Security fix, which we should be able to drop once it's packaged in a tarball

From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <[email protected]>

Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200

Subject: tknzr: support only max long rgb values

This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which

are longer than the support MAXLONG

---

 src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++

 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c

index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644

--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c

+++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c

@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)

         status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);

         ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));

+        if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {

+                status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;

+                goto error;

+        }

+

         red = num->val;

         cr_num_destroy (num);

         num = NULL;

@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)

                 status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);

                 ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));

+                if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {

+                        status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;

+                        goto error;

+                }

+

                 PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]);

                 if (next_bytes[0] == '%') {

                         SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1);

--