6540060 race in pkcs#11 engine in multithreaded environment
6554248 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine doesn't strip leading zeros from a computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret
/*
* Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*/
#pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI"
/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
/* This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
* use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
*
* This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
* Afchine Madjlessi.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* [email protected].
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson ([email protected]).
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/dso.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <cryptlib.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
#include "security/cryptoki.h"
#include "security/pkcs11.h"
#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
const RSA *rsa);
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char* pubkey_file,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char* pubkey_file,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa,
PK11_SESSION *sp);
#endif
/* DSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
DSA *dsa);
static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
PK11_SESSION *sp);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
PK11_SESSION *sp);
#endif
/* DH stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
const BIGNUM *pub_key,DH *dh);
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, PK11_SESSION *sp);
#endif
static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
static void check_new_rsa_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, void *rsa);
static void check_new_dsa_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, void *dsa);
static void check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, void *dh);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
{
"PKCS#11 RSA method",
pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
NULL, /* app_data */
pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
pk11_RSA_verify/*,*/ /* rsa_verify */
};
RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void)
{
return(&pk11_rsa);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
{
"PKCS#11 DSA method",
pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
0, /* flags */
NULL /* app_data */
};
DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void)
{
return(&pk11_dsa);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
{
"PKCS#11 DH method",
pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
pk11_DH_init, /* init */
pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
0, /* flags */
NULL /* app_data */
};
DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void)
{
return(&pk11_dh);
}
#endif
/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1
*/
#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
/* Lengths of DSA data and signature
*/
#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Similiar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
* support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
* support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
* The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC,PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
break;
#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
default:
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC,PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
err:
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
/* Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
* should be catched in the padding functions
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC,PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
default:
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC,PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r=pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
err:
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
/* Similar to Openssl. Input errors are also checked here
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_init(&f);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
if (flen > num)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
/* make data into a big number */
if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
/* PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
* Needs to skip these 0's paddings here */
for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
if (buf[j] != 0)
break;
p = buf + j;
j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,p,j,num);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,p,j,num,NULL,0);
break;
#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,p,j,num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,p,j,num);
break;
default:
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
BN_clear_free(&f);
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
/* Similar to Openssl. Input errors are also checked here
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f;
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_init(&f);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (buf == NULL)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
if (flen > num)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
goto err;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
/* PK11 functions are called here */
r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
/* PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
* Needs to skip these 0's here */
for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
if (buf[i] != 0)
break;
p = buf + i;
i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,p,i,num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,p,i,num);
break;
default:
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
BN_clear_free(&f);
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
/* This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
* C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted=flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
char tmp_buf[20];
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
return -1;
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->rsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_ENCRYPT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
retval = bytes_encrypted;
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return retval;
}
/* This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
* C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG ul_sig_len=flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key= CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
char tmp_buf[20];
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
return -1;
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->rsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGNINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
retval = ul_sig_len;
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return retval;
}
/* This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
* C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
char tmp_buf[20];
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
return -1;
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->rsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, PK11_R_DECRYPT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
retval = bytes_decrypted;
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return retval;
}
/* This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
* and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
* The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
*/
static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
{
CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
int retval = -1;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
char tmp_buf[20];
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
return -1;
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->rsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
p_mech, h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
pk11_return_session(sp);
return -1;
}
retval = bytes_decrypted;
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return retval;
}
static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
{
/* This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
* rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. */
rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
return 1;
}
static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
return pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
}
/* Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
* rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
* See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c */
static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
{
X509_SIG sig;
ASN1_TYPE parameter;
int i,j;
unsigned char *p,*s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
int ret = 0;
char tmp_buf[20];
unsigned long ulsiglen;
/* Encode the digest */
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
{
if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
s = (unsigned char *)m;
}
else
{
sig.algor= &algor;
sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type);
if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
goto err;
}
parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL;
parameter.value.ptr=NULL;
sig.algor->parameter= ¶meter;
sig.digest= &digest;
sig.digest->data=(unsigned char *)m;
sig.digest->length=m_len;
i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL);
}
j=RSA_size(rsa);
if ((i-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
goto err;
}
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
if (s == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p=s;
i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p);
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
goto err;
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_priv_key = sp->rsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->rsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
ulsiglen = j;
rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
*siglen = ulsiglen;
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
memset(s,0,(unsigned int)j+1);
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return ret;
}
static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
const RSA *rsa)
{
X509_SIG sig;
ASN1_TYPE parameter;
int i,j;
unsigned char *p,*s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
int ret = 0;
char tmp_buf[20];
/* Encode the digest */
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
{
if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
s = (unsigned char *)m;
}
else
{
sig.algor= &algor;
sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type);
if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
goto err;
}
parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL;
parameter.value.ptr=NULL;
sig.algor->parameter= ¶meter;
sig.digest= &digest;
sig.digest->data=(unsigned char *)m;
sig.digest->length=m_len;
i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL);
}
j=RSA_size(rsa);
if ((i-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
goto err;
}
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
if (s == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p=s;
i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p);
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
goto err;
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_pub_key = sp->rsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->rsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf,
(CK_ULONG)siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
{
memset(s,0,(unsigned int)siglen);
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return ret;
}
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char* privkey_file,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
FILE *pubkey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
RSA *rsa;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((pubkey=fopen(privkey_file,"r")) != NULL)
{
pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fclose(pubkey);
if (pkey)
{
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa)
{
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_priv_key = pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
sp);
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
else
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return(pkey);
}
EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char* pubkey_file,
UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
FILE *pubkey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
RSA *rsa;
PK11_SESSION *sp;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((pubkey=fopen(pubkey_file,"r")) != NULL)
{
pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fclose(pubkey);
if (pkey)
{
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa)
{
check_new_rsa_key(sp, (void *) rsa);
h_pub_key = pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
else
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return(pkey);
}
/* Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
char tmp_buf[20];
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
int i;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = sp->session;
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
}
sp->rsa = rsa;
err:
for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return h_key;
}
/* Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
int i;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
char tmp_buf[20];
/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys
*/
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = sp->session;
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
/* Put the private key components into the template */
if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
}
sp->rsa = rsa;
err:
/* 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components
* They need to be freed apon exit or error.
