	PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION			158
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PIN				159
+#define	PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 			160
+#define	PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 		161
+#define	PK11_F_CACHE_PIN			162
+#define	PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY		163
+#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 			164
+#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 			165
+#define	PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 			166
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+#define	PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 			100
+#define	PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 			101
+#define	PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 			102
+#define	PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 		103
+#define	PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 		104
+#define	PK11_R_INITIALIZE 			105
+#define	PK11_R_FINALIZE 			106
+#define	PK11_R_GETINFO 				107
+#define	PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 			108
+#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 	109
+#define	PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 	110
+#define	PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 		111
+#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 			112
+#define	PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 			113
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 			114
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 			115
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 		116
+#define	PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 			118
+#define	PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 			119
+#define	PK11_R_OPENSESSION 			120
+#define	PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 			121
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 			122
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPT 				123
+#define	PK11_R_SIGNINIT 			124
+#define	PK11_R_SIGN 				125
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 			126
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPT 				127
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 			128
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFY 				129
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 		130
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 			131
+#define	PK11_R_GEN_KEY 				132
+#define	PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 			133
+#define	PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 			134
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 		135
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 		136
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 		137
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 		138
+#define	PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 		139
+#define	PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 			140
+#define	PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 			141
+#define	PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 	142
+#define	PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 	143
+#define	PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 	144
+#define	PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT		145
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH		146
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R		147
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S		148
+#define	PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY			149
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE			150
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE			151
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTINIT			152
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE			153
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL			154
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL			155
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL			156
+#define	PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT			157
+#define	PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO			158
+#define	PK11_R_DERIVEKEY			159
+#define	PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE		160
+#define	PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE		161
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE			162
+#define	PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM		163
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE		164
+#define	PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED			165
+#define	PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED			166
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED		167
+#define	PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND	168
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI		169
+#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN		170
+#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND		171
+#define	PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED			172
+#define	PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND	173
+#define	PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC		174
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED		175
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET		176
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED		177
+#define	PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL		178
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH		179
+#define	PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND		180
+#define	PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND			181
+#define	PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID	182
+#define	PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED			183
+#define	PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED			183
+#define	PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING	184
+#define	PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED			185
+#define	PK11_R_FORK_FAILED			186
+
+#endif /* E_PK11_ERR_H */
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_pub.c	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,3235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "e_pk11.h"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+
+/*
+ * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
+ * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
+ */
+char *passphrasedialog;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DSA stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+	DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+	DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DH stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
+#endif
+
+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
+	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+
+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
+#else
+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
+ * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
+ * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
+ * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
+ * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
+ * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
+ * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
+ * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
+ */
+#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
+	{								\
+	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
+		{							\
+		var = CK_TRUE;						\
+		if (unlock)						\
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
+		goto label;						\
+		}							\
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
+		if (entry->h == h)
+			return (entry);
+
+	return (NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	/* search for entry in the active list */
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
+		entry->refcnt++;
+	else
+		{
+		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
+		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
+		if (entry == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		entry->h = h;
+		entry->refcnt = 1;
+		entry->prev = NULL;
+		entry->next = NULL;
+		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
+		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+		else /* make the entry first in the list */
+			{
+			entry->next = active_list[type];
+			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (entry->refcnt);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+void
+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *prev_entry;
+
+	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
+	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+		{
+		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		active_list[type] = entry->next;
+		/* we were the first but not the only one */
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* sanitization */
+	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	entry->prev = NULL;
+	entry->next = NULL;
+	OPENSSL_free(entry);
+	}
+
+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
+void
+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
+	switch (type)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			break;
+		default:
+			return;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
+ *
+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
+	entry->refcnt--;
+	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+		{
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 RSA method",
+	pk11_RSA_public_encrypt,		/* rsa_pub_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_public_decrypt,		/* rsa_pub_decrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_encrypt,		/* rsa_priv_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_decrypt,		/* rsa_priv_decrypt */
+	NULL,					/* rsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL,					/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_RSA_init,				/* init */
+	pk11_RSA_finish,			/* finish */
+	RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER,			/* flags */
+	NULL,					/* app_data */
+	pk11_RSA_sign,				/* rsa_sign */
+	pk11_RSA_verify				/* rsa_verify */
+	};
+
+RSA_METHOD *
+PK11_RSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_rsa);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DSA method",
+	pk11_dsa_do_sign, 	/* dsa_do_sign */
+	NULL, 			/* dsa_sign_setup */
+	pk11_dsa_do_verify, 	/* dsa_do_verify */
+	NULL,			/* dsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL, 			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DSA_init, 		/* init */
+	pk11_DSA_finish, 	/* finish */
+	0, 			/* flags */
+	NULL 			/* app_data */
+	};
+
+DSA_METHOD *
+PK11_DSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dsa);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
+ * enough.
