components/unzip/patches/04_CVE-2014-9636.patch
author pkidd <patrick.kidd@oracle.com>
Wed, 22 Mar 2017 09:27:09 -0700
branchs11u3-sru
changeset 7792 ee802f9b5132
parent 5551 6d32c82eb4f5
permissions -rw-r--r--
Added tag 0.175.3.19.0.2.0, S11.3SRU19.2 for changeset d23f3837744d

Patch source: http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/download/file.php?id=95&sid=ec5c7dac6dd48459f3be4effa1a30945
More info: http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450

From a9bfab5b52d08879bbc5e0991684b700127ddcff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014
Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow

By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that
purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding
uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can
trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or
possibly have other unspecified impact.

This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the
"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match.

---
 extract.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2217,6 +2217,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si
     ulg eb_ucsize;
     uch *eb_ucptr;
     int r;
+    ush method;
 
     if (compr_offset < 4)                /* field is not compressed: */
         return PK_OK;                    /* do nothing and signal OK */
@@ -2226,6 +2227,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si
          eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
         return IZ_EF_TRUNC;               /* no compressed data! */
 
+    method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
+    if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize))
+	return PK_ERR;			  /* compressed & uncompressed
+					   * should match in STORED
+					   * method */
+
     if (
 #ifdef INT_16BIT
         (((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) ||