*/
for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return h_key;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/* The DSA function implementation
*/
static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
{
return 1;
}
static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
{
return pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
}
static DSA_SIG *
pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
int i;
DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
/* The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
* each is 20 bytes long
*/
unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
char tmp_buf[20];
if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
goto ret;
}
i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
if (dlen > i)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto ret;
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
goto ret;
check_new_dsa_key(sp, (void *) dsa);
h_priv_key = sp->dsa_priv_key;
if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_priv_key = sp->dsa_priv_key =
pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, sp);
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto ret;
}
memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
(unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
(CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto ret;
}
}
if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto ret;
}
BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r);
BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s);
dsa_sig->r = r;
dsa_sig->s = s;
ret:
if (dsa_sig == NULL)
{
if (r != NULL)
BN_free(r);
if (s != NULL)
BN_free(s);
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return (dsa_sig);
}
static int
pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
DSA *dsa)
{
int i;
CK_RV rv;
int retval = 0;
CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
char tmp_buf[20];
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
goto ret;
}
if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
goto ret;
}
i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
if (dlen > i)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto ret;
}
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
goto ret;
check_new_dsa_key(sp, (void *) dsa);
h_pub_key = sp->dsa_pub_key;
if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_pub_key = sp->dsa_pub_key =
pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, sp);
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto ret;
}
memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf);
BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2]);
rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto ret;
}
}
retval = 1;
ret:
pk11_return_session(sp);
return retval;
}
/* Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG found;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
int i;
char tmp_buf[20];
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
};
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = sp->session;
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
}
sp->dsa = dsa;
err:
for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return h_key;
}
/* Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
*/
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
int i;
char tmp_buf[20];
CK_ULONG found;
CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys
*/
CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
};
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = sp->session;
a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
/* Put the private key components into the template
*/
if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
}
sp->dsa = dsa;
err:
/* 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components
* They need to be freed apon exit or error.
*/
for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
{
if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return h_key;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/* The DH function implementation
*/
static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
{
return 1;
}
static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
{
return pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
}
static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
{
CK_ULONG i;
CK_RV rv, rv1;
int ret = 0;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
char tmp_buf[20];
CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof(false)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof(false)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof(false)},
{CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
{
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
{
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
{
pub_key_template[1].pValue =
OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen);
if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
}
else
goto err;
pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
{
pub_key_template[2].pValue =
OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen);
if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
}
else
goto err;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
goto err;
rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
&mechanism,
pub_key_template,
ul_pub_key_attr_count,
priv_key_template,
ul_priv_key_attr_count,
&h_pub_key,
&h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
/* Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
* is sufficient for reuse */
if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
else
reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
{
rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
goto err;
}
/* Reuse the memory allocated */
pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
{
if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
dh->pub_key = BN_new();
dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
}
/* Reuse the memory allocated */
priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
{
if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
dh->priv_key = BN_new();
dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
}
}
if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
}
}
for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
{
if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return ret;
}
static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,const BIGNUM *pub_key,DH *dh)
{
int i;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof(key_class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof(key_type)},
};
CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
{
{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
};
CK_RV rv;
int ret = 0;
PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
char tmp_buf[20];
priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
if ((sp = pk11_get_session()) == NULL)
goto err;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
h_key = sp->dh_key;
if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
h_key = sp->dh_key = pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, sp);
if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
&mechanism,
h_key,
priv_key_template,
ul_priv_key_attr_count,
&h_derived_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
goto err;
}
priv_key_result[0].pValue =
OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
/* OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
* length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key */
if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
{
/* CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
* leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
* OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
* vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
* finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
* zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
* pre-master secret.
*/
for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
{
if (((char *) priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
break;
}
memcpy(key, ((char *) priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
}
err:
if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
}
}
if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
{
OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
}
if (mechanism.pParameter)
{
OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
}
pk11_return_session(sp);
return ret;
}
static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, PK11_SESSION *sp)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
CK_ULONG found;
int i;
char tmp_buf[20];
CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
{
{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof(class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof(key_type)},
{CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof(false)},
{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
};
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = sp->session;
key_template[0].pValue = &class;
key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
ul_key_attr_count);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
if (found == 0)
{
rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
goto err;
}
}
sp->dh = dh;
err:
for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
{
if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
}
}
return h_key;
}
#endif
/* Local function to simplify key template population
* Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
*/
static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
{
CK_ULONG len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (len == 0)
return 1;
*ul_value_len = len;
*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t) *ul_value_len);
if (*p_value == NULL)
return 0;
BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
return 1;
}
static void check_new_rsa_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, void *rsa)
{
if (sp->rsa != rsa)
pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(sp);
}
static void check_new_dsa_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, void *dsa)
{
if (sp->dsa != dsa)
pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(sp);
}
static void check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, void *dh)
{
if (sp->dh != dh)
pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(sp);
}
#endif
#endif