+ */
+#define	DH_BUF_RESERVE	8
+
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DH method",
+	pk11_DH_generate_key,	/* generate_key */
+	pk11_DH_compute_key,	/* compute_key */
+	NULL,			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DH_init,		/* init */
+	pk11_DH_finish,		/* finish */
+	0,			/* flags */
+	NULL,			/* app_data */
+	NULL			/* generate_params */
+	};
+
+DH_METHOD *
+PK11_DH(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dh);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
+
+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
+#define	DSA_DATA_LEN		20
+#define	DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN	40
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
+ * should be catched in the padding functions
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	BN_init(&f);
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* make data into a big number */
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
+	 */
+	for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
+		if (buf[j] != 0)
+			break;
+
+	p = buf + j;
+	j = r - j;  /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	BN_init(&f);
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's here
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
+		if (buf[i] != 0)
+			break;
+
+	p = buf + i;
+	i = r - i;  /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_encrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
+			    rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		retval = ul_sig_len;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
+			p_mech, h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
+	 * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
+	 */
+	rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
+	 * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
+	/* Encode the digest */
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		ulsiglen = j;
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
+			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
+		*siglen = ulsiglen;
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Encode the digest	*/
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
+			(CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+#define	MAXATTR	1024
+/*
+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *privkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	const char *file;
+	int ret;
+	pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	/* We look for private keys only. */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
+	 * never ask for private components.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
+	 * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
+	 * the 'privkey_id' parameter.
+	 */
+	ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
+	if (ret == 1)
+		{
+		if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+		 * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
+		 * is done.
+		 */
+		pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
+		 * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
+		 * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
+		 * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
+		 * many times. We do not check the return value because even in
+		 * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
+		 * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+			    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
+		 * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+
+		/*
+		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
+		 * care of handle management ourselves.
+		 */
+		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+
+		/*
+		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+		/*
+		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
+		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
+		 * in the keystore.
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+			{
+			pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			(void) fclose(privkey);
+			if (pkey != NULL)
+				{
+				rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+				if (rsa != NULL)
+					{
+					(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
+					    rsa);
+
+					h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+					    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+					if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+						goto err;
+					}
+				else
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *pubkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
+	int ret;
+	const char *file;
+	pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (ret == 1)
+		{
+		if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
+		 * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
+		 */
+		pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
+		/*
+		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
+		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
+
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+			    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
+		/*
+		 * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
+		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
+		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
+		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
+		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
+		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
+		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
+		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
+		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
+		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
+		 */
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+			{
+			pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			(void) fclose(pubkey);
+			if (pkey != NULL)
+				{
+				rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+				if (rsa != NULL)
+					{
+					/*
+					 * This will always destroy the RSA
+					 * object since we have a new RSA
+					 * structure here.
+					 */
+					(void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
+					    rsa);
+
+					h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+					    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
+					if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+						{
+						EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+						pkey = NULL;
+						}
+					}
+				else
+					{
+					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+					pkey = NULL;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
+ * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
+ * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
+ * session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
+ *
+ * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
+ * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	int i;
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
+
+	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
+	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
+ * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
+ * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
+ * NULL here.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	/*
+	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
+	 * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
+	 * use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d == NULL)
+		{
+		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+		/*
+		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
+		 * session keys.
+		 */
+		a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
+		 * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
+		 * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
+		 * types we just create a new session key using the private
+		 * components from the RSA structure.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
+	 * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
+	 * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
+	 * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
+	 * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
+	 * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
+	 * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d != NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
+	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
+	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		rollback = CK_TRUE;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+ * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+ * cache miss.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
+	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 *
+	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
+	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
+	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
+	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
+	 * both data signing and verifying.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+		{
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			return (1);
+		else
+			/*
+			 * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
+			 * structure with potentially existing private key
+			 * object. We can just create a public object and move
+			 * on with this session structure.
+			 */
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+	 * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+	 */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
+ * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
+ * cache miss.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
+	 * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
+	 * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
+	 * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
+	 * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
+	 * about why we compare the handle as well.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
+		{
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			return (1);
+		else
+			/*
+			 * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
+			 * structure with potentially existing public key
+			 * object. We can just create a private object and move
+			 * on with this session structure.
+			 */
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
+	 * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
+	 */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* The DSA function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+static DSA_SIG *
+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+	int i;
+	DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
+
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+
+	/*
+	 * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
+	 * each is 20 bytes long
+	 */
+	unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
+
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+
+			(void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
+			rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			    (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
+			    (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+
+	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	dsa_sig->r = r;
+	dsa_sig->s = s;
+
+ret:
+	if (dsa_sig == NULL)
+		{
+		if (r != NULL)
+			BN_free(r);
+		if (s != NULL)
+			BN_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (dsa_sig);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
+	DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int retval = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+
+	unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
+
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
+		 * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
+		 * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
+		 */
+		(void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
+		    BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+	retval = 1;
+ret:
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	int i;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* pub_key - y */
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* priv_key - x */
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* The DH function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Generate DH key-pair.
+ *
+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+ */
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG i;
+	CK_RV rv, rv1;
+	int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
+		 * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
+		 * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
+		 */
+		pub_key_template[1].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+	pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		pub_key_template[2].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
+	 *	 a session handle. The objects created in this function are
+	 *	 destroyed before return and thus not cached.
+	 */
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    pub_key_template,
+	    ul_pub_key_attr_count,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_pub_key,
+	    &h_priv_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
+	 * should be sufficient for reuse.
+	 */
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+	rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
+		((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
+			pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+err:
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
+		{
+		if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
+			pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+	DH *dh)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = -1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
+	priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+	mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
+	if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
+
+	(void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
+
+	h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
+			pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
+			    &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    h_key,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_derived_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+	    priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue =
+		OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
+	if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
+	 * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
+	 */
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
+		 * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
+		 * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
+		 * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
+		 * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
+		 * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
+		 * pre-master secret.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
+			{
+			if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
+				break;
+			}
+
+		(void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
+		ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
+		}
+
+err:
+
+	if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+	if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
+		priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
+		}
+
+	if (mechanism.pParameter)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
+		mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
+	DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
+	int i;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	key_template[0].pValue = &class;
+	key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+	key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
+
+	key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
+
+	key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
+	key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = CK_TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dh;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
+			key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ *
+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
+ *       to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
+ */
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
+	 * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
+	 * in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Local function to simplify key template population
+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+ */
+static int
+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
+	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG len;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
+	 * check that here than individually in the callers.
