--- a/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.1-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/e_pk11_pub.c Wed Oct 12 06:26:22 2016 -0700
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,3274 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
- *
- */
-
-/* crypto/engine/e_pk11_pub.c */
-/*
- * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
- * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
- *
- * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
- * Afchine Madjlessi.
- */
-/*
- * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * [email protected].
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson ([email protected]).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <strings.h>
-
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/dso.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
-#include <libgen.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-#include <security/pkcs11.h>
-#include "e_pk11.h"
-#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
-
-static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
-extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
-
-/*
- * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the
- * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent.
- */
-char *passphrasedialog;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* RSA stuff */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- const RSA *rsa);
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
-
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-
-static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
-#endif
-
-/* DSA stuff */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
-static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
-static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA *dsa);
-static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
- BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
- BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-
-static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
-#endif
-
-/* DH stuff */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
-static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
-static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
-static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
- const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
- BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
-
-static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
-#endif
-
-static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
-static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
- CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
-static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
-
-static int pk11_pkey_meth_nids[] = {NID_dsa};
-
-/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
-#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
-static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
-#else
-static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11
- * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if
- * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list
- * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from
- * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the
- * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to
- * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy().
- * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY.
- */
-#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
- { \
- if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
- { \
- var = CK_TRUE; \
- if (unlock) \
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
- goto label; \
- } \
- }
-
-/*
- * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
- * entry otherwise return NULL.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry;
-
- for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
- if (entry->h == h)
- return (entry);
-
- return (NULL);
- }
-
-/*
- * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
- * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
- * failure.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-int
-pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-
- if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- /* search for entry in the active list */
- if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
- entry->refcnt++;
- else
- {
- /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
- entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
- if (entry == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (-1);
- }
- entry->h = h;
- entry->refcnt = 1;
- entry->prev = NULL;
- entry->next = NULL;
- /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
- if (active_list[type] == NULL)
- active_list[type] = entry;
- else /* make the entry first in the list */
- {
- entry->next = active_list[type];
- active_list[type]->prev = entry;
- active_list[type] = entry;
- }
- }
-
- return (entry->refcnt);
- }
-
-/*
- * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-void
-pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *prev_entry;
-
- /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
- if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
- {
- prev_entry->next = entry->next;
- if (entry->next != NULL)
- entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
- }
- else
- {
- active_list[type] = entry->next;
- /* we were the first but not the only one */
- if (entry->next != NULL)
- entry->next->prev = NULL;
- }
-
- /* sanitization */
- entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- entry->prev = NULL;
- entry->next = NULL;
- OPENSSL_free(entry);
- }
-
-/* Free all entries from the active list. */
-void
-pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry;
-
- /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
- switch (type)
- {
- case OP_RSA:
- case OP_DSA:
- case OP_DH:
- break;
- default:
- return;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
- while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
- pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
- }
-
-/*
- * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
- * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
- *
- * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
- * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
- *
- * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
- * held.
- */
-int
-pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
- {
- PK11_active *entry = NULL;
-
- if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
- entry->refcnt--;
- if (entry->refcnt == 0)
- {
- pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
- return (1);
- }
-
- return (0);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
- {
- "PKCS#11 RSA method",
- pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
- pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
- pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
- pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
- NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
- NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
- pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
- pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
- RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
- NULL, /* app_data */
- pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
- pk11_RSA_verify, /* rsa_verify */
- /* Internal rsa_keygen will be used if this is NULL. */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
- };
-
-RSA_METHOD *
-PK11_RSA(void)
- {
- return (&pk11_rsa);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
- {
- "PKCS#11 DSA method",
- pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
- NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
- pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
- NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
- NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
- pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
- pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL /* app_data */
- };
-
-DSA_METHOD *
-PK11_DSA(void)
- {
- return (&pk11_dsa);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/*
- * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
- * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
- * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
- * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
- * enough.
