usr/src/uts/common/syscall/uid.c
author Casper H.S. Dik <Casper.Dik@Sun.COM>
Wed, 28 Apr 2010 10:01:37 +0200
changeset 12273 63678502e95e
parent 9799 641e52717cb5
permissions -rw-r--r--
PSARC 2009/377 In-kernel pfexec implementation. PSARC 2009/378 Basic File Privileges PSARC 2010/072 RBAC update: user attrs from profiles 4912090 pfzsh(1) should exist 4912093 pfbash(1) should exist 4912096 pftcsh(1) should exist 6440298 Expand the basic privilege set in order to restrict file access 6859862 Move pfexec into the kernel 6919171 cred_t sidesteps kmem_debug; we need to be able to detect bad hold/free when they occur 6923721 The new SYS_SMB privilege is not backward compatible 6937562 autofs doesn't remove its door when the zone shuts down 6937727 Zones stuck on deathrow; netstack_zone keeps a credential reference to the zone 6940159 Implement PSARC 2010/072

/*
 * CDDL HEADER START
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
 * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 *
 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
 * and limitations under the License.
 *
 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
 *
 * CDDL HEADER END
 */
/*
 * Copyright (c) 1994, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
 */

/*
 * 	Copyright (c) 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 AT&T
 */

#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/tuneable.h>
#include <sys/cred_impl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/debug.h>
#include <sys/policy.h>
#include <sys/zone.h>
#include <sys/sid.h>

int
setuid(uid_t uid)
{
	proc_t *p;
	int error;
	int do_nocd = 0;
	int uidchge = 0;
	cred_t	*cr, *newcr;
	uid_t oldruid = uid;
	zoneid_t zoneid = getzoneid();
	ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
	zone_t	*zone = crgetzone(CRED());

	if (!VALID_UID(uid, zone))
		return (set_errno(EINVAL));

	if (uid > MAXUID) {
		if (ksid_lookupbyuid(zone, uid, &ksid) != 0)
			return (set_errno(EINVAL));
		ksp = &ksid;
	} else {
		ksp = NULL;
	}
	/*
	 * Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
	 * the p_crlock mutex.  We can't hold on to the p_crlock for most
	 * if this though, now that we allow kernel upcalls from the
	 * policy routines.
	 */
	newcr = cralloc_ksid();

	p = ttoproc(curthread);

retry:
	mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry_locked:
	cr = p->p_cred;
	crhold(cr);
	mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);

	if ((uid == cr->cr_ruid || uid == cr->cr_suid) &&
	    secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, uid, B_TRUE) != 0) {
		mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
		crfree(cr);
		if (cr != p->p_cred)
			goto retry_locked;
		error = 0;
		crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
		p->p_cred = newcr;
		newcr->cr_uid = uid;
		crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
		mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
	} else if ((error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, uid, B_FALSE)) == 0) {
		mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
		crfree(cr);
		if (cr != p->p_cred)
			goto retry_locked;
		if (!uidchge && uid != cr->cr_ruid) {
			/*
			 * The ruid of the process is going to change. In order
			 * to avoid a race condition involving the
			 * process-count associated with the newly given ruid,
			 * we increment the count before assigning the
			 * credential to the process.
			 * To do that, we'll have to take pidlock, so we first
			 * release p_crlock.
			 */
			mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
			uidchge = 1;
			mutex_enter(&pidlock);
			upcount_inc(uid, zoneid);
			mutex_exit(&pidlock);
			/*
			 * As we released p_crlock we can't rely on the cr
			 * we read. So retry the whole thing.
			 */
			goto retry;
		}
		/*
		 * A privileged process that gives up its privilege
		 * must be marked to produce no core dump.
		 */
		if (cr->cr_uid != uid ||
		    cr->cr_ruid != uid ||
		    cr->cr_suid != uid)
			do_nocd = 1;
		oldruid = cr->cr_ruid;
		crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
		p->p_cred = newcr;
		newcr->cr_ruid = uid;
		newcr->cr_suid = uid;
		newcr->cr_uid = uid;

		/* Remove the PRIV_PFEXEC, we changed the real uid. */
		if (uidchge)
			CR_FLAGS(newcr) &= ~PRIV_PFEXEC;

		crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);

		priv_reset_PA(newcr, B_TRUE);

		ASSERT(uid != oldruid ? uidchge : 1);
		mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
	} else {
		crfree(newcr);
		crfree(cr);
		if (ksp != NULL)
			ksid_rele(ksp);
	}

	/*
	 * We decrement the number of processes associated with the oldruid
	 * to match the increment above, even if the ruid of the process
	 * did not change or an error occurred (oldruid == uid).
	 */
	if (uidchge) {
		mutex_enter(&pidlock);
		upcount_dec(oldruid, zoneid);
		mutex_exit(&pidlock);
	}

	if (error == 0) {
		if (do_nocd) {
			mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
			p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
			mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
		}
		crset(p, newcr);	/* broadcast to process threads */
		return (0);
	}
	return (set_errno(error));
}

int64_t
getuid(void)
{
	rval_t	r;
	cred_t *cr;

	cr = curthread->t_cred;
	r.r_val1 = cr->cr_ruid;
	r.r_val2 = cr->cr_uid;
	return (r.r_vals);
}

int
seteuid(uid_t uid)
{
	proc_t *p;
	int error = EPERM;
	int do_nocd = 0;
	cred_t	*cr, *newcr;
	ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
	zone_t	*zone = crgetzone(CRED());

	if (!VALID_UID(uid, zone))
		return (set_errno(EINVAL));

	if (uid > MAXUID) {
		if (ksid_lookupbyuid(zone, uid, &ksid) != 0)
			return (set_errno(EINVAL));
		ksp = &ksid;
	} else {
		ksp = NULL;
	}