+	 */
+	if (bn != NULL)
+		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+
+	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	*ul_value_len = len;
+	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
+	if (*p_value == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void
+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
+	{
+		if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+			*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
+ * if we find more objects based on the template we got.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 OK
+ *	0 no object or more than 1 object found
+ */
+static int
+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG objcnt;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (objcnt > 1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		if (objcnt == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_uri.c	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+
+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
+#include "e_pk11.h"
+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
+
+/*
+ * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one
+ * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI
+ * processing.
+ */
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+/*
+ * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not
+ * cache the PIN by default.
+ */
+static char *token_pin;
+
+static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin);
+static char *run_askpass(char *dialog);
+
+/*
+ * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to
+ * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using
+ * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated
+ * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take
+ * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted
+ * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN.
+ *
+ * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after
+ * the fork.
+ *
+ * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock"
+ * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL)
+ *	1 if we got the PIN
+ */
+#define	EXEC_SPEC	"exec:"
+#define	BUILTIN_SPEC	"builtin"
+int
+pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin)
+	{
+	/* Initialize as an error. */
+	*pin = NULL;
+
+	if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0)
+		{
+		/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		/* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */
+		*pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: ");
+		if (*pin == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			char *pw;
+
+			/*
+			 * getpassphrase() uses an internal  buffer to hold the
+			 * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer
+			 * with '\0'.
+			 */
+			if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			/* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */
+			memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin));
+			*pin = pw;
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/*
+		 * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output
+		 * of an external command.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0)
+			{
+			dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC);
+			if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog
+			 * keyword.
+			 */
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the
+ * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present
+ * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes
+ * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct'
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN
+ * 	1 if all is OK
+ *	2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string
+ *	pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points
+ *	inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present.
+ */
+int
+pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+	const char **file)
+	{
+	char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name;
+
+	/* Check the "file://" case. */
+	if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0)
+		{
+		*file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX);
+		return (2);
+		}
+
+	/*  This is the "pkcs11:" case. */
+	if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0)
+		{
+		/* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */
+		*file = (const char *)uristr;
+		return (2);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */
+		uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX));
+		if (uristr2 == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Initialize the structure. */
+	memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct));
+
+	/*
+	 * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We
+	 * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first
+	 * and the last character in the URI.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' ||
+	    (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';'))
+		goto bad_uri;
+
+	tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1);
+	for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1))
+		{
+		/* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */
+		name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2);
+		/* Check whether there is '=' at all. */
+		if (l2 == NULL)
+			goto bad_uri;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit
+		 * attributes.
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->token == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->serial == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->model == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+				{
+				uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2);
+				if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0)
+			if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
+					goto no_mem;
+				}
+			else
+				goto bad_uri;
+		else
+			goto bad_uri;
+		}
+
+	/* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */
+	if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	free(uristr2);
+	return (1);
+bad_uri:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI);
+	if (uristr2 != NULL)
+		free(uristr2);
+	return (0);
+no_mem:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err:
+	pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE);
+	if (uristr2 != NULL)
+		free(uristr2);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside.
+ */
+void
+pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself)
+	{
+	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->token);
+	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->manuf);
+	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->serial);
+	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->model);
+	if (uri_struct->object != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->object);
+	if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->objecttype);
+	if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+		free(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+	if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE)
+		OPENSSL_free(uri_struct);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is
+ * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that
+ * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note
+ * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to
+ * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see
+ * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11
+ * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	if (token_info == NULL)
+		{
+		token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO));
+		if (token_info == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
+			    PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0)
+			{
+			goto urierr;
+			}
+
+	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf,
+		    (char *)token_info->manufacturerID,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
+		if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial,
+		    (char *)token_info->serialNumber,
+		    strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 :
+		    strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0)
+			goto urierr;
+
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (1);
+
+urierr:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH);
+	/* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */
+err:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the
+ * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will
+ * not have any affect on the policy.
+ *
+ * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked.
+ *
+ * Returns the caching policy number.
+ */
+int
+pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void)
+	{
+	char *value = NULL;
+	static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		return (policy);
+
+	value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY");
+
+	if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_NONE;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_MEMORY;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0)
+		{
+		policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY;
+		goto done;
+		}
+
+	return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE);
+done:
+	return (policy);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or
+ * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_cache_pin(char *pin)
+	{
+	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+	/* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */
+	if (token_pin != NULL)
+		goto ok;
+
+	if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY)
+		if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+	else
+		if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY)
+			{
+			if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+ok:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to
+ * the normal memory caching.
+ *
+ * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock"
+ * mutex.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+static int
+mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin)
+	{
+	void *addr = NULL;
+	long pagesize = 0;
+
+	/* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */
+	if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */
+	if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */
+	if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common
+		 * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues.
+		 */
+		if (errno == EPERM)
+			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING);
+		else
+			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
+			    PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED);
+
+		/*
+		 * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check
+		 * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet
+		 * anyway.
+		 */
+		(void) munmap(addr, pagesize);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */
+	token_pin = (char *)addr;
+	strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+    pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even
+	 * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to
+	 * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may
+	 * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the
+	 * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set.
+	 */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ||
+	    is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags &
+	    CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into
+	 * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we
+	 * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in
+	 * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded
+	 * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
+	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a
+	 * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before
+	 * C_Login().
