components/quagga/patches/35-cve-2016-2342.patch
author Drew Fisher <drew.fisher@oracle.com>
Thu, 29 Sep 2016 08:21:19 -0700
branchs11u3-sru
changeset 7115 0c932cebfc40
parent 5801 96db4259786b
permissions -rw-r--r--
24737607 problem in PYTHON-MOD/DJANGO

The fix for this CVE is included in Quagga version 1.0 and later. This patch
may be removed when Quagga is upgraded to a version later than that. The patch
is the same as that submitted and subsequently committed to the code base,
except there is a one line modification to patch. In July 2015 the call to
decode_label was removed from the code base because it was useless. The
patch was changed to remove this line. The existence of the line prevented
the patch from applying as is. After the application of this patch the result
is the same as is currently available in the community code base.

From: Donald Sharp <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 16:54:45 +0000
Subject: bgpd: Fix VU#270232, VPNv4 NLRI parser memcpys to stack on unchecked length

Address CERT vulnerability report VU#270232, memcpy to stack data structure
based on length field from packet data whose length field upper-bound was
not properly checked.

This likely allows BGP peers that are enabled to send Labeled-VPN SAFI
routes to Quagga bgpd to remotely exploit Quagga bgpd.

Mitigation: Do not enable Labeled-VPN SAFI with untrusted neighbours.

Impact: Labeled-VPN SAFI is not enabled by default.

* bgp_mplsvpn.c: (bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4) The prefixlen is checked for
  lower-bound, but not for upper-bound against received data length.
  The packet data is then memcpy'd to the stack based on the prefixlen.

  Extend the prefixlen check to ensure it is within the bound of the NLRI
  packet data AND the on-stack prefix structure AND the maximum size for the
  address family.

Reported-by: Kostya Kortchinsky <[email protected]>

This commit a joint effort between:

Lou Berger <[email protected]>
Donald Sharp <[email protected]>
Paul Jakma <[email protected]> / <[email protected]>
---
diff --git bgpd/bgp_mplsvpn.c bgpd/bgp_mplsvpn.c
index a72d5ed..75c90cd 100644
--- bgpd/bgp_mplsvpn.c
+++ bgpd/bgp_mplsvpn.c
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer,
   pnt = packet->nlri;
   lim = pnt + packet->length;
 
+#define VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES (3 + 8) /* label + RD */
   for (; pnt < lim; pnt += psize)
     {
       /* Clear prefix structure. */
@@ -109,19 +110,38 @@ bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer,
 
       /* Fetch prefix length. */
       prefixlen = *pnt++;
-      p.family = AF_INET;
+      p.family = afi2family (packet->afi);
       psize = PSIZE (prefixlen);
 
-      if (prefixlen < 88)
-	{
-	  zlog_err ("prefix length is less than 88: %d", prefixlen);
-	  return -1;
-	}
+      /* sanity check against packet data */
+      if (prefixlen < VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8 || (pnt + psize) > lim)
+        {
+          zlog_err ("prefix length (%d) is less than 88"
+                    " or larger than received (%u)",
+                    prefixlen, (uint)(lim-pnt));
+          return -1;
+        }
+
+      /* sanity check against storage for the IP address portion */
+      if ((psize - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES) > (ssize_t) sizeof(p.u))
+        {
+          zlog_err ("prefix length (%d) exceeds prefix storage (%zu)",
+                    prefixlen - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8, sizeof(p.u));
+          return -1;
+        }
+
+      /* Sanity check against max bitlen of the address family */
+      if ((psize - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES) > prefix_blen (&p))
+        {
+          zlog_err ("prefix length (%d) exceeds family (%u) max byte length (%u)",
+                    prefixlen - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8, 
+                    p.family, prefix_blen (&p));
+          return -1;
 
-      label = decode_label (pnt);
+        }
 
       /* Copyr label to prefix. */
-      tagpnt = pnt;;
+      tagpnt = pnt;
 
       /* Copy routing distinguisher to rd. */
       memcpy (&prd.val, pnt + 3, 8);
@@ -140,8 +160,9 @@ bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer,
 	  return -1;
 	}
 
-      p.prefixlen = prefixlen - 88;
-      memcpy (&p.u.prefix, pnt + 11, psize - 11);
+      p.prefixlen = prefixlen - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES*8;
+      memcpy (&p.u.prefix, pnt + VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES, 
+              psize - VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES);
 
 #if 0
       if (type == RD_TYPE_AS)
@@ -152,9 +173,6 @@ bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer,
 		   rd_ip.val, inet_ntoa (p.u.prefix4), p.prefixlen);
 #endif /* 0 */
 
-      if (pnt + psize > lim)
-	return -1;
-
       if (attr)
 	bgp_update (peer, &p, attr, AFI_IP, SAFI_MPLS_VPN,
 		    ZEBRA_ROUTE_BGP, BGP_ROUTE_NORMAL, &prd, tagpnt, 0);
@@ -162,12 +180,12 @@ bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer,
 	bgp_withdraw (peer, &p, attr, AFI_IP, SAFI_MPLS_VPN,
 		      ZEBRA_ROUTE_BGP, BGP_ROUTE_NORMAL, &prd, tagpnt);
     }
-
   /* Packet length consistency check. */
   if (pnt != lim)
     return -1;
-
+  
   return 0;
+#undef VPN_PREFIXLEN_MIN_BYTES
 }
 
 int