- */
-#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
-
-/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
- {
- "PKCS#11 DH method",
- pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
- pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
- NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
- pk11_DH_init, /* init */
- pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL, /* app_data */
- NULL /* generate_params */
- };
-
-DH_METHOD *
-PK11_DH(void)
- {
- return (&pk11_dh);
- }
-#endif
-
-/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-
-/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
-#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
-#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/*
- * Similar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
- * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
- * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
- * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-err:
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
- * should be caught in the padding functions
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
-err:
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f;
- int j, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- BN_init(&f);
-
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-
- if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes
- */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
- PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
- PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-
- /*
- * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
- * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
- if (buf[j] != 0)
- break;
-
- p = buf + j;
- j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f;
- int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- BN_init(&f);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes
- */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
- PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* PK11 functions are called here */
- r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
-
- /*
- * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
- * Needs to skip these 0's here
- */
- for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
- if (buf[i] != 0)
- break;
-
- p = buf + i;
- i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
- break;
- default:
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return (r);
- }
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
- * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
- PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
- PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
- retval = bytes_encrypted;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
- * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
- PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
- rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- retval = ul_sig_len;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
- * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
- retval = bytes_decrypted;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
- * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
- * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
- const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
- {
- CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
- int retval = -1;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
- p_mech, h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
- PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (-1);
- }
- retval = bytes_decrypted;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
- * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
- */
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
- * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
- * structures.
- */
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
- * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
- * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
- */
-static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
- {
- X509_SIG sig;
- ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i, j;
- unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR algor;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned long ulsiglen;
-
- /* Encode the digest */
- /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
- PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
- s = (unsigned char *)m;
- }
- else
- {
- sig.algor = &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
- goto err;
- }
- parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-
- sig.digest = &digest;
- sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
- sig.digest->length = m_len;
-
- i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
- }
-
- j = RSA_size(rsa);
- if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p = s;
- (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ulsiglen = j;
- rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
- (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
- *siglen = ulsiglen;
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- const RSA *rsa)
- {
- X509_SIG sig;
- ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i, j;
- unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR algor;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Encode the digest */
- /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
- s = (unsigned char *)m;
- }
- else
- {
- sig.algor = &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
- goto err;
- }
- parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
- sig.digest = &digest;
- sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
- sig.digest->length = m_len;
- i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
- }
-
- j = RSA_size(rsa);
- if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p = s;
- (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
- rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
- (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
- {
- (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-#define MAXATTR 1024
-/*
- * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
- * PKCS#11 token.
- */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- FILE *privkey;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
- const char *file;
- int ret;
- pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
- CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR];
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-
- /* We look for private keys only. */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
- {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
- {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
- };
-
- /*
- * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
- * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
- * never ask for private components.
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
- };
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- /*
- * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in
- * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in
- * the 'privkey_id' parameter.
- */
- ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
-
- if (ret == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */
- if (ret == 1)
- {
- if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
- search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-
- if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
- &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
- * if we can't find it.
- */
- if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
- &ks_key) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
- * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find
- * is done.
- */
- pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
-
- /*
- * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to
- * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL
- * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate
- * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used
- * many times. We do not check the return value because even in
- * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports
- * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
-
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
- /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
- sp->persistent = CK_TRUE;
-
- if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
- get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now
- * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons.
- */
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
-
- /*
- * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take
- * care of handle management ourselves.
- */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
-
- /*
- * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
- * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
- */
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
- /*
- * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
- * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
- * in the keystore.
- */
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
- {
- pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- (void) fclose(privkey);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- if (rsa != NULL)
- {
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp,
- rsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (pkey);
-err:
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- return (pkey);
- }
-
-/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- FILE *pubkey;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- PK11_SESSION *sp;
- /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */
- int ret;
- const char *file;
- pkcs11_uri uri_struct;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE;
- CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)},
- {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)},
- {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
- };
-
- /*
- * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
- * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
- {
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */
- };
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file);
-
- if (ret == 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (ret == 1)
- {
- if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object;
- search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
-
- if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
- &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
- &ks_key) == 0)
- {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field
- * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done.
- */
- pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0);
- /*
- * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
- * structure. No cache hit is possible.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
-
- if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
- get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
- */
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
-
- /*
- * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export
- * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
- */
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
- attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
-
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Create a session object from it so that when calling
- * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
- * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
- * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
- * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
- * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
- * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
- * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
- * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
- * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
- */
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
- {
- pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- (void) fclose(pubkey);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- if (rsa != NULL)
- {
- /*
- * This will always destroy the RSA
- * object since we have a new RSA
- * structure here.
- */
- (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp,
- rsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp);
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- }
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
- return (pkey);
-err:
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
- return (pkey);
- }
-
-/*
- * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the
- * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and
- * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new
- * session object is created and put also onto the active object list.
- *
- * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in
- * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- int i;
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
- if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
-
- a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
- a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
- if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e'
- * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference
- * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be
- * NULL here.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
-pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- int i;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
-
- /*
- * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
- };
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- /* Put the private key components into the template */
- if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
- &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
- &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
- &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
- &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
- &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
- &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
- &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
- &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
- /*
- * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL.
- * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can
- * use only public components for searching for the private key handle.