+	 */
+	if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+		    uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+			    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
+		    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+			{
+			if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass,
+			    &uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
+		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
+		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
+		 * the engine.
+		 *
+		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
+		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
+		 */
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
+			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin,
+			    strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+
+			/*
+			 * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which
+			 * would need to relogin).
+			 */
+			if (passphrasedialog == NULL &&
+			    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
+				{
+				passphrasedialog =
+				    strdup(uri_struct->askpass);
+
+				if (passphrasedialog == NULL)
+					{
+					PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+					    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv);
+					goto err_locked;
+					}
+				}
+
+			/*
+			 * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might
+			 * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required -
+			 * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory.
+			 */
+			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() ==
+			    POLICY_WRONG_VALUE)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE)
+				if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0)
+					goto err_locked;
+			}
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
+			 * login was done.
+			 */
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that
+	 * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the
+	 * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the
+	 * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with
+	 * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it.
+	 */
+	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+
+	return (1);
+
+err_locked:
+	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+err:
+	/* Always get rid of the PIN. */
+	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
+		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There
+ * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite
+ * different so we need a separate function for this.
+ *
+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again.
+	 * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session
+	 * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token
+	 * then.
+	 */
+	if (passphrasedialog != NULL)
+		{
+		char *pin = NULL;
+
+		/* If we cached the PIN then use it. */
+		if (token_pin != NULL)
+			pin = token_pin;
+		else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+		    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
+			    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
+
+		/* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */
+		if (pin != token_pin)
+			{
+			memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
+			OPENSSL_free(pin);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we
+ * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able
+ * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we
+ * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed
+ * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose().
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	allocated buffer on success
+ *	NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *
+run_askpass(char *dialog)
+	{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int n, p[2];
+	char *buf = NULL;
+
+	if (pipe(p) == -1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	switch (pid = fork())
+		{
+		case -1:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED);
+			return (NULL);
+		/* child */
+		case 0:
+			/*
+			 * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on
+			 * file descriptor shortage.
+			 */
+			close(p[0]);
+			(void) dup2(p[1], 1);
+			close(p[1]);
+			/*
+			 * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are
+			 * in the child. However, parent will get read() error
+			 * so do not worry.
+			 */
+			(void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL);
+			exit(1);
+		/* parent */
+		default:
+			/* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */
+			buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
+			if (buf == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+				    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				return (NULL);
+				}
+
+			close(p[1]);
+			n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN);
+			if (n == -1 || n == 0)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
+				    PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND);
+				OPENSSL_free(buf);
+				return (NULL);
+				}
+			buf[n] = '\0';
+
+			(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+		}
+
+	return (buf);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_uri.h	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected]
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef	E_PK11_URI_H
+#define	E_PK11_URI_H
+
+#include <security/pkcs11t.h>
+
+/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */
+#define	PK11_URI_PREFIX		"pkcs11:"
+#define	FILE_URI_PREFIX		"file://"
+#define	PK11_TOKEN		"token"
+#define	PK11_MANUF		"manuf"
+#define	PK11_SERIAL		"serial"
+#define	PK11_MODEL		"model"
+#define	PK11_OBJECT		"object"
+#define	PK11_OBJECTTYPE		"objecttype"
+#define	PK11_ASKPASS		"passphrasedialog"
+
+/* PIN caching policy. */
+#define	POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED	0
+#define	POLICY_NONE		1
+#define	POLICY_MEMORY		2
+#define	POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY	3
+#define	POLICY_WRONG_VALUE	4
+
+/*
+ * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports.
+ */
+#define	PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN	256
+
+/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */
+typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct
+	{
+	char	*object;	/* object label, the only mandatory info */
+	char	*objecttype;	/* (private|public|cert), currently unused */
+	char	*token;		/* token label */
+	char	*manuf;		/* manufacturer label */
+	char	*serial;	/* serial number label */
+	char	*model;		/* model label */
+	char	*askpass;	/* full path to the command to get the PIN */
+	/* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */
+	char	*pin;		/* token PIN */
+	} pkcs11_uri;
+
+/* For URI processing. */
+extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock;
+
+int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin);
+int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void);
+int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
+	const char **file);
+int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct);
+void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself);
+int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin);
+int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+	pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private);
+int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+#endif /* E_PK11_URI_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h	Tue Dec 17 10:05:22 2013 -0800
+++ /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.h */
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    [email protected]
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef	HW_PK11_H
-#define	HW_PK11_H
-
-#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
-
-/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
-#define	PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX			32
-
-/*
- * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
- * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
- * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
- * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
- * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
- * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
- *
- * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
- * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
- * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
- */
-typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
-	{
-	struct PK11_st_SESSION	*next;
-	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;	/* PK11 session handle */
-	pid_t			pid;		/* Current process ID */
-	CK_BBOOL		persistent;	/* is that a keystore object? */
-	union
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		struct
-			{
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-			RSA			*rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-			BIGNUM			*rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
-			BIGNUM			*rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
-			RSA			*rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-			BIGNUM			*rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
-			} u_RSA;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		struct
-			{
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
-			DSA			*dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
-			BIGNUM			*dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
-			DSA			*dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
-			BIGNUM			*dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
-			} u_DSA;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		struct
-			{
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dh_key; /* key handle */
-			DH			*dh; /* dh key addr */
-			BIGNUM			*dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
-			} u_DH;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-		struct
-			{
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	cipher_key; /* key handle */
-			unsigned char		key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
-			int			key_len; /* priv key len */
-			int			encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
-			} u_cipher;
-		} opdata_u;
-	} PK11_SESSION;
-
-#define	opdata_rsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
-#define	opdata_rsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
-#define	opdata_rsa_pub		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
-#define	opdata_rsa_priv		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
-#define	opdata_rsa_n_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
-#define	opdata_rsa_e_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
-#define	opdata_rsa_d_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
-#define	opdata_dsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
-#define	opdata_dsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
-#define	opdata_dsa_pub		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
-#define	opdata_dsa_pub_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
-#define	opdata_dsa_priv		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
-#define	opdata_dsa_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
-#define	opdata_dh_key		opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
-#define	opdata_dh		opdata_u.u_DH.dh
-#define	opdata_dh_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
-#define	opdata_cipher_key	opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
-#define	opdata_key		opdata_u.u_cipher.key
-#define	opdata_key_len		opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
-#define	opdata_encrypt		opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
-
-/*
- * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
- *   1) asymmetric operations
- *   2) random operations
- *   3) symmetric and digest operations
- *
- * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
- * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
- * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
- * only a single group of operations.
