components/unzip/patches/04_CVE-2014-9636.patch
author Vladimir Marek <Vladimir.Marek@oracle.com>
Fri, 26 Feb 2016 15:01:20 +0100
changeset 5537 fb31633dac76
parent 4108 components/unzip/patches/CVE-2014-9636.patch@9738d7207050
permissions -rw-r--r--
22782878 The option -T (Test for Integrity/ on files named *.war fail

Patch source: http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/download/file.php?id=95&sid=ec5c7dac6dd48459f3be4effa1a30945
More info: http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450

From a9bfab5b52d08879bbc5e0991684b700127ddcff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014
Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow

By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that
purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding
uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can
trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or
possibly have other unspecified impact.

This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the
"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match.

---
 extract.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2217,6 +2217,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si
     ulg eb_ucsize;
     uch *eb_ucptr;
     int r;
+    ush method;
 
     if (compr_offset < 4)                /* field is not compressed: */
         return PK_OK;                    /* do nothing and signal OK */
@@ -2226,6 +2227,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si
          eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
         return IZ_EF_TRUNC;               /* no compressed data! */
 
+    method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
+    if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize))
+	return PK_ERR;			  /* compressed & uncompressed
+					   * should match in STORED
+					   * method */
+
     if (
 #ifdef INT_16BIT
         (((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) ||