	/*
	 * Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
	 * the p_crlock mutex.
	 */
	newcr = cralloc_ksid();
	p = ttoproc(curthread);
	mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry:
	crhold(cr = p->p_cred);
	mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);

	if (uid == cr->cr_ruid || uid == cr->cr_uid || uid == cr->cr_suid ||
	    (error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, uid, B_FALSE)) == 0) {
		/*
		 * A privileged process that makes itself look like a
		 * set-uid process must be marked to produce no core dump,
		 * if the effective uid did changed.
		 */
		mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
		crfree(cr);
		if (cr != p->p_cred)
			goto retry;
		if (cr->cr_uid != uid && error == 0)
			do_nocd = 1;
		error = 0;
		crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
		p->p_cred = newcr;
		newcr->cr_uid = uid;
		crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
		priv_reset_PA(newcr, B_FALSE);
		mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
		if (do_nocd) {
			mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
			p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
			mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
		}
		crset(p, newcr);	/* broadcast to process threads */
		return (0);
	}

	crfree(newcr);
	crfree(cr);
	if (ksp != NULL)
		ksid_rele(ksp);
	return (set_errno(error));
}

/*
 * Buy-back from SunOS 4.x
 *
 * Like setuid() and seteuid() combined -except- that non-root users
 * can change cr_ruid to cr_uid, and the semantics of cr_suid are
 * subtly different.
 */
int
setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
{
	proc_t *p;
	int error = 0;
	int do_nocd = 0;
	int uidchge = 0;
	uid_t oldruid = ruid;
	cred_t *cr, *newcr;
	zoneid_t zoneid = getzoneid();
	ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
	zone_t	*zone = crgetzone(CRED());

	if ((ruid != -1 && !VALID_UID(ruid, zone)) ||
	    (euid != -1 && !VALID_UID(euid, zone)))
		return (set_errno(EINVAL));

	if (euid != -1 && euid > MAXUID) {
		if (ksid_lookupbyuid(zone, euid, &ksid) != 0)
			return (set_errno(EINVAL));
		ksp = &ksid;
	} else {
		ksp = NULL;
	}

	/*
	 * Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
	 * the p_crlock mutex.
	 */
	newcr = cralloc_ksid();

	p = ttoproc(curthread);

retry:
	mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry_locked:
	crhold(cr = p->p_cred);
	mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);

	if (ruid != -1 && ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_uid &&
	    secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, ruid, B_FALSE) != 0) {
		mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
		crfree(cr);
		if (cr != p->p_cred)
			goto retry_locked;
		error = EPERM;
	} else if (euid != -1 &&
	    euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_uid &&
	    euid != cr->cr_suid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, euid, B_FALSE)) {
		mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
		crfree(cr);
		if (cr != p->p_cred)
			goto retry_locked;
		error = EPERM;
	} else {
		mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
		crfree(cr);
		if (cr != p->p_cred)
			goto retry_locked;
		if (!uidchge && ruid != -1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) {
			/*
			 * The ruid of the process is going to change. In order
			 * to avoid a race condition involving the
			 * process-count associated with the newly given ruid,
			 * we increment the count before assigning the
			 * credential to the process.
			 * To do that, we'll have to take pidlock, so we first
			 * release p_crlock.
			 */
			mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
			uidchge = 1;
			mutex_enter(&pidlock);
			upcount_inc(ruid, zoneid);
			mutex_exit(&pidlock);
			/*
			 * As we released p_crlock we can't rely on the cr
			 * we read. So retry the whole thing.
			 */
			goto retry;
		}
		crhold(cr);
		crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
		p->p_cred = newcr;

		if (euid != -1) {
			newcr->cr_uid = euid;
			crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
		}
		if (ruid != -1) {
			/* Remove the PRIV_PFEXEC, we changed the real uid. */
			if (uidchge)
				CR_FLAGS(newcr) &= ~PRIV_PFEXEC;

			oldruid = newcr->cr_ruid;
			newcr->cr_ruid = ruid;
			ASSERT(ruid != oldruid ? uidchge : 1);
		}
		/*
		 * "If the real uid is being changed, or the effective uid is
		 * being changed to a value not equal to the real uid, the
		 * saved uid is set to the new effective uid."
		 */
		if (ruid != -1 ||
		    (euid != -1 && newcr->cr_uid != newcr->cr_ruid))
			newcr->cr_suid = newcr->cr_uid;
		/*
		 * A process that gives up its privilege
		 * must be marked to produce no core dump.
		 */
		if ((cr->cr_uid != newcr->cr_uid ||
		    cr->cr_ruid != newcr->cr_ruid ||
		    cr->cr_suid != newcr->cr_suid))
			do_nocd = 1;

		priv_reset_PA(newcr, ruid != -1 && euid != -1 && ruid == euid);
		crfree(cr);
	}
	mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);

	/*
	 * We decrement the number of processes associated with the oldruid
	 * to match the increment above, even if the ruid of the process
	 * did not change or an error occurred (oldruid == uid).
	 */
	if (uidchge) {
		ASSERT(oldruid != -1 && ruid != -1);
		mutex_enter(&pidlock);
		upcount_dec(oldruid, zoneid);
		mutex_exit(&pidlock);
	}

	if (error == 0) {
		if (do_nocd) {
			mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
			p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
			mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
		}
		crset(p, newcr);	/* broadcast to process threads */
		return (0);
	}
	crfree(newcr);
	if (ksp != NULL)
		ksid_rele(ksp);
	return (set_errno(error));
}