- *
- * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
- * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
- * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
- *
- * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
- * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
- */
-typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
-	{
-	OP_RAND,
-	OP_RSA,
-	OP_DSA,
-	OP_DH,
-	OP_CIPHER,
-	OP_DIGEST,
-	OP_MAX
-	} PK11_OPTYPE;
-
-/*
- * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
- * and locks associated with the lists.
- */
-typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
-	{
-	PK11_SESSION *head;
-	pthread_mutex_t *lock;
-	} PK11_CACHE;
-
-/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
-typedef struct PK11_active_st
-	{
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
-	unsigned int refcnt;
-	struct PK11_active_st *prev;
-	struct PK11_active_st *next;
-	} PK11_active;
-
-extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
-extern PK11_active *active_list[];
-/*
- * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
- * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
- */
-extern char *passphrasedialog;
-extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-
-#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
-	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type])
-#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
-	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type])
-
-extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
-	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
-extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-
-#endif /* HW_PK11_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h	Tue Dec 17 10:05:22 2013 -0800
+++ /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    [email protected]
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef	HW_PK11_ERR_H
-#define	HW_PK11_ERR_H
-
-void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
-#define	PK11err(f, r)	ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
-
-/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-
-#define	PK11_F_INIT 				100
-#define	PK11_F_FINISH				101
-#define	PK11_F_DESTROY 				102
-#define	PK11_F_CTRL 				103
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_INIT 			104
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 			105
-#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 			106
-#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 		107
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 			108
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 			109
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 			110
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 			111
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 			112
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 			113
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 			114
-#define	PK11_F_RAND_ADD 			115
-#define	PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 			116
-#define	PK11_F_GET_SESSION 			117
-#define	PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 			118
-#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 			119
-#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 			120
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 			121
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 		122
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 			123
-#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 		124
-#define	PK11_F_DSA_SIGN				125
-#define	PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY			126
-#define	PK11_F_DSA_INIT				127
-#define	PK11_F_DSA_FINISH			128
-#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY			129
-#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 		130
-#define	PK11_F_DH_INIT 				131
-#define	PK11_F_DH_FINISH 			132
-#define	PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 			133
-#define	PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 			134
-#define	PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS		135
-#define	PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION			136
-#define	PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT			137
-#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT			138
-#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER			139
-#define	PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY			140
-#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT			141
-#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE			142
-#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL			143
-#define	PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT			144
-#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL			145
-#define	PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 			146
-#define	PK11_F_LOAD 				147
-#define	PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY			148
-#define	PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 			149
-#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 			150
-#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP			151
-#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD			152
-#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE			153
-#define	PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS		154
-#define	PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC			155
-#define	PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS			156
-#define	PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS			157
-#define	PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION			158
-#define	PK11_F_GET_PIN				159
-#define	PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 			160
-#define	PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 		161
-#define	PK11_F_CACHE_PIN			162
-#define	PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY		163
-#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 			164
-#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 			165
-#define	PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 			166
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-#define	PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 			100
-#define	PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 			101
-#define	PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 			102
-#define	PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 		103
-#define	PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 		104
-#define	PK11_R_INITIALIZE 			105
-#define	PK11_R_FINALIZE 			106
-#define	PK11_R_GETINFO 				107
-#define	PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 			108
-#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 	109
-#define	PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 	110
-#define	PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 		111
-#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 			112
-#define	PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 			113
-#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 			114
-#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 			115
-#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 		116
-#define	PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 			118
-#define	PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 			119
-#define	PK11_R_OPENSESSION 			120
-#define	PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 			121
-#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 			122
-#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPT 				123
-#define	PK11_R_SIGNINIT 			124
-#define	PK11_R_SIGN 				125
-#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 			126
-#define	PK11_R_DECRYPT 				127
-#define	PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 			128
-#define	PK11_R_VERIFY 				129
-#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 		130
-#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 			131
-#define	PK11_R_GEN_KEY 				132
-#define	PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 			133
-#define	PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 			134
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 		135
-#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 		136
-#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 		137
-#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 		138
-#define	PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 		139
-#define	PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 			140
-#define	PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 			141
-#define	PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 	142
-#define	PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 	143
-#define	PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 	144
-#define	PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT		145
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH		146
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R		147
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S		148
-#define	PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY			149
-#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE			150
-#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE			151
-#define	PK11_R_DIGESTINIT			152
-#define	PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE			153
-#define	PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL			154
-#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL			155
-#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL			156
-#define	PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT			157
-#define	PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO			158
-#define	PK11_R_DERIVEKEY			159
-#define	PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE		160
-#define	PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE		161
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE			162
-#define	PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM		163
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE		164
-#define	PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED			165
-#define	PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED			166
-#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED		167
-#define	PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND	168
-#define	PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI		169
-#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN		170
-#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND		171
-#define	PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED			172
-#define	PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND	173
-#define	PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC		174
-#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED		175
-#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET		176
-#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED		177
-#define	PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL		178
-#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH		179
-#define	PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND		180
-#define	PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND			181
-#define	PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID	182
-#define	PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED			183
-#define	PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED			183
-#define	PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING	184
-#define	PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED			185
-#define	PK11_R_FORK_FAILED			186
-
-#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c	Tue Dec 17 10:05:22 2013 -0800
+++ /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,870 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    [email protected]
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <strings.h>
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-#include <security/pkcs11.h>
-#include "hw_pk11.h"
-#include "hw_pk11_uri.h"
-
-/*
- * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one
- * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI
- * processing.