- */
- if (rsa->d == NULL)
- {
- ul_key_attr_count = 8;
- /*
- * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
- * session keys.
- */
- a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- /*
- * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we
- * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was
- * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key
- * types we just create a new session key using the private
- * components from the RSA structure.
- */
- if (rsa->d == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private
- * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we
- * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented
- * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it
- * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no
- * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read
- * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage.
- */
- if (rsa->d != NULL)
- {
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-
- /*
- * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
- * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
- * 'n'/'e' components as well.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
- sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- /*
- * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
- * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
- */
- for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
- a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
- * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
- * cache miss.
- */
-static int
-pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
- * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
- * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
- *
- * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
- * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
- * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
- * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
- * both data signing and verifying.
- */
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
- {
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- return (1);
- else
- /*
- * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA
- * structure with potentially existing private key
- * object. We can just create a public object and move
- * on with this session structure.
- */
- return (0);
- }
-
- /*
- * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
- * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss,
- * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for
- * cache miss.
- */
-static int
-pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA
- * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
- * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component
- * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are
- * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub()
- * about why we compare the handle as well.
- */
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 &&
- BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0)
- {
- if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- return (1);
- else
- /*
- * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA
- * structure with potentially existing public key
- * object. We can just create a private object and move
- * on with this session structure.
- */
- return (0);
- }
-
- /*
- * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously
- * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
- (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/* The DSA function implementation */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-
-static DSA_SIG *
-pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
- {
- BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
- int i;
- DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
-
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
-
- /*
- * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
- * each is 20 bytes long
- */
- unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
- unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
- unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
-
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-
- if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
- if (dlen > i)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
- goto ret;
-
- (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
-
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
- if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
- pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
- &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
- &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
- rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
- (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
- goto ret;
- }
- }
-
-
- if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
- BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- dsa_sig->r = r;
- dsa_sig->s = s;
-
-ret:
- if (dsa_sig == NULL)
- {
- if (r != NULL)
- BN_free(r);
- if (s != NULL)
- BN_free(s);
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
- return (dsa_sig);
- }
-
-static int
-pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
- DSA *dsa)
- {
- int i;
- CK_RV rv;
- int retval = 0;
- CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
- CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
-
- unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
- unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
- unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
-
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-
- if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
-
- if (dlen > i)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
- PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
- goto ret;
-
- (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
-
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
- if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
- pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
- &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
- h_pub_key);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
- rv);
- goto ret;
- }
-
- /*
- * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
- * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
- * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
- */
- (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
- BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
- BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
- BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
- (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
- goto ret;
- }
- }
-
- retval = 1;
-ret:
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
- return (retval);
- }
-
-
-/*
- * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
- * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
- DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
- int i;
-
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
- {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
- {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
- };
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
- &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
- &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
- &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
- &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
- if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- if (key_ptr != NULL)
- *key_ptr = dsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
- * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
- */
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
- DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- int i;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
-
- /*
- * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys
- */
- CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
- {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
- {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
- {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
- };
-
- a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
- a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
-
- /* Put the private key components into the template */
- if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
- &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
- &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
- &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
- init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
- &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
- PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
- if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- if (key_ptr != NULL)
- *key_ptr = dsa;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-
-malloc_err:
- /*
- * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
- * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
- */
- for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
- {
- if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
- a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
- OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
- a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
- * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
- */
-static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
- * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
- * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
- (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
- {
- /*
- * We do not check the return value because even in case of
- * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
- * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
- * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
- */
-static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
- * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
- * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
- (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
- {
- /*
- * We do not check the return value because even in case of
- * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
- * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-#endif
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* The DH function implementation */
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
- {
- return (1);
- }
-
-/*
- * Generate DH key-pair.
- *
- * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
- * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
- * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
- * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
- * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
- */
-static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
- {
- CK_ULONG i;
- CK_RV rv, rv1;
- int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
- CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
-
- CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-
- CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
- {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}
- };
-
- CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
- {
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
- {
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
- if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
- {
- /*
- * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
- * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
- * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
- */
- pub_key_template[1].pValue =
- OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
- DH_BUF_RESERVE);
- if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
- }
- else
- goto err;
-
- pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
- if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
- {
- pub_key_template[2].pValue =
- OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
- DH_BUF_RESERVE);
- if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
- }
- else
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
- * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
- * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
- */
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
- &mechanism,
- pub_key_template,
- ul_pub_key_attr_count,
- priv_key_template,
- ul_priv_key_attr_count,
- &h_pub_key,
- &h_priv_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
- * should be sufficient for reuse.