- */
-extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
-
-/*
- * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not
- * cache the PIN by default.
- */
-static char *token_pin;
-
-static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin);
-static char *run_askpass(char *dialog);
-
-/*
- * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to
- * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using
- * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated
- * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take
- * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted
- * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN.
- *
- * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after
- * the fork.
- *
- * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock"
- * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL)
- *	1 if we got the PIN
- */
-#define	EXEC_SPEC	"exec:"
-#define	BUILTIN_SPEC	"builtin"
-int
-pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin)
-	{
-	/* Initialize as an error. */
-	*pin = NULL;
-
-	if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0)
-		{
-		/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
-		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
-		/* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */
-		*pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: ");
-		if (*pin == NULL)
-			{
-			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
-			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			char *pw;
-
-			/*
-			 * getpassphrase() uses an internal  buffer to hold the
-			 * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer
-			 * with '\0'.
-			 */
-			if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL)
-				{
-				PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			/* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */
-			memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin));
-			*pin = pw;
-			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/*
-		 * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output
-		 * of an external command.
-		 */
-		if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0)
-			{
-			dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC);
-			if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL)
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/*
-			 * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog
-			 * keyword.
-			 */
-			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return (1);
-err:
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the
- * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present
- * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes
- * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct'
- * structure.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN
- * 	1 if all is OK
- *	2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string
- *	pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points
- *	inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present.
- */
-int
-pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct,
-	const char **file)
-	{
-	char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name;
-
-	/* Check the "file://" case. */
-	if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0)
-		{
-		*file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX);
-		return (2);
-		}
-
-	/*  This is the "pkcs11:" case. */
-	if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0)
-		{
-		/* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */
-		*file = (const char *)uristr;
-		return (2);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */
-		uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX));
-		if (uristr2 == NULL)
-			{
-			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
-			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Initialize the structure. */
-	memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct));
-
-	/*
-	 * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We
-	 * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first
-	 * and the last character in the URI.
-	 */
-	if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' ||
-	    (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';'))
-		goto bad_uri;
-
-	tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1);
-	for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1))
-		{
-		/* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */
-		name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2);
-		/* Check whether there is '=' at all. */
-		if (l2 == NULL)
-			goto bad_uri;
-
-		/*
-		 * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit
-		 * attributes.
-		 */
-		if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->token == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->serial == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->model == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
-				{
-				uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2);
-				if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0)
-			if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL)
-					goto no_mem;
-				}
-			else
-				goto bad_uri;
-		else
-			goto bad_uri;
-		}
-
-	/* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */
-	if (uri_struct->object == NULL)
-		{
-		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	free(uristr2);
-	return (1);
-bad_uri:
-	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI);
-	if (uristr2 != NULL)
-		free(uristr2);
-	return (0);
-no_mem:
-	PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err:
-	pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE);
-	if (uristr2 != NULL)
-		free(uristr2);
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside.
- */
-void
-pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself)
-	{
-	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->token);
-	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->manuf);
-	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->serial);
-	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->model);
-	if (uri_struct->object != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->object);
-	if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->objecttype);
-	if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
-		free(uri_struct->askpass);
-
-	if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE)
-		OPENSSL_free(uri_struct);
-	}
-
-/*
- * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is
- * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that
- * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note
- * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to
- * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see
- * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11
- * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	1 on success
- *	0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct)
-	{
-	CK_RV rv;
-	static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL;
-
-	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
-	if (token_info == NULL)
-		{
-		token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO));
-		if (token_info == NULL)
-			{
-			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
-			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info);
-		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-			{
-			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS,
-			    PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (uri_struct->token != NULL)
-		if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label,
-		    strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 :
-		    strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0)
-			{
-			goto urierr;
-			}
-
-	if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL)
-		if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf,
-		    (char *)token_info->manufacturerID,
-		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 :
-		    strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0)
-			goto urierr;
-
-	if (uri_struct->model != NULL)
-		if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model,
-		    strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 :
-		    strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0)
-			goto urierr;
-
-	if (uri_struct->serial != NULL)
-		if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial,
-		    (char *)token_info->serialNumber,
-		    strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 :
-		    strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0)
-			goto urierr;
-
-	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-	return (1);
-
-urierr:
-	PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH);
-	/* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */
-err:
-	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the
- * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will
- * not have any affect on the policy.
- *
- * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked.
- *
- * Returns the caching policy number.
- */
-int
-pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void)
-	{
-	char *value = NULL;
-	static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED;
-
-	if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-		return (policy);
-
-	value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY");
-
-	if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
-		{
-		policy = POLICY_NONE;
-		goto done;
-		}
-
-	if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0)
-		{
-		policy = POLICY_MEMORY;
-		goto done;
-		}
-
-	if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0)
-		{
-		policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY;
-		goto done;
-		}
-
-	return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE);
-done:
-	return (policy);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or
- * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	1 on success
- *	0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_cache_pin(char *pin)
-	{
-	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
-	/* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */
-	if (token_pin != NULL)
-		goto ok;
-
-	if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY)
-		if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL)
-			{
-			PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-	else
-		if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY)
-			{
-			if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0)
-				goto err;
-			}
-
-ok:
-	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-	return (1);
-err:
-	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to
- * the normal memory caching.
- *
- * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock"
- * mutex.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	1 on success
- *	0 on failure
- */
-static int
-mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin)
-	{
-	void *addr = NULL;
-	long pagesize = 0;
-
-	/* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */
-	if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1)
-		{
-		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */
-	if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
-	    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
-		{
-		PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */
-	if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1)
-		{
-		/*
-		 * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common
-		 * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues.
-		 */
-		if (errno == EPERM)
-			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
-			    PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING);
-		else
-			PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY,
-			    PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED);
-
-		/*
-		 * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check
-		 * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet
-		 * anyway.
-		 */
-		(void) munmap(addr, pagesize);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */
-	token_pin = (char *)addr;
-	strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
-	return (1);
-err:
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
- * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
- * multiple threads.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	1 on success
- *	0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
-    pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private)
-	{
-	CK_RV rv;
-
-	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
-		{
-		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even
-	 * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to
-	 * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may
-	 * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the
-	 * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set.
-	 */
-	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ||
-	    is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags &
-	    CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)
-		{
-		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into
-	 * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we
-	 * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in
-	 * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded
-	 * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
-	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a
-	 * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before
-	 * C_Login().
-	 */
-	if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE)
-		{
-		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
-		    uri_struct->askpass == NULL)
-			{
-			PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-			    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE &&
-		    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
-			{
-			if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass,
-			    &uri_struct->pin) == 0)
-				{
-				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		/*
-		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
-		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
-		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
-		 * the engine.
-		 *
-		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
-		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
-		 */
-		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
-		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
-			{
-			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
-			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin,
-			    strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK)
-				{
-				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-				goto err_locked;
-				}
-
-			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
-
-			/*
-			 * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which
-			 * would need to relogin).
-			 */
-			if (passphrasedialog == NULL &&
-			    uri_struct->askpass != NULL)
-				{
-				passphrasedialog =
-				    strdup(uri_struct->askpass);
-
-				if (passphrasedialog == NULL)
-					{
-					PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-					    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv);
-					goto err_locked;
-					}
-				}
-
-			/*
-			 * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might
-			 * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required -
-			 * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory.
-			 */
-			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() ==
-			    POLICY_WRONG_VALUE)
-				{
-				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
-				    PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID);
-				goto err_locked;
-				}
-
-			if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE)
-				if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0)
-					goto err_locked;
-			}
-		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-			/*
-			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
-			 * login was done.
-			 */
-			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that
-	 * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the
-	 * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the
-	 * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with
-	 * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it.
-	 */
-	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
-		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
-
-	return (1);
-
-err_locked:
-	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-err:
-	/* Always get rid of the PIN. */
-	if (uri_struct->pin != NULL)
-		memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin));
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There
- * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite
- * different so we need a separate function for this.
- *
- * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
- * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
- *
- * Returns:
- *	1 on success
- *	0 on failure
- */
-int
-pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
-	{
-	CK_RV rv;
-
-	/*
-	 * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again.
-	 * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session
-	 * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token
-	 * then.
-	 */
-	if (passphrasedialog != NULL)
-		{
-		char *pin = NULL;
-
-		/* If we cached the PIN then use it. */
-		if (token_pin != NULL)
-			pin = token_pin;
-		else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0)
-			goto err;
-
-		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
-		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
-		    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK)
-			{
-			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
-			    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
-			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-
-		/* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */
-		if (pin != token_pin)
-			{
-			memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
-			OPENSSL_free(pin);
-			}
-		}
-
-	return (1);
-err:
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-/*
- * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we
- * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able
- * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we
- * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed
- * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose().
- *
- * Returns:
- *	allocated buffer on success
- *	NULL on failure
- */
-static char *
-run_askpass(char *dialog)
-	{
-	pid_t pid;
-	int n, p[2];
-	char *buf = NULL;
-
-	if (pipe(p) == -1)
-		{
-		PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED);
-		return (NULL);
-		}
-
-	switch (pid = fork())
-		{
-		case -1:
-			PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED);
-			return (NULL);
-		/* child */
-		case 0:
-			/*
-			 * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on
-			 * file descriptor shortage.
-			 */
-			close(p[0]);
-			(void) dup2(p[1], 1);
-			close(p[1]);
-			/*
-			 * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are
-			 * in the child. However, parent will get read() error
-			 * so do not worry.
-			 */
-			(void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL);
-			exit(1);
-		/* parent */
-		default:
-			/* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */
-			buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1);
-			if (buf == NULL)
-				{
-				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
-				    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return (NULL);
-				}
-
-			close(p[1]);
-			n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN);
-			if (n == -1 || n == 0)
-				{
-				PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS,
-				    PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND);
-				OPENSSL_free(buf);
-				return (NULL);
-				}
-			buf[n] = '\0';
-
-			(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-		}
-
-	return (buf);
-	}
-
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140.p5m	Tue Dec 17 10:05:22 2013 -0800
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140.p5m	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
 file $(MACH32)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lcrypto.ln
 file llib-lssl path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lssl
 file $(MACH32)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lssl.ln
+file $(MACH32)/engines/libpk11.so path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/libpk11.so.1
+link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/libpk11.so target=libpk11.so.1
 # 64 bit libraries, lint libraries, and engines.
 file $(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0
 link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.1.0.0
@@ -56,6 +58,8 @@
 file $(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln
 file llib-lssl path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl
 file $(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln
+file $(MACH64)/engines/libpk11.so path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/$(MACH64)/libpk11.so.1
+link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/engines/$(MACH64)/libpk11.so target=libpk11.so.1
 # Header files.
 #
 # Take header files from the 32-bit build. This build has the patched
--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch	Tue Dec 17 10:05:22 2013 -0800
+++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch	Tue Dec 17 15:19:48 2013 -0800
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
  	s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
  	s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
 +	s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
+	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
  	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
  	s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
 --- /tmp/Makefile.org	Fri Feb 11 14:41:54 2011
@@ -83,27 +83,77 @@
  # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
  OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
  
---- /tmp/Makefile	Fri Feb 11 14:42:03 2011
-+++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/Makefile	Fri Feb 11 14:45:43 2011
[email protected]@ -22,13 +22,13 @@
-	tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
-	tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
-	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
--	eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c
-+	eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11_uri.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
-	eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
-	tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
-	tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
-	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
--	eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o
-+	eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11_uri.o
-
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/engines/Makefile.~1~        Fri Nov 22 13:40:31 2013
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/engines/Makefile    Fri Nov 22 13:43:46 2013
[email protected]@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
+ APPS=
+ 
+ LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+-LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi
++LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi \
++	pk11
+ 
+ LIBSRC=	e_4758cca.c \
+	e_aep.c \
[email protected]@ -38,7 +39,8 @@
+	e_sureware.c \
+	e_ubsec.c \
+	e_padlock.c \
+-	e_capi.c
++	e_capi.c \
++	e_pk11.c
+ LIBOBJ= e_4758cca.o \
+	e_aep.o \
+	e_atalla.o \
[email protected]@ -49,7 +51,8 @@
+	e_sureware.o \
+	e_ubsec.o \
+	e_padlock.o \
+-	e_capi.o
++	e_capi.o \
++	e_pk11.o
+ 
  SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
---- /tmp/eng_all.c	Fri Feb 11 14:46:11 2011
-+++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	Fri Feb 11 14:38:01 2011
[email protected]@ -80,6 +80,9 @@
+ 
[email protected]@ -63,7 +66,8 @@
+	e_nuron_err.c e_nuron_err.h \
+	e_sureware_err.c e_sureware_err.h \
+	e_ubsec_err.c e_ubsec_err.h \
+-	e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h
++	e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h \
++	e_pk11.h e_pk11_uri.h e_pk11_err.h e_pk11_pub.c e_pk11_uri.c e_pk11_err.c
+ 
+ ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+ 
[email protected]@ -78,7 +82,7 @@
+		for l in $(LIBNAMES); do \
+			$(MAKE) -f ../Makefile.shared -e \
+				LIBNAME=$$l LIBEXTRAS=e_$$l.o \
+-				LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)' \
++				LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto -lcryptoutil $(EX_LIBS)' \
+				link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+		done; \
+	else \
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c.~1~       Mon Feb 11 07:26:04 2013
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c   Wed Nov 20 11:38:05 2013
[email protected]@ -59,6 +59,16 @@
+ #include "cryptlib.h"
+ #include "eng_int.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * pkcs11 engine no longer is a built-in engine, and ENGINE_load_pk11() needs to be
++ * defined in libcrypto.so for ssh. Instead of load pkcs11 engine, it loads dynamic
++ * engines.
++ */
++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++	{
++	ENGINE_load_dynamic();
++	}
++
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
+	{
+	/* Some ENGINEs need this */
[email protected]@ -80,6 +90,9 @@
 	ENGINE_load_rdrand();
  #endif
 	ENGINE_load_dynamic();
@@ -113,6 +163,35 @@
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c.~1~       Wed Nov 20 13:10:57 2013
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c   Wed Nov 20 13:30:46 2013
[email protected]@ -426,6 +426,26 @@
+		DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME,DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
++	/*
++	 * For pkcs11 engine, use libpk11.so (instead of libpkcs11.so) to
++	 * avoid the name collision with PKCS#11 library.
++	 */
++	if (strcmp(filename, "pkcs11") == 0)
++		{
++#ifdef _LP64
++		static const char fullpath[] = "/lib/openssl/engines/64/libpk11.so";
++#else
++		static const char fullpath[] = "/lib/openssl/engines/libpk11.so";
++#endif
++		result = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(fullpath) + 1);
++		if(result == NULL)
++			{
++			DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return(NULL);
++			}
++		BUF_strlcpy(result, fullpath, sizeof(fullpath));
++		return(result);
++		}
+	if((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0)
+		{
+		if(dso->name_converter != NULL)
 --- /tmp/engine.h	Fri Feb 11 14:46:24 2011
 +++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/engine.h	Fri Feb 11 14:47:32 2011
 @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@