- */
- if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
- {
- reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
- reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
- }
- else
- {
- reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
- reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
- pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
- rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
- {
- rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
- ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Reuse the memory allocated */
- pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
- pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
- pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
- {
- if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
- if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
- pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
- if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Reuse the memory allocated */
- priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
- priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
- {
- if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
- if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
- priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
- if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
-
- if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
- }
- }
-
- if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
- PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
- {
- if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
- pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
- DH *dh)
- {
- int i;
- CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-
- CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
- };
-
- CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
- {
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
- };
-
- CK_RV rv;
- int ret = -1;
- PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-
- if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
- priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-
- if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
- mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
- if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
-
- (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
-
- h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
- if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
- pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
- &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
-
- if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
- &mechanism,
- h_key,
- priv_key_template,
- ul_priv_key_attr_count,
- &h_derived_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
- goto err;
- }
- priv_key_result[0].pValue =
- OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
- if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
- priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
- * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
- */
- if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
- {
- /*
- * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
- * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
- * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
- * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
- * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
- * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
- * pre-master secret.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
- {
- if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
-
- (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
- priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
- ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
- }
-
-err:
-
- if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
- PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
- }
- }
- if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
- priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
- }
-
- if (mechanism.pParameter)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
- mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
- }
-
- pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
- return (ret);
- }
-
-
-static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
- DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
- CK_ULONG found;
- CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE;
- int i;
-
- CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
- {
- {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
- {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
- {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
- {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
- {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
- {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
- {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
- };
-
- key_template[0].pValue = &class;
- key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-
- key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
- key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
- if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
-
- key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
- key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
- if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
-
- key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
- key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
- (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
- if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto malloc_err;
- }
-
- BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
-
- /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
- ul_key_attr_count);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (found == 0)
- {
- rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
- key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
- if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rollback = CK_TRUE;
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
- KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err);
- if (key_ptr != NULL)
- *key_ptr = dh;
-
-err:
- if (rollback)
- {
- /*
- * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
- * since we are doing rollback.
- */
- if (found == 0)
- (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
- h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
- }
-
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-
-malloc_err:
- for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
- {
- if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
- key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return (h_key);
- }
-
-/*
- * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
- * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
- *
- * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
- * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
- */
-static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
- {
- /*
- * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
- * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
- * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
- * in PK11_SESSION structure.
- */
- if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
- (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
- {
- /*
- * We do not check the return value because even in case of
- * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
- * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
- * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
- */
- (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
- }
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Local function to simplify key template population
- * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
- */
-static int
-init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
- CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
- {
- CK_ULONG len;
-
- /*
- * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to
- * check that here than individually in the callers.
- */
- if (bn != NULL)
- len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-
- if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
- return (1);
-
- *ul_value_len = len;
- *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
- if (*p_value == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
-
- return (1);
- }
-
-static void
-attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
- {
- if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
- *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
- }
-
-/*
- * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or
- * if we find more objects based on the template we got.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 OK
- * 0 no object or more than 1 object found
- */
-static int
-find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
- {
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_ULONG objcnt;
-
- LOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
- if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
- PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
- if (rv != CKR_OK)
- {
- PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
- rv);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (objcnt > 1)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
- PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if (objcnt == 0)
- {
- PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
-
- (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
- return (1);
-err:
- UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op);
- return (0);
- }
-
-/*
- * OpenSSL 1.0.0 introduced ENGINE API for the PKEY EVP functions. Sadly,
- * "openssl dgst -dss1 ..." now uses a new function EVP_DigestSignInit() which
- * internally needs a PKEY method for DSA even when in the engine. So, to avoid
- * a regression when moving from 0.9.8 to 1.0.0, we use an internal OpenSSL
- * structure for the DSA PKEY methods to make it work. It is a future project to
- * make it work with HW acceleration.
- *
- * Note that at the time of 1.0.0d release there is no documentation as to how
- * the PKEY EVP functions are to be implemented in an engine. There is only one
- * engine shipped with 1.0.0d that uses the PKEY EVP methods, the GOST engine.
- * It was used as an example when fixing the above mentioned regression problem.
- */
-int
-pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids,
- int nid)
- {
- if (pmeth == NULL)
- {
- *nids = pk11_pkey_meth_nids;
- return (1);
- }
-
- switch (nid)
- {
- case NID_dsa:
- *pmeth = (EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)EVP_PKEY_meth_find(nid);
- return (1);
- }
-
- /* Error branch. */
- *pmeth = NULL;
- return (0);
- }
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */